

THE U.S. POWER STRUCTURE AND THE MASS MEDIA

by

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by

Frank Spurgeon Morrow, Jr

1984

DEDICATED TO

My mother and father

Ethel and Frank Morrow

My son

Michael

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F.S.M.

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There are three basic approaches to the analysis of the U.S. power system. The Power Elitists say there is a small group of people, mainly from the corporate world, which controls the prime decision making positions of the economy and government and which receives the most benefits from the system. The Pluralists claim that power is diffused through many competing individuals and groups. Marxists have traditionally said that the economic system determines the power system, with the controllers of the means of production being the ruling class. They recently developed the concept of hegemony, a means by which the ruling class inculcates its values in the underclasses in order to maintain societal control.

A combination of the Power Elite and Marxist approaches most closely describes the reality of the U.S. power system. This ruling group, which is called the Ruling Cartel, controls the core economic organizations: the largest financial institutions and corporations. It

dominates the country's political institutions through a combination of holding the key decision making positions--regardless of administration, of financing political campaigns and by creating ruling consensus and policy formation through elite organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderbergers and Trilateral Commission. Idea and educational control is effected through an interlocking network of think tanks, foundations, corporations, universities and the government. Ideological control is maintained through many means, but particularly through the mass media. These also are dominated by the Ruling Cartel through the same mechanisms which are used to control the other institutions. Media content coincides with the range of respectable discourse within the Ruling Cartel itself, thereby shielding the American people from knowing the realities of the nation's power system. Thus, ruling class hegemony is maintained.

However, if public access TV is allowed to proliferate and grow, it has the potential to play a significant contributory role in the production of a greater variety of media content. It can be particularly useful in conjunction with the efforts of individuals and groups which are trying to change or modify the existing power relationships in the country. The success of an alternative news magazine show

on the public access channel in Austin, Texas, is an example of what can be accomplished in presenting information and opinions which are outside the hegemonic range of the Establishment media.

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VITA

Frank Spurgeon Morrow, Jr., was born in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, May 17, 1933, the son of Frank Spurgeon Morrow and Ethel Goodfellow Morrow. Graduating in 1951 from Central High School in Tulsa, Oklahoma, he entered the University of Tulsa on a full, four-year radio scholarship. While attending school he worked full time at various radio stations as announcer, disc jockey and newsperson. He also appeared in many plays, won a city oration contest, and was narrator for the Tulsa Easter Pageant. He received his B.A. in radio and speech in 1955 and worked on an M.A. in history (received in 1968). He entered the Navy in 1957 and served as a communications intelligence officer and Russian linguist for sixteen years, living and travelling in four continents. He left the Navy in 1973 to attend The University of Texas at Austin, and since then has been promoted to captain in the Naval Reserve. Since October, 1978, he has produced a weekly, sixty-minute alternative news magazine program on the public access channel of the Austin cable system. The program has received national and international notice.

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1.1 PURPOSE

Much of social science is based on observing phenomena and making so called "objective" conclusions. Next, theories are developed which are used to understand and explain the world and its inhabitants and to lay foundations for further research. However, most of this research in the U.S. is seriously deficient, in that it either does not question or tacitly accepts the basic nature and assumptions of Western capitalist society and the power structures which support it and which provide the mechanisms for social control. Without the description and function of the American power structure the nature of the world cannot be clearly ascertained; and without such a picture, social science theory and research is sadly incomplete, even irrelevant in our complex society.

This dissertation is an attempt to lay a foundation for

research into social science, particularly regarding the mass media. I will try to describe the American power structure and to ascertain the place and role of the mass media within it. It is very a difficult task for many reasons. First, complete information is not easy to find. Secrecy is a very important part of the maintenance of power and control. Second, social scientists generally do not seem desirous of studying the subject. Third, the super-rich and powerful do not wish that the American people discover how the system is run. And, fourth, the subject is very complex, requiring vast interdisciplinary knowledge.

There are two other reasons for writing on this subject. Assuming that the information contained herein is disseminated more widely, it can serve to open the eyes of the American people as to how their economic and political system really works and the role the mass media play in this. Next, it is hoped that by pointing out the availability of the public access channels of the cable television systems in the country, people might be able to confront the power of the Establishment media monopoly and communicate more directly with each other, thereby democratizing the media to some extent and effecting some degree of delegitimation of the traditional media in the process.

This does not mean that all the relevant information and all the definitive answers are here. But this dissertation does provide a framework within which we can better understand U.S. history, contemporary events and the people who are the primary actors. I believe that, after reading the following pages, world events will make more sense.

1.2 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

There are many aspects of the nature of the American power system and the mass media within it which will be explored, and the following propositions will be used as guides during the course of this dissertation:

1. There is a ruling class in the United States which has a disproportionate amount of the country's wealth and income and which strategically places a disproportionate number of people in the prime political and economic decision making positions in the nation.
2. This ruling class maintains its control over the country through economic, political and social

institutions, using its own members as well as others it selects as key decision makers, forming what could be termed the American "Ruling Cartel."

1. Control over the nation's economy is effected mainly through the giant Rockefeller-Morgan insurance companies and transnational banks in an intricate web of mechanisms such as stock ownership, interlocking directorates and control of corporate debt.
2. Political control is maintained primarily through covert and semi-covert political organizations (such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderbergers and the Trilateral Commission), and overt organizations and structures such as the U.S. Executive Branch, regulatory agencies, the Federal Reserve System and the police, military and intelligence organizations.
3. Ideological hegemony over the masses is sustained through Ruling Cartel control of the mass media and of the education and idea development systems.
4. The prime people in the Ruling Cartel are aware of the twin problems of the contradictions of capitalism and

its incompatibility with democracy, and that therefore they must constantly be vigilant to the struggles of the people which could undermine Cartel control and the profitability of the system.

5. The mass media are also owned and controlled by the Ruling Cartel through the use of the same methods as are employed with the other major large business institutions.
6. The U.S. mass media perform two basic power functions: the maintenance of Ruling Cartel hegemony and the legitimation of the system in the eyes of the people. This is accomplished through the following:

1. The true nature and operation of the U.S. power system are hidden and obfuscated.
2. Through censorship and distortion of data only a narrow range of opinion and information is presented (corresponding to the range of "legitimate" democratic activity allowed within the existing two-party system), or, if any information is presented counter to the existing system, it is done in a distorted and uncomplimentary fashion.
3. Alternative ways of organizing and running society are either not provided or are scorned

or dismissed out-of-hand.

7. Control of the mass media is maintained through, (a) concentration of ownership at national, regional and local levels; (b) through political activity in Congress, in the courts and in the Federal Communications Commission; and (c) the nature of the mass media being capitalist enterprises with the attendant requirements of profits, ratings and advertisers.
8. Specific methods used to limit information and opinions are gatekeeping, agenda setting, kingmaking, bias and censorship, including self-censorship of suitably socialized staffs.
9. Press and political activity of an alternative nature are either crippled or maintained in a position of non-threatening influence through a combination of economic starvation, police and political repression, and a lack of direct access to a mass audience.
10. The interconnectedness of the above propositions is shown by the final proposition:
 1. Economic power is the basis for political power.
 2. Economic concentration of ownership and control

is the basis for concentrated political power.

3. Concentration of ownership of the mass media facilitates content control.
4. The capitalist nature of the mass media system also limits the range of possible discourse in the media.
5. Mass media control causes content to be distorted, biased and censored, producing a limited range of information which is aimed at supporting and legitimating the system and continuing Ruling Class hegemony.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THEORY

Every people is governed by an elite, according to Pareto (Garson 1977, 32-36)¹. Yet, the power structure in nations has not been the subject of exhaustive analysis as has other aspects of human social behavior. Most of these studies have been purely theoretical. There has been considerable data produced in the U.S. which could be used for the study of the U.S. power structure, but the material has rarely been employed in an attempt to formulate a

comprehensive description of the power structure, and these studies have been made only in the last half of the Twentieth Century.

Perhaps the earliest writing on power comes from the 14th Century Arab, Ibn Saud. The earliest work which had the greatest impact in the West was that of Machiavelli (Skinner 1981). He was the first to make a completely amoral, realistic description of how a strong leader should run his state, using all his nakedly brutal power to achieve his ends. But he also wrote about how a pluralistic republic could best be organized and run so as to preserve freedom and maintain a vigorous government and body politic. Finally he noted the tensions which developed when powerful rulers and nobles would try to maintain their positions and privileges while the people struggled against being dominated.

With the rise of capitalism Marx offered a new perspective on the use of power: economic determinism, indicating that it is the economic nature of capitalism, and the capitalist ownership class which controls the system, which provide the basis for power and the people who run the economic-political system. The state is run and for their benefit and it is their ideas and culture which are hegemonic.

Lenin (Menshikov 1969) developed Marx' ideas further, making them more complex and introducing empirical observations about the nature of the capitalist ruling class, such as information about the Rockefellers and Morgans in the U.S.. He argues that the capitalist state's democratic political forms are a manipulatable facade shielding a repressive core controlled by the ruling class. Therefore, true democracy cannot be achieved within such a structure.

At the turn of the century and into the 1920s Thorstein Veblen (1948), an economist but drawing from all fields of study, contributed to both economic theory and power studies. Particularly important was his Theory of the Leisure Class which links his economic and political thinking. It describes the way the upper class (of the business-power group) lived and conspicuously displayed its wealth. He then shows how the lower classes identified with the upper class and tried to emulate it, thereby producing social cohesion and control. Veblen's Absentee Ownership comprehensively describes the business system and its use of power.

Also, in the early 1900s various federal governmental investigating bodies--particularly the Pujo Commission (US Congress 1913)--Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (1914) and

the proponent of the Trust System, John Moody (1904), looked at the U.S. economic system empirically, showing how, through stock ownership and interlocking directorates, the U.S. economy was controlled by an integrated, cooperating economic elite. These data, however, were not used as a basis for a framework to show the total economic-political system in the country.

Meanwhile, non-Marxist political theorists began formulating a position labelled "elite theory," which stated that, regardless of the type of political or economic system which is extant, a few powerful people still would run things. Some of the contributors to this approach, such as Mosca and Pareto, used the theory to glorify the elites as the ideal medium to keep the state out of the hands of the dumb, crude masses (or the scoundrel demagogue around whom the populace would rally.) Ironically, Mosca and Pareto were warm supporters of Mussolini.

American supporters of the elite theory tried to inject a small degree of democratic influence into the process. Although Ortega y Gasset advised against democratic participation, he called for the elites to be democratically influenced by the needs of the masses.

Schumpeter was less democratic: the role of the citizens should simply be to accept their elite leaders, who

needed to be insulated from the masses. Elections should be between competing sets of elites which in turn would govern with a minimum degree of accountability.

Weber developed the elite theory further by analyzing the sociological nature of power. He concluded that the people from the dominant groups tend to form "collegial bodies" where consensus is reached, adjustments are made, conflicts are resolved and bodies are established to supervise the operation of the political economy.

In the U.S., Lasswell wrote several books about power and elites, but these were all of a purely theoretical nature containing interesting insights, but mainly irrelevant to the task of bringing to light the who-what-where-when-how and why of power in the U.S.. Lasswell (1958) did make an analysis of the use of symbols and ideology used by the dominant elites to keep the masses under control. But, again, this was theoretical.

Meanwhile, economists were addressing the question of control of the corporation. With the destruction of competitive capitalism and its replacement by a system of giant combinations and trusts as the dominant economic institutions, the answer to the question "who controls?" acquired great importance. Earlier, Marx (Menshikov 1969) said that, with the development of the joint-stock company,

management would become divorced from both ownership and financial control and that the financiers would become dominant. Tawney believed that the managers--the creative force in the corporation--would not tolerate exploitation and domination by the financial controllers, and they would achieve ascendancy. Berle and Means (1932) also were alarmed about the revolution which had come to capitalism: the divorce between ownership and management in the light of the amassing of the great concentration of wealth and economic control. They also showed that through various legal devices and stock ownership, corporations could be controlled by management. Burnham agreed that the managers had become preeminent, an assertion echoed later by Galbraith (1968) who argued that the real power lies with the managers and technical staffs, because they have the technological knowledge and ability. The boards of directors are therefore anachronisms and impotent.

This led to further studies by economists trying to indicate how many of the largest corporations are management-controlled, director-controlled or family-controlled. Making an arbitrary cutoff point of stock ownership percentage, they try to estimate which corporations fall into which category, and then they draw conclusions about the control of the U.S. corporate system

at large. Larner (1966) is a good example of such an author. Herman (1981) is the latest to use this method. These writers invariably come to the conclusion that ownership is not very concentrated and that most of the industry in the U.S. is management-controlled.

Others have taken a more comprehensive approach, using not only stock ownership, but also family ties (occasionally), interlocking directorates and relationships with other economic institutions. The Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) studies of the 1930s and 1940s are preeminent (Thorpe and Crowder 1941; US Congress 1941; Securities and Exchange Commission (1941); Sweezy (1939); Chevalier (1969); Fitch and Oppenheimer (1970a, 1970b, 1970c; and Lundberg (1968, 1975, 1976) also made contributions. John Blair (1972) made a comprehensive study of economic concentration. The Congressional investigations in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly those of Representative Patman (US Congress 1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1966b, 1967a, 1968), Senator Muskie (US Congress 1973, 1974c, 1977) and Senator Metcalf (US Congress 1978b, 1978c), are continuations of the tradition of the studies at the turn of the century. These show the domination of the economy by a few giant institutional investors.

An approach to studying power which gained great

popularity in the 1950s was called group theory, which evolved into the pluralist theory. Started by David Truman in 1951, it claimed that politics was a result of the activity of special interest groups bargaining and applying pressure on the governmental process. By compromise and accomodation, the various groups would be able to achieve some of their goals. Pluralism gained its main adherents in the political science community. This approach specifically eschewed elite theory and either ignored or downplayed the importance of economics. Dahl (1961) is the prime pluralist, especially for community power studies. Rose (1967) wrote a book using the pluralist perspective in an analysis of power in the U.S. at the national level.

What is obvious by now is that we have been talking about researchers observing and theorizing about two phenomena: economic control and political control. No one had looked at both together in a comprehensive way at the national level, particularly from the total sociological point of view. Yet, studies of community power had been conducted using this method, starting in the 1920s by the Lynds (1929, 1937). It is in the studies of the local power structures that elite and pluralist theories received their earliest, most comprehensive analyses, with the sociologists on one side espousing the elite approach and the political

scientists using the pluralist perspective (Hawley and Svara 1972). Hunter's (1956) book on Atlanta is the classic from the elite point of view, and Dahl's (1961) study of New Haven is the best of the pluralist perspective.

It was not until C. Wright Mills wrote the Power Elite (1956) that an extensive, comprehensive empirical view of both the economic and political aspects of power in the U.S. was made. Hunter (1959) completed a study three years later which showed that the top economic elites knew each other and worked together when necessary to achieve economic and political goals.

1.4 SPECIFIC CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POWER

1.4.1 MILLS AND THE POWER ELITE

Before C. Wright Mills shocked the Establishment, there had been general speculation about such an elite for many years, but no one had followed up on it.² Mills' Power Elite is a ruling group of economic, political, social and military interlocks which is comprised of a few of the most wealthy people and a small number of politicians, celebrities, high corporate executives and top military

officers. This group controls the mainsprings of wealth and power in the country and maintains its control and effects its regeneration in several ways. True democracy is a carefully nurtured myth, leaving the people almost a helpless mass, mere observers of the secondary levels of power--the legislative bodies.

1.4.2 DOMHOFF AND THE GOVERNING CLASS

When the Power Elite caused such a furor, Domhoff (1968) defended Mills. He also wrote other books (1967, 1971, 1979) to provide more empirical evidence than Mills did, and he modified and extended the power elite theory. Domhoff's conclusion is that there is a governing class in the U.S. which is composed of a social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of the country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of the nation's income and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision making groups of the country. Domhoff recognizes that our democracy exists within the range of differences of opinion among the members of the ruling class. Indeed, democracy cannot work without such differences of opinion, no matter how narrow. Even though the upper class is not monolithic or omnipotent,

pluralist activity is dominated by members of the American upper class and generally stays within limits set by the ruling class. Although the upper class has its antagonisms--mainly ethnic, religious, and new-rich versus old-rich--it is knitted together by such mechanisms as stockownership, trust funds, intermarriages, private schools, exclusive clubs and summer resorts, various social functions, elite political organizations and interlocking corporate boards of directors.

Whereas Mills pictured the people as an almost voiceless, faceless mass, Domhoff, Weinstein (1968), Aronowitz (1973) and Miliband (1969) see the people as being able to wrest some gains from the ruling class, but only after considerable struggle because they are without primary power to implement their desires or to fulfill their needs directly. Although the ruling class responds to these pressures from below, it still controls the institutions of power, and through a combination of propaganda, cooptation, and force and by providing enough positive responses to the popular ferment, it is able to contain the people's aspirations. Meanwhile, the rulers make sure that their dominant position is not seriously challenged and that whatever gains are made by the masses do not come at significant expense to the controlling elite. The latter

uses any degree of legal and illegal power and force necessary to deal effectively with dissidents, particularly those working "outside the system," i.e., outside of the ruling class range of approved opinion and of the political and economic institutions controlled by the power structure (Wolfe 1973).

The pluralists, particularly Rose (1967), tried to answer the Domhoff-Mills thesis, but the realities exposed by the Johnson-Nixon years caused the prime pluralists to admit that their position was only an illusory goal, not a reality. ³ Additionally, studies such as those made by Knowles (1973) provided incontrovertible evidence of an interconnected power group of upper class individuals and families which, both individually and through their institutions, control the main economic and political institutions in the U.S..

1.4.3 MARXIAN APPROACHES

Meanwhile, the Marxists have been developing their theories of power and the state. There are several varieties. The instrumentalist approach, as represented by Miliband, is similar to that of Domhoff but in a Marxian economic and class perspective. Another analysis is the

4

structuralist (Gold, Ló and Wright 1975). Adherents to this point of view see the functions of the state as being determined by societal class and economic structures. They say that the state is a medium through which the contradictions of capitalism can be controlled in order to maintain the existence of the state and the system. It is important to the rulers that the working class is atomized and favorably indoctrinated so that the basic capitalist contradictions are not apparent and so that the workers will not develop a unity which could threaten capitalist control. Therefore, the state must function independently to a degree, not just as a simple capitalist tool, because the ruling class itself is not completely united, having factions following their own self-interests which the state must mediate. The degree of state autonomy depends on the degree of internal divisiveness of the ruling class as a whole and upon the nature and degree of the cohesiveness and struggle of the working class. Unlike the instrumentalists, the structuralists have almost eliminated conscious, autonomous action on the part of the capitalist ruling class, because it is forced to handle the continuous situations arising from the basic contradictions of capitalism itself.

5

The next school of thought is the Hegelian-Marxist. It

contains a higher level of abstraction than the other approaches, heavily relying on an analysis of hegemony, legitimacy, consciousness and ideology to determine the nature of capitalist domination of the state and the people. Specific decision making and the sociology of individual incumbents in particular positions and institutions are largely ignored.

Gold, Lo and Wright believe that all the above approaches are inadequate: the Instrumentalist because there is more to the state than the conscious decision making of ruling class office holders; the Structuralist because it does not explain the social mechanisms which produce a class policy that is compatible with the requirements of the system; and the Hegelian-Marxist, because it is too abstract for application to a specific situation and because it does not adequately consider the economic bases of Marxist theory.

More recent attempts at further analysis have been by Offe, Habermas (1973), O'Connor (1973) and Wolfe. They deal in different ways with what they call the legitimation crisis. The capitalist system must have accumulation (basically, producing an increasing amount of capital, or, more simply, increased profits) and legitimation (basically, mass loyalty and acceptance). To maintain security, harmony

and cooperation, the state must perform a mixture of repression and mystification. Being in control of the capitalist ruling class, the state naturally is also of prime significance in fostering accumulation. But because increased accumulation comes at the expense of the people, and because it becomes more and more apparent to the people that the state is not neutral or democratic but actively supports the ruling class, a legitimation crisis appears. People quit believing the myths and start seeing the reality. Ruling class hegemony is questioned.

Offe shows how the various selections processes take place to ensure that capitalist personnel, subjects and decisions are maintained. He looks at times of crisis when the inner mechanisms of the state and system are exposed, showing the contradictions of the system and the way the state handles them. Offe says that the state is incapable of handling all the contradictions as well as the assumption of a continuously growing role in the accumulation process.

O'Connor has developed a more empirical basis for the theory, based on the budget required by the state, particularly in the U.S.. In the accumulation process there are contradictions and incompatibilities among the three basic economic sectors of society: the monopolistic, the competitive and the state. Additionally, the state becomes

embroiled in various political alternatives, not only in trying to handle the above contradictions, but also in containing the struggles of the people. By doing so, the state itself becomes a target of discontent, which, because the state is so deeply involved with the entire economic system, causes the whole system to come under question.

Wolfe attempts to blend the Structuralist and the Hegelian-Marxist traditions. He states that politics is alienated from the people just as work is. There is a basic contradiction between "liberalism," which supports the governmental role in ensuring capitalist accumulation and control, and with "democracy," with its participatory and egalitarian facets. This also leads to the legitimation crisis. Wolfe also believes that the shape of the state is a result of class struggle.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS DISSERTATION

Each of these approaches has various aspects which seem to be pertinent in developing a theoretical framework for studying the U.S. power system and its mass media. All of them have something to contribute and are correct for

certain aspects of the study of power. Much of the time it is a matter of the micro or macro level and the degree of abstraction on which the analysis is based. It also depends on what part of the world, at what time in history and on what phenomena a particular writer is emphasizing.

The capitalist system must be considered before anything else, because that is the basis for everything else. Marx stated that the capitalist values and structures are dominant (just as "socialist" values are dominant in the Soviet Union). The dominant ruling institutions are capitalist and are controlled by the capitalist ruling class. Hegemony over the masses is maintained through a combination of repression and control over the prime media of knowledge and ideology, rendering anything to the contrary as not legitimate.

The power of the state is used primarily to support the capitalist process of accumulation and legitimation--creating in the masses an acceptance of the system. The primary function is control; with control, all else is much more simple. This is true whether we are looking at the top level of the state or at the stratum of monopolists trying to rationalize their business situations in order to maximize profits and to create a greater degree of certainty.

It is highly questionable that the state functions with the independence that the Structuralists claim. It is true that the state must contend with the populace at certain levels and in certain institutions, but most of the state apparatus is run by and for the capitalists and is either only slightly influenced by the people or is totally outside of the reach of the masses. Some of this is covert; some occurs overtly but without sufficient publicity or public knowledge, so that it operates in a semi-covert fashion; some functions are by law directly unreachable by the public; and other government operations, although ostensibly open to public influence are heavily stacked in favor of the capitalists. The greatest degree of seeming independence of the state occurs when the government is the arena for the struggles of factions within the ruling group itself and in the attempts of the rulers to handle the contradictions within the system, particularly the basic incompatibility between capitalism and democracy.

I will emphasize the instrumentalist approaches of Domhoff and Miliband, because that is where the real world operates and where the main gap lies between myth and relevant theory. It also is the main area where the greatest amount of empirical data must be developed and synthesized. It is from this analysis that we can see the

system at work.

There also is activity of a pluralist nature which goes on every day at a circumscribed, lower level of authority and control, but always under the watchful eye of the power structure at each level of activity. This is tolerated (even when opposed) by the ruling class and power elite at the local and national levels so long as it does not get into areas of basic control and direction and so long as it does not represent a serious, or potentially serious, challenge to the bases of the American capitalist system.

This pluralist activity is indispensable to the ruling class because it saves it the time and effort of performing some of the less significant, day-to-day details of the running of a complex society. Of prime significance is that it is a good way to focus the attention of the American people away from the basic centers of control and onto the noisy sideshow of lower levels of authority. It acts as a display piece to show the people that they do, indeed, live in a democratic society, thereby perpetuating the myths. It also is of significance in that, to realize any gains at all, the people must struggle mightily at this lower level of power, thereby dissipating time and energy which could be used for achieving more basic and permanent change. And, finally, it provides some of the mechanisms, not only

through which the differences within the capitalist class can be resolved, or at least accomodated, but also where the economic and political spoils can be fought over and divided by the capitalists themselves.

In all these functions the mass media play a critical role: setting the limits of "responsible" and "legitimate" debate; hiding the realities of how the country is run and the bases for the rulers' powers; focusing on the pluralistic activity in government; perpetuating the myths, including the one that the media are the watchdogs of the system; downgrading or ignoring the potential powers and some of the successful struggles of the people; not providing positive information about alternative ways of establishing and running a just, humane society; and, finally, hiding from the public the true ownership and control of the media themselves and their real function within the power structure.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

The study of power in the U.S. must be accomplished in an eclectic manner--fitting this study from this field with that study from another discipline, trying to put together

the most accurate picture possible. Therefore, the methodology utilized in this dissertation is mainly historical, seeing what has been said by many writers who used many methods. The sociology of leadership approach, which is used extensively by Domhoff, is relied on to a considerable degree.

Relevant information was sought in all fields which have touched on the subject: government, economics, sociology, history, communications and law. The sources range from professional journals to popular "men's magazines," from the Left Wing press to the Right Wing press, from the business press to small publications of local activist groups and from written sources to television programs--all the while keeping in mind the various theoretical approaches. I have tried to analyze the information and to synthesize the data into a comprehensive picture of what the American power structure seems to be and the place and role within it of the mass media. It is only after this has been accomplished that relevant theory development can begin. Without this large first step, we are working in a vacuum.

1.7 SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION MATERIAL

The main body of the dissertation contains a description of the American power structure, the place and role of the mass media in it and the nature and potential of an alternative communications medium--public access cable television. Chapter II provides an in-depth assessment of the economic, political and mass media bases of the American power structure. It starts with a description of the degree of economic concentration of ownership and control which exists in the U.S. today, showing the dense and complex interlocked nature of the system through such mechanisms as interlocking directorates, activities of the financial institutions, law firms and accounting companies, control of stocks and corporate debt and upper class family alliances. The results of this economic control are found in the concentration of the distribution of wealth and income in the country: the same individuals, families and institutions which are at the top of the controlling stratum of society also are the prime economic benefactors of the system.

Next is shown the various political organizations which the top power group--called the Ruling Cartel--uses to maintain control and to develop and effect policy. Of particular importance are the Council on Foreign Relations,

the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission. It is shown that, regardless of which administration is in power in the federal government, the key leaders and decision makers come from the same stratum of society and are generally either filtered through the elite organizations or are already significant participants in them.

The next step in control is in the determination of idea and culture formation. We see how the most significant foundations, think tanks and universities are firmly in Cartel control in an interlocking relationship, not only among themselves, but also with the government, military, the corporate world and the elite political organizations.

The mass media are an integral part of the Ruling Cartel, being owned and controlled in the same way as the other corporate giants. The economic and political relationships of the media with the government and the Cartel organizations are assessed.

In Chapter III we look extensively at the nature of the media ownership. The owners and managers are scrutinized from various aspects, including their place and function in the local power structures. The effects of media concentration in local monopoly and oligopoly situations are analyzed. The role of advertising is also looked at from this perspective, noting the contribution to further

economic concentration when wealthy, powerful corporations can monopolize or dominate the media advertising at the local and national levels, thereby either limiting or destroying competition. Finally, we assess the role of the government--the Federal Communications Commission and other regulatory agencies, Congress, the President, the courts and antitrust activities.

Media content is the focus of Chapter IV. First is a discussion of the role of the media in maintaining ruling class hegemony. Then various corporate and individual sources are described which influence media content, such as profit requirements, corporate structure and decision making. Individual influences on content are also noted. Social control in the newsroom is analyzed, followed by a discussion of bias and censorship. Finally, a macro view of content is made which shows two basic phenomena. The first is that an opinion and information range is presented on the Establishment media which normally corresponds to that found within the ruling class itself. Anything outside of this spectrum is either ignored or slandered as being "radical." The other media phenomenon is that the reality of the US power system is not presented. The elite Cartel organizations and how they operate in society in their total framework are never revealed on television or in the

newspapers or magazines.

Public access to the mass media is the focus of Chapter V. We chronicle the history of the long struggle of people and organizations to gain an audience via the media and the response of the government to these efforts, either by thwarting them or weakening them. Also noted is the governmental role performed by the police agencies, such as in the FBI's COINTELPRO operation against the dissident press. Public access on cable TV is discussed, particularly its revolutionary, experimental nature which could present a potential threat to the existing Establishment media if access is allowed to develop freely and if the people use the new medium to its fullest capability. Realizing the potential of the new medium, attacks are being made on access by politicians, the courts, governmental bodies and the cable industry at both the national and local levels.

Finally, in this chapter an example of an extremely successful access program is noted--a weekly alternative news magazine show in Austin, Texas. The large audience elicited by this program in the city and the positive reaction received, not just in Austin, but in many parts of the country and even in Europe, indicate that a large number of people are eager to receive information which is not found in the traditional media.

Chapter VI is an interpretive section of the material previously presented. The problems of maintaining control of society by the Cartel are analyzed, pointing out the many instabilities in the system and "leaks" in the framework of control where the struggles of the people can fruitfully take place. The divisions and instabilities within the international capitalist system itself also create problems of control. The role of the mass media in the US in maintaining ruling class hegemony is also made difficult by trying to live up to their self-proclaimed myth of being "objective" and performing the role of watchdog of the system and by having to respond to situations and subjects which they and their controllers would prefer to leave alone.

The second half of the interpretations chapter is a review of various theoretical approaches to power and the media in light of the material previously presented. It shows that parts of many theories are relevant, but that the Mills-Domhoff and Marxian approaches seem to be the most useful, particularly when these ideas are formulated by using the material presented in this dissertation. This section mainly indicates that, now that a more thorough and realistic presentation of the American power system and the mass media has been provided, relevant theory making can

begin which can provide us with a truer understanding of the world than the old theories which were based on myth and which had emerged from an empirical vacuum.

The final chapter not only summarizes the main points of the dissertation, it also provides suggestions for comprehensive media strategies for the people to use to challenge the existing power structures in the country.

Chapter 2

THE AMERICAN POWER STRUCTURE: METHODS OF CONTROL

2.1 ECONOMIC CONTROL AND CONCENTRATION

In the capitalist system economic power results in political power. We must therefore look at the bases of the economic power of the American ruling class. Various studies clearly show that the largest financial institutions control the major corporations in the U.S. through a combination of stock ownership, interlocking directorates, marriage alliances, joint ventures, debt holdings and other banking functions (Blair 1972, 1978; Menshikov 1969; Dowd 1974; Brandeis 1914; Securities and Exchange Commission 1941; Knowles 1973; U.S. Congress 1913, 1941, 1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1966b, 1967a, 1968, 1974, 1977, 1978a, 1978c).

These institutional investors--mainly banks and insurance companies, along with their allied investment banks--are also interlocked in the same way with each other. As a result of this and the merger movements which

have occurred over the years, the most basic economic decisions affecting the country (indeed, the world, considering that these corporations are generally large, multinational conglomerates and transnational banks) are made by a few hundred people at the most (US Congress 1978c). Because concentration of control of the economy is so central to political control of the country, we must make an assessment of total economic concentration. This must be viewed within the history of the merger movements which have radically transformed the economy of the U.S. and which have resulted in concentrating economic power--and with it political power--in fewer and fewer hands (Blair 1972, 257; Dowd 1974).

2.1.1 MERGER MOVEMENTS

The first merger movement, occurring from 1897 through 1905, had an immense impact on the country because it changed the nation's economic structure from competitive to oligopolistic. This period saw the birth of the giant trusts, with 5,300 industrial firms becoming controlled by 318 corporations (Dowd 1974, 65).

The next merger movement began immediately after World War I, declined during the post-war depression and reached

new heights in 1928 and 1929. This movement continued the consolidations of the first period, but had a greater accent on vertical rather than horizontal integration (Blair 1972).

The third movement commenced after World War II, accelerated greatly in the late 1960s and has continued to the present. This period was marked by (1) the continuing absorption of small and medium-sized companies by larger ones, (2) the many acquisitions by major oil companies, including the expansion into other energy areas, and (3) the creation of huge holding companies called conglomerates. In recent years the most significant activity has been the acquisition of huge corporations--even conglomerates--by even larger corporations. Since 1980 we have seen the biggest acquisitions in history in terms of assets and money paid. There seems to be no end in sight to the continuation of increase in size and scope of this phenomenon: Texaco bought Getty Oil, and Standard Oil of California purchased Gulf Oil in 1984 for 10.1 and 13.4 billion dollars, respectively, in early 1984 (DeCormis 1984a).

Actually, there has been an almost continuous merger movement since the first consolidations began in the late 1800s. The times between the three "periods" mainly have been interruptions resulting from major wars and severe depressions. However, the power of these giant corporations

is so great now that the third merger period has continued even through war and recession.

2.1.2 TOTAL CONCENTRATION

A result of these merger movements can be seen by looking at the increase of aggregate concentration over the years. Berle and Means (1932) estimated that the top 200 manufacturing corporations controlled approximately 33% of the assets of all non-financial corporate corporations in 1905, but by 1930 it was 50%. By 1968 it had risen to 60.4% (Blair 1972, v., 64). In 1977 it was estimated to be 65% (Mueller 1970). The share of assets of the top 100 manufacturing corporations rose from 35.6% in 1925 to 53.9% in 1931 (Blair 1972, 266). By 1968 the largest 100 had a greater share of all manufacturing assets than the 200 largest did in 1950, and the top 100 controlled the same share of assets as the 1,000 largest in 1941 (Green, M.J., 1972, 9).

But this concentration becomes more extreme as we get nearer to the top corporations. The largest 50 did 45% of the business of the leading 500, and the top ten gained over 20% of ALL corporate profits in 1971. The biggest 100 (of 1,500,000) corporations got 50% of manufacturing profits;

the top 200 receive 70%; and the top 500 made 80% (Roberts 1978). In 1978 the leading 122 corporations were so large that the total market value of their common stock was 41% of the value of ALL such stock in the U.S. (US Congress 1978a).

The increased concentration of ownership of stock in the hands of financial institutions has paralleled the growth of overall concentration. From 1900 to 1929 the share of financial institutions in corporate stock rose from 7.9% to 14.2%; by 1949 it was 23.6%; and by 1954 it was 33% (Mintz and Cohen 1976, 266, 267).

Another way to look at it is to assess the share of stocks and bonds held by the most affluent one percent of adults. In 1922 for corporate stock it was 61.5%; in 1953 it was 76%. For state and local bonds it had grown from 88% in 1922 to 100% in 1953. The percentage of ownership for all other bonds in the hands of the top one percent rose from 69.2% to 77.5% in the same period. A Senate committee estimated in the late 1950s that one percent of the families owned over 80% of all publicly held industrial stock. Harvard economists estimated that 0.2% of the "spending units" had 65-70% of stock that was publicly held (Domhoff 1967, 45).

2.2 METHODS OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

Assessing total concentration is only the start of observing how control of the U.S. economy and political process is concentrated, because these business institutions are themselves interlocked with each other in a web of stock ownership, interlocking directorates, joint ventures, the sharing of law firms, bankers and accountants, debt holdings and other banking functions, and with a framework of sociological interlocking of private schools, social clubs, marriage alliances and various political, civic, charitable, educational and cultural organizations (Domhoff 1967, 1979; Knowles 1973). The structure which emerges I will call the American Ruling Cartel.

2.2.1 STOCK OWNERSHIP

We will look at these various media through which control is concentrated. First we will consider stock ownership. If a corporation has widely dispersed stock, control (or at least great influence) over a corporation can be exercised with as little as a 5% stockholding--even as

low as one percent. This position is considerably strengthened if the stockholder or his representative also sits on the board of directors (US Congress 1968; Blair 1972; Zeitlin 1970).

The Metcalf Committee in Congress (1978a) reported that the 122 largest firms from the financial, industrial, transportation, utility and retailing sectors of the economy are controlled via stock ownership by 21 institutional investors. These 122 firms have 2,259 subsidiaries and affiliates. To concentrate this power further, these financial institutions form an interlocking community of interest through a combination of ownership of each other's stock and of interlocking directorates. In the case of large funds like TIAA-CREF the control is in the hands of the bank administering it through its trust department and by the interlocking of members of the fund's executive committee with the bank (US Congress 1978a, 1978c).

The control of these few huge institutionals and the interlocking among them were also shown in the 1960s by Wright Patman's congressional studies on banks when he specified the interlocks of stockholding, shared directors and, occasionally, of bondholdings in all major U.S. industry (US Congress 1963c, 1966b, 1967a, 1968). Patman's four monumental studies showed what Metcalf was

rediscovering: the Bank Trust, as described in by Louis Brandeis (1914) and the Pujo Committee (1913) and in 1957 by Victor Perlo, is more powerful than ever.

Even the conservative U.S. News and World Report (1974) had an article of concern, asking if the huge megabanks, through the use of their trust departments, were not becoming too powerful. The article referred to Congressional studies which showed that the largest banks controlled, not just many major corporations, but whole industries.¹

2.2.2 INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

Another mechanism of control of corporations is interlocks of directors and management personnel. The basic significance of this method is twofold: it forms a communications path, and it is a means of access to privileged corporate information. The use of interlocking directorates has been the subject of many governmental studies since the turn of the century (Sherrill 1980)). One of the main provisions of the Clayton Act was to prevent such interlocks. However, because of a combination of loopholes in the law, non-vigorous enforcement by the government and inconsistent rulings by the courts, the use

of these interlocks is still extremely widespread (Travers 1968). So pervasive is this practice that the boards of the largest U.S. corporations are tied together by a thick web of director interlocks.

The same top 130 firms which Senator Metcalf used for his 1978 study of stock ownership also were the basis for his interlock study (US Congress 1978a, 1978c). These corporate giants had 530 direct and 12,193 indirect interlocks. And this included neither those of their subsidiaries nor of their management personnel. Concentration was higher among the leading 13 giants. Each one of these reached an average of 70% of the other major companies through a total of 140 direct and 5,547 indirect interlocks. This estimate is conservative, because the interlocks of the megacorporations' 486 subsidiaries were not included.

The huge banks and insurance companies are key meeting places for big business. Not only are they interlocked with each other, but also they are interlocked with the nation's largest utility, transportation, energy, industrial and retailing corporations. These giant financial institutions also are the ones which are the central figures in the stock ownership domination mentioned earlier.

Another significant factor is that within an industry

the competitors are joined with each other numerous times, particularly with indirect interlocks on the boards of these financial institutions.² Not only are competitors joined together, but suppliers are interlocked with their competitors as well as the corporations they supply. All are heavily linked with financial institutions.

The major mass media corporations, particularly the broadcasting networks, the leading news magazines and the largest newspapers (including the big chains) are similarly interlocked. We shall look at this in detail in Chapter III.

Metcalf noted that previous governmental investigations on the subject in 1950, 1965 and 1969 concluded that such interlocking can provide preferential treatment in supply, purchasing and financial services, can destroy competition and can concentrate economic power. It can lead to conflict of interest and inside dealing. The Patman Committee went so far as to say that the pervasive interlocks of banks with non-banking corporations "could radically change the entire economic structure of the United States by the creation of giant conglomerate cartels centered around large banking institutions" (Sherrill 1980).

Sociologists and political scientists have only recently studied interlocking directorates. In fact, except

for the works by Sweezy in 1939, Perlo in 1957, Dooley in 1969, and by Blair in 1972, even economists have not done much basic research independent of the government. The few economists who used the material have not been those of the mainstream, neo-classical theorists, but people who have either been interested mainly in antitrust, such as Blair (1972) and Mueller (1970), or are more radical, such as Dowd (1974), Magdoff (1969) and Perlo (1957).

However, some sociologists have more recently applied themselves to the subject, with very interesting results (Levine, J.H., 1972; Mariolis 1974; Soref 1976; Koenig and Gogel 1979; Allen, M., 1974):

1. Interlocks between major banks and the major industrial corporations form a dense and tightly interconnected network, with sub-networks of clusters.
2. Banks have the most interlocks, forming the primary institutions through which control of other corporations is effected.
3. Of the boards of directors of the Fortune 500 and the top 50 banks, insurance companies, retailers, utilities and 45 miscellaneous companies, "it is possible to trace a link through overlapping board

memberships between (any) one corporation and every single one of 721 others."

4. This interlocking is also close, i.e., each of the boards of the Fortune 500 is at the most only a few steps away from all the others.
5. A division of labor exists within the corporate elite, in that

"upper-class officer directors have interests in other companies to a greater extent than non-upper-class directors. ... There may be a class-based division of labor in which the upper-class directors are more concerned with inter-organizational relationships and with the functioning of the economy as a whole, and that non-upper-class directors are concerned with day-to-day operations of individual companies"

(Soref 1976, 360, 366).

6. The boards of directors show two trends: they are becoming smaller and there are more outside directors, indicating that "legal control of the biggest industrials is increasingly falling into the hands of outside directors" (Koenig and Gogel 1979). The fascinating aspect of this empirical conclusion is that these two trends have been pushed by the banking interests and their allies in government, but are being resisted by management--another indication as to where the superior power lies (Insurance Information

Institute (1977b).

Koening and Gogel (1979, 39, 40) have developed a class hegemony model, using social network theory, showing the corporate elite comprise a social network. The use of interlocking directorates forms a "network through which affect, evaluation, knowledge, opinion, influence and power are constantly passing among directors." This does not take place just on corporate boards, but with other social media such as conferences, exclusive schools and their reunions, social clubs, and civic and cultural organizations in which the elite participate. In addition to creating a common world view, it helps to produce consensus and cooperation and to establish communications paths.

The corporate board network is particularly powerful because it controls great economic resources. Although this power can be latent or low keyed, it can become quite visible and fully employed in times of crisis. Hence, the system of interlocking directorates acts as a system of social and economic cohesion and power.

2.2.3 COMMERCIAL BANK FUNCTIONS

2.2.3.1 Bond Holding

There are other mechanisms besides interlocking directorates and stock ownership through which banks and insurance companies can exert control or domination over corporations. One is bond holding (Menshikov 1969). Bonds are very significant in establishing ties between industrial corporations and institutional investors, because they are the primary media for long-term financing. Bond investors generally do not simply sell the bonds and collect the interest. Even the large corporations are required to sign agreements with various stipulations which make them dependent in varying ways on the investors, thus giving up to the investors a wide range of aspects of their freedom of decision making and tying them more closely with the financial web (Kimball 1962, 55).

If the debt holding group also has control over large blocks of stock, supplemented by representation on the board of directors, control over the company can be safely assumed. Indeed, a former professor of finance and Dean of the School of Business Administration at the University of Massachusetts says that the bondholders actually own the

company until the debt is paid (Kimball 1962). Since companies generally are always in debt (Heilbroner and Bernstein 1971), the conclusion could be that the debt holders continuously control the corporations.

2.2.3.2 Term Loans

The term loan--an agreement to pay back a certain amount of money in a specified length of time--is another means for tying a company to the purse strings of institutional investors. Because the loans are arranged in the form of syndicates, the corporation cannot find competitors to arrange for more favorable conditions. As with bonds, there are restrictions placed on the company in order to get the money (Kimball 1962).

The long-term ties created by such loans and bond sales place the banks in such a central position of influence and control within the debtor company that they can handle other needs including mergers, evaluations of diversification and other financial operations, even to the extent of finding buyers for the company. By becoming a corporation's banker, a financial company can gain sensitive, inside information about its client. This can be used either to gain more control over the corporation or to provide

information to a more favored company wanting to take over the first corporation.

2.2.3.3 Trust Departments

The activities of bank trust departments have been under scrutiny of the government for many years because enormous amounts of economic power are concentrated there. The trust departments hold assets for others. They are prohibited by law to use their trust departments to maintain their own accounts. The banks manage not only the wealth of individuals and families, but also pension funds. Although it is optional with the primary owner of the assets as to how the stock in the various companies is voted, generally the bank will exercise the vote.

Congressman Wright Patman (US Congress 1968) was greatly concerned with the great financial power which had been concentrated in these banks with their trust departments, particularly since, with the use of secret accounts, the true ownership in companies could be hidden so that various laws regarding ownership restrictions could be obviated. In the U.S. News and World Report (1974) article mentioned previously, it was the economic power which the leading banks had obtained through their trust departments

which was the cause of such alarm.

2.2.3.4 Correspondent Bank Function

A seemingly innocuous means for effecting control or influence of the big banks over the smaller ones is through the correspondent relationship (Campbell and Campbell 1972, 73, 74). To state it simply, the large bank is the banker for the smaller one. The correspondent bank helps in providing money for loans which are too large for the smaller bank to handle legally; it provides advice on investments and legal matters; it may provide information on credit ratings of borrowers and even may help in finding management personnel for the smaller bank. Finally, the correspondent bank might also invite the smaller bank to join in loan syndicates.

2.2.4 INVESTMENT BANKING

The role of the investment banker is another part of the financial web holding a company entrapped (US v. Henry S. Morgan, 118 F. Sup 621, (1953)). A prime function of the investment banker is the placement of his clients' securities. As financial advisor (and usually having a

member on the board of directors) the investment banker is closely involved with his clients' financial interests and in the management of the companies (Menshikov 1969; Brandeis 1914; Kimball 1962). The investment banker can become so intimately involved with the company that the Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that if an investment bank has a director on the board of a corporation, it controls that company.

2.2.5 ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING FIRMS

Accounting firms are at a lower level of power than the banks and the elite law firms (to be discussed later), but they provide information and communications which greatly assist in establishing, maintaining and enhancing economic power. The Metcalf Committee also delved into the accounting profession and the concentration in it, the control of it and how it operates. Its report said that the big accounting firms "heavily influence the economy as well as society in general (because) accounting is the language by which businesses report the results of their activities" (US Congress 1978a; Wall Street Journal 1977a).

Hence, accounting methods have a tremendous impact, not only in relationships among business, but also with

investors and with governments. The merger movements were lubricated by accounting grease--much of it fraudulent. The most recent merger era has been greatly facilitated by "creative" accounting methods, as well as by favorable tax laws (Chatov(1975)).

The accounting situation takes on even greater complexity and importance when looking at the great multinational corporations. Governments--big or small--cannot prevent these global giants from circumventing their tax, securities and banking laws. The corporations' accountants and tax lawyers are able to devise a different set of books for each requirement, person, agency or government. "Skilled obfuscation is now an essential accounting tool" which produces results which have little to do with the real world (Barnet and Muller 1974, 263).

The auditing function of the accounting firms is supposed to be performed in an independent and disinterested way so that the public, investors and governments can be protected. But this has not happened because of a combination of factors. The auditors are not always given access to all relevant information; the auditing firm has its primary loyalty to its client, not to the public; and if an adverse audit is presented to a company, the auditor is frequently fired and another one is brought in to devise a

rosier picture (Briloff (1972, 1981); Chatov (1975); US Congress 1978a; Wall Street Journal 1982a).

A recent development of the accounting firms now ties them even closer with their corporate clients and has greatly heightened and solidified the community of interest between the two. This is management consultation. The firms which are supposed to be objective are very deeply involved with their companies; hence, they are even less likely to blow the whistle on the efforts of their own management consultant.

Senator Metcalf also analyzed concentration in the accounting field. Parallel with the structure of most business in the U.S., the accounting profession is highly concentrated. This takes the form of the "Big Eight"--the largest, most influential firms which have the most giant corporate clients. They have 85% of the 2,641 corporations listed on the American and the New York Stock Exchanges--92% on the NYSE, alone (US Congress 1978a, 15; Briloff 1981, 235). The concentration density is greater with the largest corporations and industry groups such as oil and banking (Medvin 1973). Metcalf was seriously concerned about the fact that the accounting firms are too closely intertwined with their corporate clients. Government regulation has been ineffective in this regard. Indeed, the government

agencies involved in oversight and control of the profession are part of the system, with the "revolving door" spinning at high RPM and with an ever increasing predilection by the SEC toward "self-regulation" by the industry (Common Cause 1976; US Congress 1978b; Wall Street Journal 1982b; Briloff 1981; Chatov 1975).

2.3 ELITE LAW FIRMS

Although the banks seem to be the central core in the control of the economy, the elite law firms play an important role in control, coordination and information exchange. The prestige Wall Street law firms wield power at the top along with their brethren in the banking business.

The subject of law firms is complex but very fruitful in revealing the nature of how the Ruling Cartel works, because the leading firms on Wall Street are keys to the implementation and communication of power--political as well as economic. We will look at the latter function first. Gordon says of their economic role (Domhoff 1967, 58, 59):

They serve the banks and larger corporations, and not infrequently sit on the boards of the latter. They are particularly active in mergers and reorganizations; they do legal work involved

in the issuance of new securities; they represent various of the largest firms in their dealings with government agencies. Their influence goes far beyond the giving of advice on legal matters.

These firms are not just tied to the financial community, but are an integral part of it. The partners have mostly upper class credentials, frequently hold high positions in government and teach at the major law schools (Domhoff 1967, 58-62). Being wealthy and working in jobs from which they can easily take sabbaticals, they can readily make themselves available for public service positions or on temporary "blue ribbon" panels in the government. Many Secretaries of State have come from such law firms.

Good examples can be found in the relationships of some of the Secretaries of State, their law firms and their clients in the oil industry (Blair 1978, 72, 73). John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen were partners of Sullivan and Cromwell. As Secretary of State, John Foster was instrumental in dropping antitrust action against his law firm's client, Standard Oil (now Exxon). Brother Allen, as head of the CIA, was instrumental in overthrowing Mossadegh in Iran and re-establishing the domination of the Iranian oil fields by U.S. companies.

The relationship continued into the early 1970s when another lawyer from Sullivan and Cromwell, as

Under-secretary of State, travelled to Iran to support the Shah. Later, another Wall Street lawyer and former Secretary of State, William Rogers, became an agent for the Shah. A successor as Secretary of State in the Democratic administration was another Wall Street lawyer--Cyrus Vance (Engler 1977; Lundberg 1968; Domhoff 1967; TV Documentary The Controlling Interest).

One does not have to be the top man at the State Department to be powerful and influential. For instance, Wall Street lawyer and investment banker George Ball was Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, but additionally has been a key foreign policy advisor for many years as well as being an important participant in the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderbergers and the Council on Foreign Relations (to be discussed later) (Shoup and Minter 1977, 238-43, 264; Sklar 1980, 9, 179).

C. Wright Mills (1956, 289) evaluated the significance of men such as Ball:

The corporation lawyers and the investment bankers perform the functions of the 'go-between' effectively and powerfully. ... They transcend the narrower milieu of any one industry, and accordingly are in a position to speak and act for the corporate world or at least sizable sectors of it. The corporate lawyer is a key link between the economic, military and political areas; the investment banker is a key organizer and unifier of the corporate world and a person well versed in spending the huge amounts of money the American military establishment now ponders. When you get

a lawyer who handles the legal work of investment bankers, you get a key member of the power elite.

In addition to its analysis of stock ownership and interlocking directorates, the Corporate Data Exchange study for the Metcalf Committee also looked into the question of shared law firms. The information revealed that it is a common practice for law firms to represent a number of competing firms (Sherrill 1980).

Thus, the people from these elite law firms are tied together sociologically and professionally with each other and to other Cartel institutions by the same interlocking mechanisms we have previously mentioned. These men appear to be the prime media for establishing the legal framework of our monopoly capitalist system, for tying together of economic and political power, and for the implementation of this power in the government.

2.4 CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH AND INCOME IN THE U.S.

2.4.1 INTRODUCTION

In Domhoff's (1967) definition of a ruling class in the U.S. the top people would receive and disproportionate share

of wealth and income. We will now look to see if the monetary benefits do mainly devolve to this class, and we will attempt to ascertain if the main beneficiaries are the ones who are also in political control.

There are two sides of this subject. The first is the acquisition of wealth and income and the other is taxation. Dowd's (1974, 117) definitions and explanation of income and wealth are clear and concise:

Income is a flow of money and purchasing power over time; wealth is a stock of things owned that have market value. Money income includes wages and salaries, social security benefits, dividends, interest and rents recieved, welfare payments, pensions, alimony recieved, net income from self-employment (for instance, from farming, or by doctors), and other periodic income. Wealth includes automobiles and homes as well as trucks and mines and corporate stock; but for analytical purposes the ownership of productive--that is, income producing--assets is the vital factor.

Historically, there has always been concentration of wealth in the U.S., starting in colonial times (Feagin 1982). Although this declined slightly after the Civil War and again in the 1930s and 1940s, it has increased since that time. Around 1800 the U.S. economy and nation were dominated by a small group of agricultural and commercial capitalists. It was estimated that prior to the Civil War 200 families controlled all the major trade and financial organizations. Later the industrialists moved into the

ranks of the wealthy. Even though there were conflicts between the old wealth and the new wealth, an accomodation gradually took place which has resulted in the distribution of power and wealth which we have today (Parker 1972, 116, 117).

Many studies have been made over the years on the subject of wealth and income distribution. But there has been difficulty in obtaining the most accurate, reliable and relevant information, resulting in controversy after some of the studies were published (Tuchman 1973, 41, 48, 50; Lampman 1970, 103; Dowd 1974, 118-120; Perlo 1970; Miller 1971, 247). The two main sources used have been the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Census Bureau. Each has its drawbacks, one of the main ones being that each asks the people to tell the truth. Tax lawyers for the wealthy are able to mine the rich veins of tax loopholes for the corporate rich. The IRS information does not take into account the fact that more than one person in a family--particularly a wealthy one--will file returns. The Census Bureau information is ascertained only from a sample survey. The Bureau does not include certain items as business income, such as the gains realized from the sale of stocks, expense accounts and various other executive benefits. Neither the IRS nor the Census Bureau includes

retained capital gains.

The concluding estimates of the Office of Business Economics of the Commerce Department are about 13% higher than those of the Census Bureau in determining the inequality of income (Tuckman 1973, 48). As a result of the problems with these two main sources, researchers have used various other means either in combination with IRS and Census information or they have developed data which they have used independently.

There are other problems of studying wealth and income distribution in relation to power.

1. Most studies divide the population by fifths. But this does not show with clarity the great concentration at the top--the group which constitutes one percent or less of families where the real power resides.
2. Certain types of wealth and income can be hidden either by not being included in the studies (as in the case of some of the IRS and Census Bureau data), by being spread throughout a family, by placing stocks to be held in trust, or to be placed with foundations where the control can be maintained and where the foundations can in turn invest in the various dominant companies.

3. Comparison of one study with previous or subsequent ones is difficult because of differing approaches and usages of varying data bases.
4. Many types of income of the wealthy generally are not considered such as free country club memberships, expense accounts, stock options, undistributed capital gains and free insurance and retirement policies.
5. Income in kind is usually not considered, such as a farmer growing his own food or people using the barter system.
6. The considerable tax loopholes and evasion.
7. Government support of business interests in the form of subsidies, tax breaks, provision of infrastructure, friendly regulatory agency administration, guaranteed loans, financial bailouts of ailing companies, foreign aid which must be spent with U.S. firms, support of the dollar, the entire Defense Department's budget, and many more government activities and laws which fall under the general heading of "welfare for the rich" (Tuckman 1973, 76-107; Boaz 1982; Hapgood 1974). Inability to get precise data on the very rich and the lack of information on the very poor.
8. The significant differences between personal income and distribution of income from production, which

includes factors not paid out to persons, such as undistributed corporate profits, contributions for social insurance and corporate inventory valuations.

9. Taxes not being factored in, particularly considering that state and local taxes are regressive and, although the federal taxes are progressive on paper, in actuality they produce only a very slight levelling of income.

2.4.2 INCOME

Most studies show that, although income concentration has been decreasing slightly, it has remained basically the same since the turn of the century. The most conservative estimate, by Miller (1971, 50), showed that in 1968 the lowest 20% of the families received 4% of the income, while the top 20% had 44% and the top 5% of families had 15%. Pechman and Okner (1974, 45, 46), using additional figures and estimates for non-reporting and underreporting of income, had the lowest 20% receiving 3.7% of income, the highest 20% having 47.9%, the top 5% having 22.1%, and the top one percent receiving 10.5%. The before and after-tax figures are very revealing. Before-tax income concentration

toward the rich declined slightly, but the after-tax figures of the IRS indicated a rise. Consequently, in 1952 the top 15% of tax units held 30% of income, but this increased to 34% by 1967, Pechman showed (Parker 1972, 178).

Two controversial studies on income distribution over the years should be mentioned because they showed opposite results (Zeitlin 1970, 114). Using income tax returns, Kuznets' conclusion was that there had been a significant reduction of about 40% in the income share received by the top 5% of individuals between 1929 and 1948. This report received great attention in the press because it purported to show how redistributive the American capitalist system had become. Goldsmith's figures also showed this concentration decline, although to a lesser degree (Miller 1971, 51, 52).

Kuznets' methodology and sources were attacked (Parker 1972, 118; Tuckman 1973, 54; Perlo 1970, 137), in that he used the vulnerable IRS data, did not consider that these top income holders come from a single social or economic class, that the wealthy people split their incomes for tax purposes, that there is significant underreporting of income in the higher brackets from dividends, interest and rent, and that undistributed profits were left out. Furthermore, because of paucity of information on the poor, the data for

this group was estimated. Perlo's analysis, which corrected for these factors (except for class), showed that Kuznets' much acclaimed decline in concentration actually would be eliminated and the top 5% would receive 30% instead of 17.6%.

Goldsmith (1970) recomputed her findings and concluded that Kuznets' analysis was indeed faulty. But, considering additional factors, she stated, although the concentration would be lower than Kuznets estimated, the general pattern would be the same--the narrowing of the inequality of the rich and the poor. However, Zeitlin (1970, 114, 115) points out that by using distribution of income from production (from 1949-1955) compared with personal income, there has been no decline, and the relative income shares have remained fairly constant. Perlo (1970, 136) also points out that the Commerce Department figures indicated that between 1929 and 1948--the period of the Goldsmith and Kuznets reports--corporate profits increased 244%, farm income was up 212% and non-farm, unincorporated business income increased 177%; but wages and salaries increased only 156% (before taxes).

The other controversial study was that of Kolko (1962) which showed that, instead of the levelling of incomes, the opposite had happened. Although the share of the highest

tenth of the population had decreased from 33.9% to 29% from 1910-1959, there had been a slight increase since 1950. Furthermore, the share of the bottom tenth had fallen from 3.4% to 1.0% in 1941 and had remained constant since then.

(Note that Kolko used tenths, not fifths, because using fifths would bring in too many people at the top who did not nearly have the great incomes which the very rich received. Kolko also included the other factors of income of the wealthy which we have referred to above but which are usually not considered, such as expense accounts, retained corporate earnings, tax breaks, etc.)

Additionally, the lower one-half income groups received 27% of national personal income in 1919; but this had fallen to 23% by 1959. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center showed in 1968 that the share of the bottom half had dropped to 22%, indicating a continuing decline. The study revealed that in 1968 the top tenth received 30%, the top three tenths got 58%, with the remaining 60% of the population having the leftover 43% (Parker 1972, 81).

Kolko's data sources were mainly the National Industrial Conference Board (a pro-business research center) and the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. These data were criticized by Goldsmith, Kuznets and others (Miller 1971, 51, 52). Miller (1971, 51, 52) cites two

studies which show that when capital gains are figured in, increases in the share of the top five percent are only a fraction of a point. Also he feels that a combination of government welfare for the poor and the nature of taxation produce "considerable redistribution."

However, other studies support the Kolko perspective. Pechman and Okner (1974, 46) of the Brookings Institution showed that in 1966 inequality was more heavily weighted toward the top 5% than what Miller had estimated, i.e., 19.1%, vice 16%. Stern (1972, 419) noted that the nation's Gross National Product (GNP) more than doubled between 1947 and 1970, but the shares of income going to each fifth remained basically the same.

The controversy over income distribution will probably continue because there are too many variables which cannot be verified by present research methods because of inaccessibility to relevant data, particularly to corporate records and to information on the poor. Despite the differences of opinion over methods and data used, the preponderance of information indicates that there has been no basic or significant change in the nature of unequal distribution in the U.S.: it is concentrated in the upper brackets.

2.4.3 WEALTH

The possession of wealth is much more important in the determination of holding of power than is distribution of income (Dowd 1974, 123). Wealth not only produces income but provides the power to give income and to limit that of others. The control of wealth is the control of the economy, which can be translated into political power. Furthermore, it is not just the possession of wealth which is of primary importance, but the control over the key institutions of the production and management of wealth, i.e., control over the major corporations and financial institutions.

Although there is not the controversy over the research on the distribution of wealth as is found in the studies of income, there are problems in ascertaining precise information. Some of these are as follows:

1. Control and ownership of stock can be hidden by various means such as secret and hidden accounts, ownership among various family members and the use of foundations.
2. A trust department of a bank can control voting power over someone else's stock.
3. A trust department may have economic decision making

control over someone else's trust fund.

4. Non-funded retirement plans for corporate executives can keep wealth in the corporations until the executive retires.

5. Stock in one company can be held by other companies.

6. The decision of what measuring unit to use--individual, family, spending unit, extended family, interest group, social class--can make a significant difference in results.

Because of the economic complexity and the legal protection of secrecy involving these problems, most inquiries must work with only the data which is readily available. This is acknowledged by Lampman (1970) in his oft noted study of wealth holders from 1922-1956 which he made for the National Bureau of Economic Research. He showed that the top 1.6% of the wealth holders owned 32% of all privately owned wealth, including 82.2% of stock, 100% of state and local bonds, 38.2% of federal bonds, 88.5% of other bonds, 29.1% of cash, 36.2% of mortgages and notes, 13.3% of insurance reserves, 16.1% of real estate and 22.1% of debts. These findings were close to those of the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1953.

Lampman also measured the degree of change in concentration during the period. He found that the richest one percent of the people owned 24% of all personal wealth

2% of U.S. citizens had total wealth greater than the nation's Gross National Product and that the same was true ten years later.

Miller (1971, 156) looked at the last year (1962) the government produced figures of wealth holders from a top, tiny percentage, information which could give us a much clearer picture of the super rich and powerful. This showed that 200,000 consumer units constituted 0.5% of all units, but held 22% of the wealth, and the top 2.5% had 61%. Miller noted that .02% had 7% of all wealth and owned 21% of corporate stock. The increase in concentration of ownership in stock is indicated by the fact that in 1953 the wealthiest one percent of the population had 69.5%, but nine years later in 1962 this had increased to 71.6% (Dowd 1974, 124).

As is apparent, the figures differ a little from study to study--but only a little. Wealth is highly concentrated and has been for many decades. In focusing on the most affluent people with the greatest wealth holdings, we are looking at the same people and families which are among those of the American Ruling Cartel--the top executives, the big bankers and the wealthiest families such as the Fords, Rockefellers, Mellons and duPonts. And, significantly, the government data on this tiny percentage at the top has not

been developed since 1962. Feagin (1982) states that this might indicate the pressure of the powerful not to provide such information to the public.

2.4.4 TAXES

It could be argued that the maldistribution of income and wealth could be justified from an egalitarian perspective if things were evened out fairly through taxation, particularly if poorer people were getting fair shares of government largesse in return. Miller (1971, 16) believes that "when transfer payments are taken into account, a large measure of progressivity is added to the tax structure." However, even though the federal income tax is designed to be progressive, because of so many loopholes and widespread evasion, the tax turns out to be hardly progressive at all (Perlo 1970, 138; Pechman and Okner (1974, 64, 65). In 1962 it was shown that for all income groups there is less than a 2% difference in before and after federal tax percentage of income (Stern 1972, 418).

Another study (Zeitlin 1970, 142) revealed that families at the bottom of the income strata paid one-third of their income in taxes compared with 36% of the top bracket. But the relative burden is much greater on the

poor (Budd 1970, 150). One-third taken in taxes from an income of \$3,000 could be disastrous, but one-third of \$300,000 leaves you quite affluent. Additionally, the regressive state and local taxes have risen from 7% to 12% of GNP, whereas federal income taxes have remained constant. As a result, when all tax factors are considered--even those effecting estate and inheritance--the overall taxation falls almost with equal proportion on all income levels (Parker 1972, 179).

However, The Economic Report of the President in 1969 (Parker 1972, 79) showed that people with annual incomes under \$2,000 paid an average of 44% of their income in taxes--two times that of someone earning \$200,000. Those with income between \$2,000 and \$4,000 paid 27%, which was equal to taxes paid by most millionaires. With the working poor not being eligible for welfare, they are in effect paying for the transfer payments of their poorer brethren. The working poor do not get back in money and services the amount they pay in taxes. On the other end of the spectrum Miller (1971, 17, 18) admits that his figures do not take into account the massive tax benefits and other aspects of government activity which is frequently called "welfare for the rich," enumerated earlier.

Not only does the tax burden not fall heavily and

directly on the rich, corporate taxes also have been decreasing as a proportion of all taxes. In the mid-1940s, corporations paid 34% of all taxes; by the late 1970s this had fallen to 13% (Feagin 1982, 61); and in the early 1980s it had dropped to 7.9% (Wall Street Journal 1982e).

This drop in corporate taxes was from 61 billion in 1981 to 49 billion in 1982. Individual taxpayers made up the shortfall of 12 billion. Some examples of individual companies are as follows: AT&T paid 8% on its 1981 domestic income, down from 11.1% in 1980; Bank of America paid 3.1% in 1980, which was higher than most banks; Exxon paid 1.3% of its U.S. income in taxes, which was less than the rate for a family with a \$10,000 income (Wall Street Journal 1982e).

What do these studies indicate about the overall structure of the income, wealth and tax situation? First, they show that as you look nearer the top the more you find inherited wealth (Tuckman 1973, 43; Parker 1972, 132). Although there is room for new millionaires in our economy, most of the wealth is inherited, and through the use of tax loopholes, the control of wealth has remained intact from one generation to the next.

Secondly, the top families in income and particularly in wealth are those which control the major industrial and

financial institutions in the country--the economic bases of the Ruling Cartel (Tuckman 1973, 44-47). These are basically the same families noted in the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) (Securities and Exchange Commission 1941; Sweezy 1939) in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the families being mainly the descendents of the robber barons of the late 1800s and early 1900s, plus a few leftovers from the "old wealth" days. This continuation of dominance of the top wealth holders over the years shows the stability of their control over the economic and political system.

Third, wealth alone is not an automatic key to power. Included in the wealthy are various people who are very rich but who are not powerful. Comedian Bob Hope is in this category (Tuckman 1973, 47). Others may be powerful within their own corporate sphere only, such as J. Paul Getty, the Hunts of Texas, and Howard Hughes. Still others may be of upperclass status but do not play power games. Among these would be the wives, particularly widows, of wealthy men. But one thing is clear. In the U.S. a person cannot be powerful on his or her own without being wealthy (Dowd 1974, 123). A Dean Rusk or Henry Kissinger can be powerful only so long as they are placed in positions of power by the powerful.

Fourth, the concentration of wealth and income

undoubtedly has accelerated since the above studies were made. The following are contributory to this:

1. The accelerated merger wave of great proportions has further concentrated corporate control and profits.
2. Inflation has transferred income from the lower income spending units to those who are reaping the benefits of monopoly profits where prices can be raised to compensate for inflationary costs.
3. The oil crisis particularly has transferred enormous amounts of income from the consumers to the controllers of oil company wealth--mainly the oil companies, their banks and the favored companies which have benefitted from the people, nations and corporations which are spending the oil wealth.
4. Meanwhile, a severe, prolonged depression has resulted in the largest unemployment since the Great Depression.
5. Many companies transfer their operations and production to lower wage scale areas such as the U.S. Sun Belt or overseas. Corporations which remain at home have exacted large income and benefit concessions and rollbacks from workers, particularly in companies with unions.
6. Meanwhile, most lower class and even middle class

families now have to have two incomes in order to maintain their standard of living--even just to make ends meet. This also means that millions of single parents slip further and further into poverty (DeCormis 1984a).

7. The Reagan tax cuts have further transferred the tax burden to the lower income levels.
8. Corporate taxes continue to fall (Wall Street Journal 1982e). In 1982 the corporate contribution to public coffers was down by \$18 billion as the corporate tax dropped to its lowest percentage in history--7.9%. This was occurring during the mid-1970s and early 1980s when most of these huge companies were breaking all records for profits. But it is not just that the corporate taxes are falling, the companies in monopolistic situations have the market power to merely pass these taxes on to their customers in the form of higher prices. Thus, the consumer ends up paying for almost all the corporate taxes, and the companies are off the tax hook.

We have quoted many statistics on income and wealth. What do they mean in more human terms? In 1968 the least wealthy 40% of our citizens received only 15% of all income and the poorest 20% got 4%--11.5 million families. The

latters' average total money income was less than \$3,150 a year, or \$60 a week--before taxes (Stern 1972, 417). Meanwhile, the top 4,000 families reported income of nearly four billion dollars. This was more than all government expenditures for feeding the poor and twice that spend on anti-poverty programs. It was more than all federal spending for education (Parker 1972, 123, 130).

Economist Paul Samuelson described income distribution with an analogy (Parker 1972, 6):

If we made an income pyramid out of a child's blocks, with each layer portraying \$1,000 of income, the peak would be far higher than the Eiffel Tower, but almost all of us would be within a yard of the ground.

Some people see the system as healthy, fair and with plenty of opportunity. Miller (1971, 159, 163, 165) (who has no criticisms of Kuznets) quotes the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Times and Fortune magazine as saying that inequality is no problem. Believing that significant redistribution has taken place, the magazine said, "Though not a head has been raised aloft on a pikestaff nor a railway station seized, the U.S. has been for some time now in a revolution." The dominant fact for Miller in showing the health of the economy and proving that America still is the land of opportunity is the fact that

there are more millionaires now than ever before, and that if a person does not hold that as a "recognizable goal" and "you blame it on the system, you may just be looking for an alibi." Besides, Miller says, you have to have to have inequality in order to get people to work. As to the poor, Miller (1971, 246) states that their solution is to "control their fertility."

2.4.5 CONCLUSION

There are two aspects of the concentration of wealth and income which are rarely mentioned and a third which is never mentioned. First, in a capitalist society this concentration must occur. A Marxist would say that it only reflects the normal result of a combination of the capitalist class owning the means of production and appropriating the surplus value from the labor of the working class. The capitalist say the same thing but in a different way: there must be large and ever expanding profits so that the system can create a sufficient pool of money for investment in order to grow, which is a basic requirement of the system. Indeed, one of the main complaints of one of the core Ruling Cartel organizations--the Trilateral Commission--regarding the

contemporary political and economic situation of the U.S. is that people are demanding too much from the system in income and benefits, thereby leaving too little for the capitalists to invest (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975).

The other aspect is mentioned time and again by the top executives in Silk and Vogel's book Ethics and Profits (1976). If people are too affluent, they will not work hard enough. If good jobs are plentiful, workers will be less apt to subject themselves to the authoritarian, demeaning demands of the workplace. Worse still, they would have time and energy left over to organize, petition and demonstrate, trying to change the system.

The third aspect is that the wealth of the top people is very different from that found in the upper-middle, middle and bottom strata. That of most people is held and used within that individual spending/wealth holding unit, whereas the enormous wealth of the power people at the top is pooled in various economic and political endeavors. They cooperate through their institutions in providing financial support for new endeavors. They invest in each other's financial institutions and commercial enterprises. They maintain and expand their wealth in extended family and interest group structures. The government supports them in these endeavors. It is therefore a distortion to consider

the wealth of the very top in simple quantitative comparison with the rest of the people, particularly the lower 85% or 90% of the population. It is qualitatively, and in the composite, quantitatively, very different.

The nature of wealth and income concentration has not been written from the standpoints of extended family, interest group or class. Nor has it been looked into in comprehensive detail from the aspect of the tiniest percentage at the top where the main power holders reside. Just as one cannot develop a true perspective of economic control by looking at individual corporations without their interconnectedness, we cannot obtain the clearest picture of the control of wealth in the country by studying only individuals, spending units or nuclear families. The research we have been citing is only the beginning of what must be accomplished.

2.5 METHODS OF POLITICAL CONTROL

For the economically powerful to have control of the state, they must have institutions through which the power is exercised. It is a central part of maintaining the

capitalist structure and dominance of the economic system that the political system also must be run by members of the powerful capitalist ruling class and their loyal representatives. In the U.S. one can look at the backgrounds in business of the key appointments in the executive branch of the government; one can see how the government regulatory agencies are run for the benefit of big business; one can see the "revolving door" of personnel between governmental agencies and the corporations which are supposed to be regulated; one can follow the paths of the laws which favor big business, from the matter of how and with whom legislation originates to the financing of pressure groups in order to get the bills passed by Congress; one can observe how the laws are administered once they become law; and one can also watch the voting behavior of people who are elected and see how their votes support those whose money helped elect them.

But there is a higher level of power which is the key to understanding the lower level of activity mentioned in the preceding paragraph. There needs to be organizations which are covert or semi-covert, which are under the complete control of the Ruling Cartel and which perform the functions of idea development, maintaining consensus, personnel recruitment, and idea transmission for

implementation into governmental policy and law. There are three prime political Cartel organizations which fall into the above category: the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Bilderberg group and the Trilateral Commission (TLC). There are several others in the U.S. which perform various functions in the power structure which act as mechanisms through which the Cartel increases and spreads its influence throughout the country in certain social, economic and political sectors (Domhoff 1967, 1979). They are significant in achieving consensus among local and regional ruling elites and they work to influence governmental policy in particular areas of interest. But, with the exception of the Brookings Institution (the prime Cartel think tank) and the Committee for Economic Development (CED)--the CFR for domestic issues--these others are of secondary importance to the big three: CFR, TLC and Bilderberg.

2.5.1 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1919, the CFR is the oldest of the three and has had a tremendous impact on governmental policy since the late 1930s. It is openly admitted by the members themselves that this is the case--and for all administrations, Republican or Democrat (Shoup and Minter 1977). The CFR is

the chief recruiter for cabinet-level officials: the secretaries, deputy-secretaries and undersecretaries (Shoup and Minter 1977, 60, 61).³ Even where the incumbent is not from the Council, he generally has a close relationship with the CFR, as in the case of Secretary of State Cordell Hull during World War II.

The CFR, TLC and the Bilderberg organization have the same structure for determining their memberships. The CFR participants, particularly those on the steering and advisory groups, are dominated by the New York City law and banking elite--the core of the American Ruling Cartel. That the CFR represents the Eastern Ruling Class Establishment is shown by the paucity of members among the conservative businessmen's organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Conference Board, where the top management men of the large corporations predominate.

The interlocking of top personnel of the Bilderbergers and the TLC with the CFR is pervasive. The men on the steering and advisory committees (who pick the other members) of the TLC and Bilderberg group are all CFR members. Of the 131 U.S. Trilateral Commissioners through 1979, 74 were CFR members, 50 of whom were involved with banking or other financial institutions. As in the economic

sphere of the history of power in the U.S., the early years of the CFR were dominated by Morgan interests, but since the 1950s the Rockefellers have prevailed, although the Morgans are not completely excluded (Menshikov 1969; Knowles 1973). The total membership principally is comprised of the following: men (and only recently a few women) from the prime multinational corporations, and particularly the banks and law firms; the carefully selected intellectuals of the approved think tanks and elite universities; leaders of the CIA; and the prime movers of the Eastern Establishment mass media (Silk and Silk 1980; Shoup and Minter 1977; New York Times 1966).

Perhaps the most important historical function of the Council has been to set up study groups to develop positions on foreign policy strategy and tactics. These conclusions and recommendations are almost always implemented by the government, even if with slight modification. The basic definition of U.S. global interest was made before U.S. entrance into World War II, setting the basic pattern and objectives for subsequent American imperialist foreign policy. Also, specific governmental actions have been taken and institutions have been set up after origination in the CFR. For example, the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, the Marshall Plan, the United Nations, the

the chief recruiter for cabinet-level officials: the secretaries, deputy-secretaries and undersecretaries (Shoup and Minter 1977, 60, 61)³. Even where the incumbent is not from the Council, he generally has a close relationship with the CFR, as in the case of Secretary of State Cordell Hull during World War II.

The CFR, TLC and the Bilderberg organization have the same structure for determining their memberships. The CFR participants, particularly those on the steering and advisory groups, are dominated by the New York City law and banking elite--the core of the American Ruling Cartel. That the CFR represents the Eastern Ruling Class Establishment is shown by the paucity of members among the conservative businessmen's organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Conference Board, where the top management men of the large corporations predominate.

The interlocking of top personnel of the Bilderbergers and the TLC with the CFR is pervasive. The men on the steering and advisory committees (who pick the other members) of the TLC and Bilderberg group are all CFR members. Of the 131 U.S. Trilateral Commissioners through 1979, 74 were CFR members, 50 of whom were involved with banking or other financial institutions. As in the economic

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, NATO, the post-war treatment of Germany and the Soviet Union, and the policy toward China and South Africa. In addition, the Council has become deeply involved in specific situations: the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala was a result of the recommendations of a CFR study group--a body which was chaired by the head of United Fruit Co. and which had great input by CFR member Allen Dulles--the head of the CIA (and whose law firm represented United Fruit.)

Another example of CFR power was demonstrated by the way the U.S. changed its Viet Nam War policy. In spite of great popular sentiment to end the war, the conflict was not brought to a halt until the CFR finally changed its mind and conveyed this to President Johnson.

Although the Council on Foreign Relations may have been eclipsed somewhat in its direct influence on government by the Trilateral Commission, it still acts as a ruling class clearinghouse for high government personnel and for discussion of developing policy.

The Council has had great impact, not only on determining what the "national interest" is and what policy is, but also who the decision makers in government are. (For instance, in 1965, this organization of 1,400 people had 176 members currently in key government positions and

more than 400 others who previously had held such jobs.) Of considerable--perhaps even greater--importance is that the CFR has determined what the range of "respectable" options are and what is even "discussable."

2.5.2 BILDERBERG GROUP

In the drive to control and rationalize the economic system, U.S. capitalism has gone a long way in the cartelization of the country and in turning it into a corporative-mercantilist state (Miliband 1969; Hayek 1944; Dowd 1974). A similar movement has been taking place on the international scene, with huge transnational corporations and financial institutions dominating commerce (Barnet and Muller 1974; Magdoff 1969).

With the Western European economic recovery following World War II, it became obvious to the Western capitalist leaders that cooperation would be desirable and profitable. The need was seen to develop consensus, hold down competition, facilitate the "free" international movement of commerce and capital, and to present a united front, both to the Third World countries (whose resources and cheap labor they needed) and to the Socialist nations (whose competition they feared). Additionally, European nations were concerned

about a powerful United States operating independently without coordination with its European allies. It was from this wellspring that the Bilderberg organization first flowered and the Trilateral Commission later emerged (Sklar 1980).

The Bilderberg initial meeting was in 1954 in the Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Holland--hence the name for the group.⁴ The organization has held at least one gathering a year since then, except for 1976 when the meeting was cancelled after a scandal involving one of the major participants.

There are three types of participants. One is a core group of regular attendees; another is comprised of more powerful men on the advisory and steering committees, the latter being a group which selects all members. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board at Chase Manhattan Bank, is the acknowledged leader of the organization. The participants are a mix of the most powerful men from the transnational industrial and banking institutions and law firms in the Western capitalist world, particularly the NATO countries.

The third type of member is part of a changing group of high governmental officials, key congressmen, military leaders, representatives from intelligence and police

organizations such as the CIA and Interpol, members of the mass media, Rockefeller think tanks and foundations, and professors from the Establishment universities. Some of the people are regular attendees year after year and some are invited only once or twice. Specially selected academicians from prestige universities are invited to present papers on pre-selected topics of relevant interest. The U.S. representatives are from the core Ruling Cartel organizations, particularly from the Rockefeller institutions.

It is an impressive fact that several people who were invited to attend Bilderberg meetings later became heads of state. This phenomenon is contrasted (perhaps supplemented) by the fact that frequently former heads of state and men who formerly held high governmental office also attend.

The meetings are held in extreme secrecy, with great security precautions taken. The staff is not allowed to leave the premises during the three or four-day meeting period. All participants are sworn to secrecy, and it is made clear that anyone who talks with the press will not be invited back. The list of the participants is a closely guarded secret as are the subjects of discussion. All notes taken during the conference are burned and minutes and summaries are sent only to the attendees, including past

participants.

The most important aspects of the Bilderberg group are that it provides a secret meeting place where the prime movers in the Western capitalist world can meet and talk frankly, iron out problems, react to crises, coordinate activities, develop consensus and establish basic policies. Next, having the multinational levers of economic and political power at their disposal, they communicate the requisite information to the organizations and people in their power network for implementation (Sklar 1980, 171).

2.5.3 TRILATERAL COMMISSION

But the Bilderberg organization was not sufficient to meet the needs of the Western capitalist system in a changing world. The establishment and operation of the Trilateral Commission represent two important changes in the international power structure. The most significant one is the recognition of Japan as a major economic power along with the need to bring her into the top levels of capitalist cooperation. The second significant aspect is that the Commission represents to a certain extent the Bilderberg group coming out of the closet with a different mask on. (It also is of significance that no one from Japan has yet

to be invited to a Bilderberg meeting.)

But perhaps the most dramatic TLC phenomenon was the sweeping, overt occupation of the executive branch of the U.S. government under Carter. This in turn has been paralleled by the establishment of a pressure group to lobby specifically for Trilateral aims (Novak 1977, 1980; Sklar 1980; Baum 1976; Bird 1977; Chomsky 1977; Frieden 1977; Wemple 1977; Sutton and Wood 1978, 1981; Karpel [all]).

The Trilateral Commission is the brainchild of David Rockefeller and his apparatchik Zbigniew Brzezinski--the National Security Advisor to former President Carter. Brzezinski succeeded Henry Kissinger, another long time Rockefeller man who held the same position in the Nixon-Ford administration. (Kissinger, a Bilderberger and a CFR member, became a TLC participant after Carter assumed office.)

Brzezinski convinced his mentor, Rockefeller, of the need to form such an organization. Rockefeller broached the subject at the 1972 Bilderberg conference and found immediate approval. He then handpicked the members of the Trilateral Commission's Executive Committee (Novak 1977; Sklar 1980), and in 1973, fueled by Rockefeller money (mainly from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, plus his personal funds), the organization commenced business. Many

of the participants were Bilderbergers (Sklar 1980; Skousen [1972]; Sutton and Wood 1978, 1981). Of the 59 U.S. members as of 15 August 1975 at least 19 either had been to Bilderberg meetings or had come from institutions or organizations which had representatives at the Bilderberg meetings. (Because we only have information for less than one-half of the meetings, there might be more Bilderbergers on the Commission.) Many foreign TLC members also have appeared at Bilderberg conferences. All U.S. members of the advisory committee are from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Regardless of the individuals, most of the institutions represented on the Commission are of the same type as is found in the Bilderbergers: the most powerful transnational companies, international banks, key governmental officials (particularly of the "up and coming" variety), influential law firms representatives from Rockefeller think tanks, college professors who have the Rockefeller stamp of approval, and personnel from the Establishment press. Missing from the Commission are the military leaders and representatives from the internationally operating intelligence and police organizations such as are found on the Bilderberg list. Added to the TLC, however, are leaders from a few safely co-opted labor unions, perhaps to provide

the illusion of working class solidarity with the capitalist system, or--which is more likely--to bring key labor leaders into the international capitalist consensus.

How does the Commission operate? It has a permanent staff and members who work on position papers. The Commission as a whole meets in secret to deliberate on the papers and the problems of the Trilateral community. The Commission accepts the papers, which are then published. The TLC also takes formal stands on subjects of importance in world politics and publicizes these positions.

What are the aims of the TLC? The Commission speaks for itself (Frieden 1977, 14).

The overriding goal is to make the world safe for interdependence by protecting the benefits which it provides for each country against the external and internal threat which will constantly emerge from those willing to pay a price for more national autonomy. This may sometimes require slowing the pace at which interdependence proceeds, and checking some aspects of it. More frequently, however, it will call for checking the intrusion of national governments into the international exchange of economic and non-economic goods.

Those words are worth reading again, noting particularly the use of the words "internal threats" and the "checking of intrusion" into "non-economic goods". What a chilling paragraph, particularly when it is realized that this group controls the most powerful economic institutions

on earth and has political control over the Western capitalist governments, including the police, intelligence and military forces.

The influence and power of the Trilateral Commission and its Bilderberg nexus can be seen by the early handpicking of Jimmy Carter for the TLC by Brzezinski and Rockefeller, followed by Carter's steady financial and political nurturing toward the presidency. The most blatant display of power is the shown by the number of men selected by Carter from the TLC to be in his cabinet--at least 25, of which at least seven are Bilderbergers. It is also of significance that Carter's Vice President, Walter Mondale, has been not only on the TLC, but also has been a Bilderberg attendee. Furthermore, it was reported that, when President, Carter kept in contact with TLC headquarters to see what the latest studies were (Karpel 1977b; Novak 1977). For the most part the Carter administration policies seemed to be lifted almost directly from the TLC position papers and books.⁵

Although these policies were mostly economic in nature, the desire to control and effect change in the U.S. by the TLC was not limited to economics. The Commission expressed the necessity to muzzle the press and to repress civil liberties as necessary to that the President could govern

more "effectively" with minimal interference from the press and pluralistic pressures. As the TLC has indicated, democracy and capitalism are not compatible. Therefore, if the people are not apathetic and if they actively participate in the democratic process and make demands on the system, they will suffer repression (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975).

The foreign policy of the Trilateralists and the Carter administration regarding the Soviet Union had some contradictions. On one hand it marked the return to Cold War tactics of belligerence and intransigence toward the USSR, along with all the rhetoric with which the Cold War has been associated. This is in keeping with the writings of Brzezinski and with the policy of the Rockefeller people for several decades (Scheer 1975; Karpel 1977b). And yet, the TLC has also expressed the view that the USSR and the Eastern European countries could be brought into the international capitalist consensus as junior economic partners (Sklar 1980, 32-35). This seems to be a source of considerable disagreement within the Cartel.

2.5.4 ELECTIONS

The complexity of power and attitude relationships

within the American power structure can be seen by comparing the presidential elections of 1976 and 1980. In 1976, Ford, who was President, was a Bilderberger and CFR member. Elliot Richardson, a TLC participant, had presented himself as a possible presidential nominee. Carter and his Vice-presidential candidate were both from the TLC, with Mondale also being a Bilderberger.

The 1980 election was more complex. Running for the nomination on the Republican side were John Anderson, a TLC member who had the support of prominent Trilateralists; George Bush, a Bilderberger, CFR member and Trilateralist; Edward Kennedy, who had some TLC support; and of course, Carter (Sklar 1980, 576, 577).

Complicating the situation was the candidacy of John Connally and Ronald Reagan. Both openly attacked the Trilateral connections of the men running for both Republican and Democratic nominations. This was the first time that the TLC had been publicly exposed at such a high level of visibility. The situation was even more complex in the light of the fact that many Reagan advisory people were from just this Establishment wellspring, although they might have been from the more conservative element. However, knowing that this was a favorite topic among the very conservative Republicans, whose support was needed in order

to get the nomination, Reagan's TLC people perhaps were merely using the attacks on the Commission as a political ploy. As subsequent events showed, this probably was the case.

After Reagan won the nomination, an accommodation was reached whereby Bush became the actor's running mate, nothing more was said about the Trilateral Commission, and David Rockefeller's support was forthcoming. This is parallel to the situation of Richard Nixon in 1960, when, after winning the nomination, he had to accept the conditions of Nelson Rockefeller before receiving Rockefeller and Establishment support (Silk and Silk 1980, 284, 284).

Despite the differences among various candidates, the range of opinions is still narrow when compared to the full width of possible options and approaches. The fact is that these varying opinions represent merely the range of acceptable dissent within the Ruling Cartel plus some accommodation to the pressures from the Right Wing. The Cartel still remains firmly in control regardless of which party is in power. The nominees from both parties are either Establishment people or must submit to Cartel demands in order to be elected.

2.5.5 DECISION MAKERS

A useful way of looking at Cartel control is to tabulate the ruling elite organizations with connections to personnel in the key positions in the executive branch from the Eisenhower years through the Reagan administration through August 1982 (Wemple 1977; Sklar 1980; Liberty Lobby [1975]; Spotlight 1984a, 1984b).

1. Secretary of State: Seven men, all from the CFR; six were Bilderbergers, two of whom also were from the TLC; a fifth man was from a prestige law firm which had two Bilderbergers.
2. Secretary of Defense: Nine men; six from the CFR, two of whom were Bilderbergers and three from the TLC; two were from the Business Advisory Council (formerly a very influential Establishment business organization).
3. Secretary of Treasury: eleven men; five from the CFR, two of whom were Bilderbergers, one of whom also was on the TLC; one was from the largest Wall Street brokerage house.
4. Director of CIA: Eight men: six from the CFR, one of whom was a Bilderberger; and one was a Trilateralist.

Also, the head of the CIA under Truman helped establish the Bilderbergers.

5. National Security Advisor: Ten men: eight from CFR, of whom six were Bilderbergers, with two also from the TLC.

It should be stressed that the above figures represent a conservative, minimal tabulation of the elite connections of the incumbents in these positions. Full information on these organizations' memberships is not available, particularly on the Bilderbergers. Participant lists of only one-half of the Bilderberg meetings have been recovered.

It also is of significance that many of the men who held high positions or who performed special functions in the Truman administration were from the CFR and became Bilderbergers--men such as Dean Acheson, Averill Harriman, Paul Hoffman and George Kennan.

This shows that, although administrations come and go, it generally makes little difference who is in "power"--Democrats or Republicans. The occupiers of the positions of political power in the U.S., particularly regarding foreign policy, almost always come from the same pot.

2.6 METHODS OF IDEA AND INFORMATION CONTROL

Institutions such as the major foundations, universities and think tanks have a great impact on development and inculcation of ideas and information. They form a close, pentagonal relationship with the governmental and corporate worlds (Whittaker 1974, 166; Domhoff 1967, 1979; Knowles 1973; Dye 1976). The corporate directors, trustees and key personnel are linked together and with the prime ruling class institutions such as the CFR, TLC, Bilderbergers and Committee for Economic Development (CED). Foundations financially support those four organizations as well as universities and think tanks. Much research is done for these four institutions as well as corporations and the government at the elite universities and think tanks.

Analysis of the prime Rockefeller men as presented by Knowles (1973, 47-50), and a reading of Dye's (1976, 130-133) list of the nation's top corporate interlockers show us how important the foundations, universities and think tanks are for control by the most powerful Americans. Knowles' 35 corporate board members have sat on the boards of trustees of 20 of the top foundations, 16 think tanks and

19 universities. Dye's top men are trustees of 18 foundations, 25 universities and six think tanks.

2.6.1 FOUNDATIONS

The subject of foundations is much more complex than the view we usually receive from the mass media (Lundberg 1968, 513). Foundations provide economic and political linkage among all the other institutions. From the economic viewpoint they can do anything a commercial bank or corporation can do, but without regulation or public supervision, and they can do it tax free. By obviating taxes, the wealth (and power) can be retained in the hands of the family or corporation rather than having it dissipated into the public coffers. Control of family or core corporations can be maintained by using the foundation to own a substantial share of stock and by self-perpetuating boards of friendly interlocking trustees. By adding stocks of your foundation with that of other friendly sources such as relatives and banks, control over many corporations can be effected.

From the non-economic standpoint, foundations "have power to . . . set the limits within which cultural and intellectual quests are undertaken" by setting funding

agendas and defining questions of importance for research (Lundberg 1968, 473). Politically, they are good training grounds for future decision makers of the power elite. From the power viewpoint, the historian Arthur Schlesinger (Shoup and Minter 1977, 63) stated that "the heart of the American Establishment . . . is the New York financial and legal community." Its "front organizations are the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie Foundations and the Council on Foreign Relations." Other social scientists conclude that the foundations are extremely significant in the maintenance of group power and in the multinational linking of ruling elites (Whittaker 1974, 12, 179).

The control of the foundation is in the hands of the trustees, a self-perpetuating body, usually controlled by the sponsoring corporation or family (Whittaker 1974, 125). Domhoff (1967, 69, 70) noted that in 12 of the top 13 foundations the power elite is in control, with two-thirds of the trustees being members of the upper class or from major corporations. The rest are mostly from universities. The more powerful families and their institutions control not just one foundation, but several: the Mellons at least six, the du Ponts at least nine, and the Rockefellers at least ten. Even more significantly, there is considerable interlocking among the foundations' trustees themselves.

It is not just on the board of trustees where control is sought. Domination of a foundation's finance committee is vitally important, because it is here where control over the investments of the organization is maintained. The Rockefeller people have long been in control of both the trustees and the finance committee of the Ford Foundation and several other large foundations (Dye 1976; Domhoff 1967).

The place of the foundations in the power structure is shown by the fact that historically the large New York foundations have been run by members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (Whittaker 1974, 97). Conversely, these foundations have financed the CFR endeavors. The same relationships exist with the CED, TLC and Bilderbergers. A prime example of how this interlocking works is found in the situation with John J. McCloy in the 1950s. He was the top man at the flagship Rockefeller institution--Chase-Manhattan Bank. As chairman of the Ford Foundation, he provided money to the CFR, of which he was chairman, to make a special study of Russian-American relations which was chaired by himself (Whittaker 1974, 11).

Governmental interlocking also is normal. Many of the past Secretaries of State were in high positions or were trustees of major foundations before assuming their key

government job. One researcher concluded that what the foundations did internationally was seldom done "without the approval of Washington" (Whittaker 1974, 100, 181). McGeorge Bundy, head of the Ford Foundation for many years, was reported saying of a particular project that he had to clear it with the White House before proceeding with his approval.

Foundations have been used frequently by the CIA as conduits for money and activities which the government did not want to become publicly known (Whittaker 1974, 144-166)⁶. The CIA set up its own dummy foundations as well as using 39 legitimate foundations. Additionally, foundation personnel move into the CIA as part of the selection process which parallels that of the State Department. Conversely, CIA personnel transfer into foundations after their tenures are over (supposedly) with the intelligence organization.

In addition to these governmental relationships, the foundation trustees have interlocks with the major multinational corporations. Such positions allow them to encourage or to disapprove efforts of foundations which could either have a beneficial or deleterious effect on multinational corporations' interests abroad (Whittaker 1974, 220).

How would the projects and accomplishments of the

foundations be assessed? Regardless of an evaluation of an individual project, most foundation money goes directly or indirectly for support of corporate goals or in maintaining the current power system (Lundberg 1968, 499; Whittaker 1974, 136). No matter what projects might benefit the people, foundation money does not go to groups or to individuals who desire basic change or who reveal how the system really works. (There are no major, significant radical foundations.) One study showed that only one percent of foundation projects could be considered controversial and only three percent were innovative (Whittaker 1974, 193, 214). (C. Wright Mills was cut off from foundation support after he wrote the Power Elite.)

So the foundations are the prime media through which the Ruling Cartel greatly determines what will flourish, what will die and what will remain untouched in economic, scientific and technical development, in social experimentation, in new communications media and their proliferation, and for new political and cultural institutions. All this is done with an eye on the maintenance of social control and the general development of the existing economic, political and power system.

It is ironic that the money the foundations are spending comes from the labor of the people: from the people

who produce the wealth for the corporations; and from the people who pay the prices the corporations set for their goods and services. The people pay again when this wealth goes untaxed and they, the taxpayers, have to make up for it out of their pockets. The people are paying for their own social control.

2.6.2 THINK TANKS

The think tank interlocking system is rather complex, because it can appear in a variety of ways. In addition to being a fully independent entity, the research organization can be a part of a university; it can be located at a university, but operated separately, theoretically, yet have university personnel; it can be composed of a consortium of universities (such as the Institute for Defense Analysis); it can be a spinoff from a university; a university can manage one of the Federal Consultant Research Centers (one-half of these are managed by universities); individual professors can be consultants for think tanks; professors can set up their own, small, profit-making research companies (and some not so small); and universities get research contracts directly from the government, particularly from the Defense Department (Ridgeway 1970, 5).

Sklar (Sklar 1980, 187) lists the primary "moderate" Ruling Cartel think tanks as the Brookings Institution (the oldest), the Rand Corporation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. Domhoff (1979) adds the Urban Institute, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Resources for the Future, the Stanford Research Institute (now known as SRI, Inc.), and the Center for International Studies at MIT.

These major institutes and those connected with universities operate primarily with foundation money, whereas smaller, more specialized think tanks are more likely to receive government and business contracts. Think tanks can be set up quickly when the Cartel decides there is a major problem which must be dealt with and which must be controlled by the ruling elite. These institutions are funded by the big foundations. The boards of trustees are dominated by foundation personnel and have links with the CFR and the CED.

The Brookings Institution holds a special place in the world of think tanks. It not only is the oldest--working closely with moderate, ruling class reformist organizations such as the National Civic Federation in the early 1900s--Dye (1976, 114-116) claims that it has recently supplanted even the Committee for Economic Development in

importance and now is the dominant domestic policy planning body, designing many of the liberal programs in the 1960s.

Domhoff (1979, 76, 77) says that in addition to conducting study groups and research, the Brookings Institution is "even more important as a kind of post-graduate school for expert advisors." It provides new ideas as well as highly qualified people for the government and for other elite organizations and institutions. Since it was founded in the 1920s, Brookings personnel have served in all administrations. It is highly interlocked with the CFR, CED and other key Cartel organizations such as Wall Street law firms and banks (Dye 1976).

2.6.3 UNIVERSITIES

The elite universities are closely integrated with the think tank-government-foundation-corporate network.⁷ In addition to being sites for such organizations, university personnel swing in and out of the big think tanks such as the Brookings Institution. These same universities are also recipients of large grants from the major foundations. Most of the trustees of the major foundations also are on the boards of trustees of the elite educational institutions (and vice-versa), and the top university personnel are on

the boards of directors of major corporations. They participate in the powerful ruling class political organizations--even though perhaps temporarily on some of them--such as the CFR and the TLC.

It is very instructive to look historically at the development of the U.S. educational system, particularly in relation to the American ruling class and the changing needs of the U.S. capitalist system. Before the Civil War, universities were generally small, private and church-oriented and with a curriculum devoted mainly to the classics. But with the amassing of the great fortunes, the concentration of power, and the changes in the industrial factory system, the needs of American capitalism changed in relation to education. The economic system needed highly trained people to administer the system and to provide for the technical and scientific needs of it. With the great wealth at their disposal, Rockefeller and Carnegie, through their foundations, changed the face of American education. Funds from business were the greatest source of income for higher educational institutions from 1872 to 1905. Not only did new colleges spring up, but those which did not want to agree to the conditions demanded of the philanthropists generally disappeared.

The emphasis of the "robber baron" money was on the

development of elite schools. From 1902 to 1934 only twenty institutions were beneficiaries of 73% of the foundations' grants. The main emphasis of the Rockefellers was "to promote a comprehensive system of higher education in the United States" (Smith, D.N., 1974, 104). The Carnegie Foundation set up rigid rules for universities to follow. These conditions formed the bases of higher education which we still have today.

After World War II another significant step was reached by the economic system. Corporations had become even larger and more complex, necessitating hiring more highly qualified administrators, lawyers, and managers and requiring a greater number of more highly trained technical and scientifically qualified people.

Foundation, corporation and government action was intertwined. The passage of a bill providing for corporate tax deductions for contributions to universities paved the way for large amounts of money from big business. The GI Bill was passed. There was a great surge in foundation development and subsequent giving to universities.

The major foundations combined their forces to form the Council for Financial Aid to Education (CYAE). The chairmen and directors were former presidents of elite schools, directly from the corporate world and from the foundations

themselves. The organization's goals, clearly stated to be for the benefit of business, were "(1) new knowledge through research and competent teaching; (2) an adequate supply of educated manpower; (3) an economic, social and political climate in which companies ... can survive and continue to progress" (Smith, D.N., 123). The man who was appointed to direct this commission was from the core Rockefeller financial institution, the Equitable Life Insurance Company, as well as from the Carnegie Corporation.

But there was more to all this than just to provide for a more suitable work force. One continuously stated goal was to indoctrinate the workers to be willing participants in the system and to eradicate any radical elements which would question the system and try to change it or overthrow it (Weinstein 1968, 133, 134; Smith, D.N., 1974, 87, 89).

This was occurring, not just with higher education, but with all education. Bowles and Gintis (1977) trace the history of educational reform in the U.S. and see the following principles at work continuously:

1. The demands for changes in education follow changes in capitalist development, i.e., from the cottage industry to factory production and from single factory to huge, multi-factory conglomerate corporations.

2. These changes create demands of industry for higher educated, more highly trained people to perform the tasks desired.
3. Although primarily benefitting business, this education would be paid for by the public.
4. Workers needed to be properly socialized so as to be able to endure the regimentation, authoritarianism and boring work of factories.
5. Workers needed to be indoctrinated to believe in the system, particularly immigrant children who might have received dangerous, radical ideas from their parents, and also the students from the areas of the country where there were Populist and labor challenges to the system.
6. Schools would act as holding tanks for too much surplus labor, particularly youths in large urban areas where social unrest might breed.

Bowles and Gintis note that at each step of the way--but not without opposition--business people and sympathetic professionals won out in the power struggle over the question of whose values would dominate, who would hold the power positions in the educational system, what the system structure would be and how it would be controlled. As with the development of our existing system of higher

education, the wealthy, large foundations, particularly those of Carnegie and Rockefeller, financed most of the change-related activity. The Progressive Era, which brought progressive education with it, was part of the larger movement--which was originated and dominated by the Eastern elites--which resulted in many economic and political reforms. Although there was opposition, this was gradually accomplished, bringing the country at the national and local levels more firmly under elite control (Domhoff 1971; Weinstein 1968).

Now we need to look more closely at the major universities and the educational system as a whole to see how they fit into the American power structure. Domhoff (1967, 77-79) says that "control of America's leading universities by members of the American Business aristocracy is more direct than with any other institution which they control."

The top power positions are the regents or trustees. Universities are set up basically on a corporate model: hierarchical, authoritarian and bureaucratic. The board of trustees controls the general direction plus as many specific aspects of university administration as it

desires. Various studies over the years show that the trustees come from the core of the local, state and national power structures (Dugger 1974, 108; Smith 1974, 38-55). Knowles' (1973) list of the 35 top Rockefeller men shows interlocks with the leading universities by 24 of them; Dye's tabulation of 24 top interlockers indicates twenty men having connections with 27 such institutions.

But the situation has gone far beyond the mere control of the university by regents, even though the regents today are claimed to be involving themselves much more deeply in the operation of the universities, at lower levels in the hierarchy, and in more subject areas than ever before (Dugger 1974). A major transformation has taken place since World War II which has progressively tied the universities more closely and intimately with the corporate and governmental world (Dugger 1974, 110; Ridgeway 1970):

1. Presidents and other high administrators, if not chosen from the corporate world, are brought into it by making them directors of corporations and by cutting them into business deals.
2. The growth of the number of professors consulting for corporations and the government has lead to a combination of their being on boards of directors of corporations and to developing their own corporations,

some of which have become multimillion dollar operations.

3. The most important phenomenon is government contracts to universities, to university-associated think tanks and research organizations, and to individual professors. This has produced military-corporate-university cooperation to such a degree that a complete structure of economic and political interest has been created, drawing the major universities tightly into the Establishment's corporate and military orbit, and supporting the ruling class' foreign and domestic policies sociologically, economically and politically, including assisting in wars, in covert intelligence operations and in the full range of needs of the multinational corporations (Noble 1982; Rosenau 1982; Nation 1982; Ridgeway 1970).
4. The major universities are big businesses themselves. Knowles says that they are even "more useful for the purpose of corporate control than are the foundations," because they "are like bank trust department holdings in the fact that they centralize the wealth of many." They are investors of billions of dollars in stocks and bonds, owners of land and

businesses, slumlords and urban renewal effectuators.

This increasing intertwining of interests of the university with the military and corporate worlds has resulted not only in the trustees and high administrators being interlocked with ruling class institutions, but also more and more of the professors being drawn into the same orbit, sharing the same world view of the multinational corporations and the U.S. ruling class. To the administrators the teaching and learning process at best has become a sideline institutionally, except for the concerns of the fields which will contribute directly to corporate needs. This results not just in neglect of the student, but also in increased repression of unorthodox views, particularly economic ones (Dugger 1974; Ridgeway 1970).

Several observers of higher education--politicians, social scientists and university presidents--have made the following statements regarding the place of the universities in modern capitalist society (Miliband 1969, 223; Dugger 1974, 256, 312, 362; Smith 1974, 53; Galbraith 1967, 370, 371; Ridgeway 1970, v):

Universities heed the requirements of the business world.

Universities are almost completely directed toward making the private enterprise system work effectively and

beneficially.

Universities are part of the corporate orbit.

Universities are locked tightly into the corporate power structure.

Universities are financed by the Establishment and answerable to it.

Universities are controlled by the ruling class and serve the interests of that class.

2.7 METHODS OF MASS MEDIA CONTROL

What is the place of the major mass media organizations in the American power structure? Most of the researchers referred to in the first chapter say that the media are a significant part of the system. But the media, themselves, frequently claim that they are separated from the system, that they are simply mirrors, objectively reflecting the reality of the world. Indeed, they claim they are the watchdogs of the system on behalf of the public. Before we can analyze their actual functioning in American society in subsequent chapters, we must first assess their place in the U.S. power structure as we have done with other major

institutions.

2.7.1 THE COMMERCIAL TV NETWORKS

Because the three television networks have the most basic influence and the greatest direct impact on the mass of Americans than any of the other mass news media (Roper 1979; Broadcasting 1982f), the question of who owns and controls the networks is an extremely important one. All three corporations are large, multinational conglomerates which historically have been high up in the top half of the ⁸ Fortune 500 (1977).

The critical questions are who owns a potentially dominant share of the stock and who are the members of the boards of directors. The study containing the most complete analysis of stockholdings was made in 1972 (Network Project ⁹ 1973a). It shows that institutional investors and the networks' boards of directors had 61.1% of CBS, 36.*% of RCA and 76% of ABC. The holding of CBS stock by identifiable Cartel banks and insurance companies was 17%; that of RCA was between nine and eleven percent; and it was 24% in ABC.

An analysis of the 1972 boards of directors of the three networks reveals even further the core Ruling Cartel domination. (This is not a recent phenomenon. When RCA and

CBS were first established, the Rockefeller and Morgan banks held large--controlling--quantities of stock in the companies and had many representatives on the boards of directors (Waldrop and Borkin 1938, 222-225).) The Cartel financial institutions and their associated corporations interlock with the networks in the following manner: four of the 18 directors of RCA; ten of 18 of CBS; and six of 14 of ABC. The top network executives which are on the boards of directors of their corporations are Cartel interlockers. Almost to a man the Cartel representatives are Ivy League educated and are members of exclusive social clubs (such as the Century Club).

But these men are also interlocked with organizations other than some of the major financial, industrial and social institutions of the U.S. and the world. As members of the Power Elite they play important roles in the U.S. federal government, both by holding government positions and by participating in the elite Cartel organizations, particularly the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development (CED), the National Advertising Council and the Business Roundtable. CBS had by far the greatest number of these ruling class interlocks--18, compared with six for RCA and four for ABC.

At other levels of government, employees of the networks have held significant jobs or relationships. Frank Stanton, the number two man at CBS at the time of the Network Project study, was a director of the CIA front, Radio Free Europe, and was a friend and confidant of Lyndon Johnson. The President of CBS-TV Service, Frank Shakespeare, was the director of the Nixon presidential media campaign in 1968 and the next year became head of the United States Information Service (USIA). NBC president Robert Kintner was a White House aide and speech writer for Johnson. General Sarnoff of NBC was on a special National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, whose other four members included the Chairmen of the boards of AT&T and ITT. Previous Voice of America directors were newsmen Ed Murrow (CBS), John Chancellor (NBC), and John Daly (ABC). Several people, including Walter Cronkite, had close, personal relationships with the CIA, as did Sig Mickelson--President of CBS News--who ran Radio Free Europe (Film documentary On Company Business; Baybak 1979b; Schorr 1977; Bernstein 1977; Conversation of author with Allan Francovich, producer-director of On Company Business).

There is yet another area of relationships which needs to be described--the interlocks among the three networks themselves. Using the same 1972 information, the directors

of the networks were on many of the same boards involving financial, industrial and social organizations. CBS was linked with ABC six times and with NBC five; NBC had seven with ABC. Although there were four interlocks on social, cultural or educational institutions and one on an industrial company, probably the most significant were the five on boards of financial institutions. The most important ones were probably those with First National City Bank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust, where representatives of all three networks sat.

Another facet of the networks is the role they play in the military industrial complex. In 1971 RCA (the NBC parent) was eighth among industrial prime contractors to NASA and 21st among prime contractors to the Defense Department. CBS Incorporated (the parent company) also had many contracts with the Defense Department, the Department of Interior, and with NASA. ABC had no direct, significant relationships with the military.

From the above information it is apparent that the controlling authorities of the three commercial TV networks are not a disinterested group of men who are outside the mainstream of power and influence in the U.S.. To the contrary, they participate directly and indirectly at some of the highest levels of government and corporate power.

2.7.2 PRINT MEDIA

The economic and sociological backgrounds of the people who own the most influential voices of the print media have not been widely studied. However, Dreier (1982), Domhoff (1967), and Dreier and Weinberg (1979) provide significant information.

Domhoff notes that, except for Pittsburgh, there is at least one newspaper owned by a Social Register listee in every city which has such a publication which tabulates their upper class members. Outside of the Social Register cities there are papers owned by such blue blooded families as the Chandlers of Los Angeles, the Hobbys of Houston and the Binghams of Louisville. The most influential upper class newspaper is the New York Times, which, along with the equally aristocratically owned Washington Post, is frequently referred to as the Eastern Liberal Establishment press. Their influence is considerably greater than their circulation numbers alone would indicate, because they are habitually read by governmental and corporate officials. Additionally, they are closely scanned by the news personnel at the TV networks to see what was covered and how it was treated in order to keep the networks' stories within the

bounds enunciated by these two newspapers, particularly the Times (Halberstam 1976; Epstein 1973).

Domhoff also notes that the Knight-Ridder and Scripps-Howard newspaper chains are owned by people who are in the Social Register. Although most newspapers are not owned by members of the upper class, the two major news magazines are--Time and Newsweek. The Time, Inc., and Cowles empires of mixed mass media are owned by members of the upper class through birth, financial interests or marriage. Other magazines with significant upper class ownership or heavy financial support range from the conservative National Review of William Buckley, to the liberal New Republic and the New York Review of Books.

Another way of ascertaining the degree of Ruling Cartel control and influence on the major newspapers is to look at the backgrounds and affiliations of the people on the boards of directors of these companies. By combining the material compiled by Dreier and Weinberg with the information previously presented, we can make some clear conclusions. The 24 largest newspaper companies, whose daily newspapers account for more than half of the circulation of all U.S. papers and which are found in the largest American cities, have a composite total of 300 directors on their boards. The interlocks of these directors tie these newspapers in

Table 1

Newspaper Directors' Participation in Cartel Organizations

Organization	*Papers With Links	Total Links
CFR	11	21
CED	10	13
Bilderbergers/TLC	**6	16
Business Roundtable, Conference Board, Natl. Assn. of Manufacturers, Committee on the Present Danger, Foreign Policy Assn.	7	16
Chamber of Commerce	7	25
Ad Council	8	9
Total		100

*Total number of papers considered is 24

**If the count is based on corporations which have been represented at a Bilderberg meeting or the Trilateral Commission instead of just an individual who was an attendee, the number is 13 instead of 6.

Table 2

Media Participants in Bilderbergers, 1950s and 1960s

	55	57	58	63	64	66	67	68
<u>NY Times</u>		a				accc	c	c
<u>Wash Post</u>							ca*	
<u>Time, Inc.</u>	a*	a*	a*	a*	a*	b	a*	
<u>Newsweek</u>								
<u>Wall St Jrn</u>								
<u>Chrsto Sci Mon</u>		c	c			c		
<u>Atl Constituto</u>		b				b		
<u>NBC (RCA)</u>		a						
<u>CBS</u>		a		a*		a*		
<u>Cowles</u>	a	a				a		
<u>Louisvl Courir</u>	a					a		
<u>Bill Moyers</u>							c	c
<u>John Gunther</u>	c	c						
<u>Denver Post</u>		a						
<u>Natl Rvw</u>								
<u>Forgn Affrs</u>								
<u>Times-Mirror</u>								
<u>Belo Corp.</u>								
Total	4	9	2	2	1	10	5	2

Note: All but eight are also members of Council on Foreign Relations. Five of the eight belong to Rockefeller organizations.

Note: Foreign Affairs is official journal of CFR.

a: Executive, publisher, director

b: Editor, managing editor

c: Reporter, writer, columnist (mainly syndicated columnists)

*: The person is not primarily occupied in the mass media

Table 3

Media Participants in Bilderbergers in 1970s,
and Participant Totals, 1954-1978

	71	74	75	78	Totals (1954-1978)
<u>NY Times</u>	a*		c		9
<u>Wash Post</u>				c	3
<u>Time, Inc.</u>		b		a	9
<u>Newsweek</u>	a*			c	2
<u>Wall St Jrn</u>				b	1
<u>Chrsto Sci Mon</u>					3
<u>Atl Constitn</u>					2
NBC (RCA)					1
CBS	a*				4
Cowles					3
<u>Louisvl Courir</u>					2
Bill Moyers	c	c	c		5
John Gunther					2
<u>Denver Post</u>					1
<u>Natl Rvw</u>			c		1
<u>Forgn Affrs</u>		b			1
<u>Times-Mirror</u>				a	1
Belo Corp.				a	1
Total	4	3	3	6	51

Note: All but eight are also members of Council on Foreign Relations. Five of the eight belong to Rockefeller organizations.

Note: Foreign Affairs is official journal of CFR.

a: Executive, publisher, director

b: Editor, managing editor

c: Reporter, writer, columnist (mainly syndicated columnists)

*: The person is not primarily occupied in the mass media

Table 4

Media Participants In Trilateral Commission

	Exec/Pblshr/ Drctr	Rptr/columnist/ writer	Editor/ Mngng Edtr
<u>NY Times</u>	2a,b		
<u>Wash. Post</u>	1b	1a	
Time, Inc.	1a,b 1a		
<u>Wall St. Jrn.</u>	1b		
NBC (RCA)	1b		
CBS	1a 1b,c		
Cowles	1a		
<u>Foreign Policy</u>	1		1a
Field Entpris.	1	1	1
Times-Mirror	1a,b		
Belo Corp.	1a,b		
Media Genrl.	1b		
Total	15	2	2

Note: All media people in TLC are also members of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), except two, of which one is a member of a Rockefeller organization and the other is in government service.

a Also a Bilderberg member

b Mass Media are not primary pursuit

c Not in CFR, but is member of Rockefeller organization

with the mainstream of the Cartel, not just with the big corporations, but also with the most important political, cultural and educational institutions, including the CFR, CED and Bilderbergers. (See table 1.) These 24 news companies have over 200 direct interlocks with the Fortune 1,300--the 1,000 largest industrials and 50 each of the largest banks, insurers, financial companies, utilities, retailers and transportation companies. There are 38 direct interlocks with the 50 largest banks as well as 45 additional ones with other banking institutions. All but four of the companies are strongly connected with these financial institutions, and these four have one interlock each with a bank.

A closer look at the director relationships shows that some of these newspaper companies are more intimately tied in with the U.S. power structure than some of the others. Field, Minneapolis Star, Washington Post, Dow Jones (publisher of the Wall Street Journal), and New York Times companies are in this category. They have a greater percentage of outside directors than the others (except for the Post whose outside directors compose only one fourth of the board); they have more people with memberships in the

elite political organizations; and are tied in with the greater number of largest institutional investors. Dow Jones and the New York Times companies lead the way in this regard.

However, the Cartel people are found in most of the companies. Some of the interlocks might be of greater significance than others. For instance, on the board of Ford Motor Company sit representatives of the Washington Post, New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. Chemical Bank of New York (a core Rockefeller institution) has two interlocks with Dow Jones and one each with the New York Times and Thomson (one of the largest chains.) The bank previously had directors from the Affiliated and Scripps chains. There are six other companies which have interlocks with two of these 24 newspaper firms.

There are 21 interlocks with the core Cartel financial institutions and several with elite law firms. The interlocking with universities, foundations and think tanks is very extensive, but mostly with the local and state institutions. The elite organizations of this nature are represented in the people who are also intimately interlocked with the other prime Cartel organizations.

It also is of significance to note that nine newspaper companies had twelve interlocks with the Associated Press

and three with United Press International (UPI). One of the companies, Scripps, owned UPI until recently. This, along with the information which shows that the elite newspapers and the TV networks are represented on the board of directors of the AP, indicate that the two wire services also are part of the power system (Dreier and Weinberg 1979; Armstrong 1979; Broadcasting 1976a).

2.7.3 THE MEDIA AND THE POWER STRUCTURE

The participation of mass media members in the three key elite political organizations have been mentioned briefly. The fact that the media have ignored reporting on the TLC, CFR and Bilderbergers indicates either that they have not participated in these groups or that they have participated in them and have not reported and commented on them. But we previously mentioned that people from both the print and electronic media are, in fact, members of these organizations. Therefore, we must look at this more closely (Liberty Lobby [1975]; Spotlight 1979b; Dunsmore 1980; Eringer 1980; Foner 1979; Nicholas 1978a, 1978b; Potts 1978).

First, the Bilderbergers. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the participation in the organization. Incomplete information

is a problem because twelve years of guest lists--about one-half--have not been revealed or uncovered. No working member of the press is at the highest levels, i.e., the advisory or steering committees, although two such committee members--Gardner Cowles and C.D. Jackson--have been prime officials in Cowles Publications and Time, Inc., respectively. The top officials from the prime Establishment newspapers--New York Times and Washington Post--do attend with regularity, but only on a composite basis. Individuals do not reappear each year as do the most influential men. An average of almost four representatives from the press have attended these meetings, with a minimum of one (once) and a maximum of ten. There has been a press representative at each gathering, with a working member being at nine of the twelve meetings about which information is available.

What has been the participation of the mass media in the Trilateral Commission? (Sklar 1980; Wemple 1977; Skousen [1972]; Sutton and Wood 1978, 1981) As Table 4 shows, we see the same institutions represented and the same power relationships as noted in the Bilderbergers. Almost half of the media TLC participants up to 1979 were also Bilderbergers. Only four of the 21 were working members of the press and only one executive had a primary role in news

gathering.

The study of the media and The Council on Foreign Relations presents revealing phenomena (Lukas 1971; New York Times 1966a). Shoup and Minter (1977) show significant participation in the CFR by members of the Establishment print media, particularly the New York Times. In 1972 three of the ten Times directors and five of nine editorial executives belong to the CFR. Talese's (1969) index shows at least twenty people associated with the Times who belong to the elite organization. Many of these are interlockers with the Bilderbergers and the TLC, including columnists James Reston and Max Frankel and executives and editors such as the Sultzbergers. The Washington Post also participates in the CFR, although not to the extent that the Times does. In 1972, nine Post directors were members including the prime working executives. The Post's sister publication, the news magazine Newsweek, also had a number of connections. Newsweek's rival, Time magazine, was even more heavily interlocked with the CFR. Allen (1971) lists other publications such as Fortune, Life, Look, Los Angeles Times, the New York Post (under its previous owner), Saturday Review, Harpers, and Business Week along with the book publishers McGraw-Hill, Simon and Schuster, and Book of the Month.

Except for ABC the TV networks also are represented in the CFR, and for the first time we see working members of TV network news, such as Daniel Schorr, Marvin Kalb and John Chancellor, as participants in an elite Cartel organization. The legendary Ed Murrow of CBS also was a member. A fascinating insight into media participation in the CFR was made by Murrow when he observed that "they probably want me to do some dirty work for them!" (Kendrick 1969, 135). At the network executive level there were four CFR members in 1972.

The pervasive nature of the CFR in the media can be seen by observing how many of the organization's media participants interlock with the Bilderbergers and the TLC. Of the 44 Bilderberg media participants, all are CFR members but eight, of whom five have other elite connections such as the CED or Brookings Institution. It is unknown if the remaining three are Council members, although they come from institutions or corporations which do have strong CFR connections. Of the 21 Trilateral Commissioners from the media, all are from the CFR except for four, who have other elite connections. The one without such credentials is the Black syndicated columnist Carl Rowan.

From the information in tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, two observations can be made. First, the media are not at the

top levels of power. Second, there is a glaring absence of representatives from the electronic media, the only ones being directors from NBC and CBS who (with the exception of Sarnoff) have no prime management interest or working function in the networks. Third, the reporters who are invited are nationally syndicated columnists--none known for their critical views of the Establishment--and these are mainly from the Times, with lesser participation from the Post and the Christian Science Monitor.

The preceding analysis shows the position of the leading mass media companies' personnel in the national power structure. Some of the outside directors are at or near the highest levels in the Cartel, but the inside directors are at much lower levels. Although the latter are not prime decision makers, they can be considered very important functionaries. The publisher of the New York Times is well aware of the position of his newspaper in U.S. society (Silk and Silk 1980, 92-103). "We are the Establishment. That's why (my friends and business associates) are so surprised when we write against them." Concerning the reporting of business issues, Sulzberger said that "they want to have only the good news reported, and our job is to report also some (emphasis mine) of the bad news as well as the good." David Rockefeller observed, "It has

long been my impression that the Times conceives its objective to be on the side of the people versus business. I don't agree with that prejudice" (Silk and Silk 1980, 95).

What is the function of the core Ruling Cartel organizations in relation to the media, and vice versa? It is the organizations' job to see that the media corporations and key personnel participate in the Cartel's consensus formation. For the media's part, they must censor what is necessary, distort and obfuscate where required and attempt to ensure that the proper responses are made or at least are kept within acceptable limits.

This has been extremely successful so far. A minuscule amount has been printed and next to nothing has been broadcast by the networks--only one brief mention about the TLC by ABC and CBS (Vanderbilt University Library 1981). The key Cartel groups still toil in anonymity as far as the mass of Americans are concerned. It is vitally necessary to our rulers to hide from the American people the reality of the way the country and its international relationships are controlled by a few people in the ruling class and their trusted elite collaborators.

2.7.4 THE MEDIA AND THE CIA

Now that we see the interlocking social, political and economic relationships of the media with the top layers of the Ruling Cartel, it is easy to understand how simple it was for the Establishment print and electronic media to cooperate with the CIA at home and abroad. As was mentioned previously, the top executives had personal, friendly relationships with the heads of the CIA. They all circulated in the same circles. Most were Bilderbergers and CFR members. Having the approval, even the urging of their top leaders, it is also easy to understand how the reporters and columnists could become involved in a special relationship with the CIA, especially those journalists who were fellow members of the elite Cartel organizations. The result is that it is relatively easy to flood the country with CIA disinformation, particularly the CIA has so many media assets around the world and especially when governmental officials and the Establishment press are in on the consensus (conversation with former CIA official John Stockwell and co-editor of Covert Action Information Bulletin, Louis Wolf).

2.8 CONCLUSION

How can we assess the composite phenomenon of the Trilateral Commission, Bilderbergers, Council on Foreign Relations and all the other institutions and people comprising the Ruling Cartel? Does it represent a secret conspiracy? The labelling of power structure studies as merely conspiracy theories is used both in a positive and negative way. A conspiracy theory accusation can be beneficial when critiquing wild claims which are made without adequate empirical evidence and with oversimplification of issues and social phenomena. Such is the case during times of Red-baiting hysteria and witchhunts; when much of the world's ills are attributed to an international Jewish conspiracy; or when the Rockefellers are seen as agents of the Kremlin.

However, the most prevalent use of the term "conspiracy theory" seems to be made by many people in academia and the press to disparage and discourage power structure studies, particularly when these studies fly into the face of cherished myths of pluralism or reveal the true nature of power relationships. Consequently, the efforts of power

structure writers are severely distorted, dismissed out of hand or ignored altogether.

The pluralist writings found in Curry and Brown's Conspiracy, The Fear of Subversion in American History (1972) provide good examples of such distorted treatment. By lumping together many groups and movements, the opinions and streams of thought which are the most bizarre are used to deny legitimacy to the other analyses which are more reasonable and based on more evidence. For instance, the anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon conspiracy writers, the Ku Klux Klan proponents and the Red baiters of the McCarthy era are treated in the same supercilious manner as are the Populist thinkers, the Socialist Party members and the people in the Progressive Movement. In fact, Hitchcock (1972, 239) lumps the McCarthyites and the New Left together as having comparable "spirit" and "character." He is especially offended that New Left people criticized the liberals who ran the Viet Nam War, particularly during the Johnson years.

The authors also disparage groups such as the Populists as being naive and inexperienced, even though the writers acknowledge the validity of the Populists' complaints of the concentration of wealth and power at that time in the financial centers of the U.S. and England. In Nugent's

(1972) chapter on the Populists, for instance, it is stated that if the Populists had been more worldly-wise, they would have seen that the hallmark of Eastern, urban economy was "dogged competition, not class conspiracy" and that

"no amount of educational excursion [of the Populist individuals] would have rid them [of the point of view] that [the capitalists] were united in a way of life, [and had] a common economic viewpoint which left farmers and laborers out of account except as factors of production and, very often, subjects for exploitation."

Nugent then calls Populists' ideas "naive and shot through with simplification." In light of the material presented in this dissertation, and the realities of the monopoly capitalist, corporate world in their time, the Populists seem to have had a clearer, more sophisticated analysis of society than Nugent, although Nugent does acknowledge that the Populists had their views rooted in a "realistic conflict of economic interest."

In addition to disparaging the very real empirical basis of the arguments of groups like the Populists, the pluralist "anti-conspiracy" writers either ignore or place no crucial significance in the great volume of empirical evidence since the turn of the Twentieth Century (particularly from government investigations) which provides bases for power structure studies. Furthermore, the writings of C. Wright Mills, Domhoff and Marx are ignored by

these pluralists in the Conspiracy book.

The effect of this criticism appears to have been the creation of a hypersensitive fear on the part of some power elite and governing class analysts in having the conspiracy epithet hurled at them. Soref (1976), after making his excellent presentation on interlocking directorates, says that "to avoid conspiracy theory," researchers should only assume that "incentives" is the basic factor in class differentiation between inside and outside directors. Mills (1956, 17, 293, 294) wrestles with the subject, but seems uncharacteristically timid in his conclusion. Criticizing the view that history is "an easily located set of villains, or of heroes," he believes that the Power Elite is not conspiratorial. Even though much of its activity is masked by secrecy, "there is nothing hidden about it, although its activities are not publicized;" and "although its decisions are often publicly unknown, ... its mode of operation is manipulative rather than explicit."

Domhoff (1972, 75) does not seem to share the hesitancies regarding the conspiracy epithet that Soref and Mills displayed. Domhoff merely states that the word "conspiracy" should be replaced with "consensus" when it comes to analyzing the governing function of the American Ruling Class.

Another reason for the quick application of the epithet "conspiracy theory" may be that much of the writing in the field (particularly since World War II) has been done by right wing authors who lack the proper academic credentials and who do not write in acceptable prose or from an "objective" viewpoint (Von Hoffman 1975). Although some of these right wing authors occasionally make extravagant or seemingly absurd claims or come to conclusions with which other researchers might disagree, the empirical evidence provided by the writers can be valuable and should not be dismissed out of hand.

It is of interest to see what some of the right wing writers have said about the nature of the conspiracy. Sutton and Wood (1978a, 40) state that the fact that the Rockefellers and the Trilateralists exercise immense power does not mean that they are the only powerful people and that they control a conspiracy. That "is really irrelevant. If it is a conspiracy, it is the most open conspiracy in world history. What is important is intention."

Allen (1971, 8, 9), on the other hand, frankly says that there is a conspiracy and uses the word frequently. He believes that the term merely means that historical phenomena are the result of things which happen because they

are planned and because someone causes them to happen, not because they occurred by accident. It is merely a cause and effect view of history. Allen quotes Franklin Roosevelt as saying that "in politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way."

Another conspiracy writer, Skousen (1971, 3) presents the oft-quoted statement of England's Benjamin Disraeli, "The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are NOT behind the scenes." Further to the right of Allen, Skousen provides a lengthy review and commentary on Quigley (1966). Although Quigley reveals the secret history and existing nature of the covert power group (basically the internationally powerful bankers), he approves of it, much as Moody did in his The Truth about the Trusts. But Skousen sees the activities of the Rockefellers, et al., as a super-conspiracy which is using the Communists and Socialists as fronts to enslave the world in a totalitarian, socialist dictatorship under their control.

This brings us to the question of the evidence provided in this dissertation. What is the degree of conspiracy in relation to the control by the Ruling Cartel? It depends on your definition of conspiracy and on how you view the activity of the Cartel. In Webster's Third Collegiate

Dictionary (1926) the definition of conspiracy has several facets: "a combination, usually secret, of persons for evil or unlawful ends;" another definition is merely "harmonious action;" and a third is "to concur or to work to an end; to agree."

The activities of the Cartel fall into all three categories. The first definition is the one to which people generally refer when the term "conspiracy" is used. Certainly there is plotting of illegal activity which is carried out in the boardrooms, at elite social clubs and in government, particularly in organizations such as the CIA. Examples of activity which can fall into the more sinister definition of the word conspiracy can be found in the meetings of the Bilderbergers, the Council on Foreign Relations and other Cartel-controlled organizations (including government agencies such as the National Security Council and the CIA), where illegal activity is planned, such as the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, the destruction of the Allende government in Chile, the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the American actions against Nicaragua.

But, the activities of plotters do not necessarily have to be illegal to be considered conspiratorial. Because the Cartel people are the individuals who develop, determine and

carry out policy, who get favorable laws passed and who appoint people who administer the laws in a favorable manner, they can get the label of "legal" attached to their actions.

There always has been covert activity, as exemplified by the framers of the existing U.S. Constitution, stately sitting in sealed secrecy in Philadelphia. The press is not allowed in boardroom discussions; media managers and reporters are not permitted to participate freely in the exclusive Ruling Class social and political institutions; there are many governmental secrets; there are executive sessions of Congress; laws protect certain secret relationships; and corporations, particularly banks, frequently do not cooperate with congressional investigations. Actually, secrecy is standard in ruling the country, particularly in the corporate world. Quigley (1966, 954) states that public exposure of the existence of the "insiders" and their control group is of great concern to the core members of the Establishment. Thus, great efforts are made to bring the Establishment media into the consensus. Therefore, the secrecy of the CFR, TLC and the Bilderbergers is not unexpected. It is merely business as usual for the powerful.

There is almost continuous activity to develop

consensus and to work out agreements on specific matters as well as general policies so that the desired action can be taken harmoniously. Additionally, there are the successful efforts in having key decision makers selected from a pool of people and who have been through the Cartel consensus-making process.

So the basic question is not a matter of conspiracy. Conspiring goes on continuously. Some is covert, some is semi-covert and some is overt.

The basic questions in studying the American power structure are not a matter of conspiracy, but the following:

1. To what degree are key political, economic, communications and cultural institutions, lawmaking and administration, policy formation and decision making controlled and influenced by the American Ruling Class via the Ruling Cartel?
2. How tightly is this control held and how directly is it exercised?
3. What are the varying degrees of consensus within the Ruling Class which can result in differences of opinion and discord within the Cartel itself?
4. What are the nature and impact of struggles of non-Establishment, special interest groups and individuals?

This chapter has provided a description of the institutions and some of the people constituting the American Ruling Cartel. In spite of the many problems which prevent the prime decision makers from running the country and its international relationships as smoothly as they would like, the fact remains that they are still firmly in control, the institutional framework and operation remain intact, and they derive most of the benefits in the form of income and wealth. Struggle as the masses of the people may, they can only use whatever means they may have to influence the controllers. Our rulers do respond eventually, even when they do not like to do so, if sufficient pressure is placed on them.

There are many significant problems which the American ruling class has handled but which still loom large in their memories: the violent labor movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the Great Depression, which brought near-revolutionary conditions; the civil rights movement with its large number of mass mobilizations, actions and riots; and the Viet Nam War which was brought to an end by public struggle too large to ignore (as well as other factors such as the success of the enemy army, the U.S.

armed forces' increasing ineffectiveness and even resistance to fight further, the economic dislocations at home, and the alienation of U.S. allies.) Now it is the peace movement which is fighting to produce a more dovish response from the Cartel.

Perhaps in response to these phenomena and the interrelated complexities of today's society, the Ruling Cartel has taken a new offensive which is unique in its relative openness, pervasiveness and dynamism. It has captured the central, most powerful financial, industrial, communications, agricultural and transporation institutions of American society, and this process of concentrating is continuing at an accelerated rate. Through a combination of legal and illegal payments to Congressmen and the inclusion of key Congressmen in the CFR, TLC and Bilderbergers, it generally obtains cooperation with the legislative branch. (If it does not always get all it wants, at least nothing deleterious to its major interests is enacted.) It has captured the regulatory agencies. Through its domination of the fiscal institutions, including the Federal Reserve System, it is controlling the economy--as much as it can be controlled. Through its control of election purse strings, it is generally able to cultivate and get elected its chosen candidates, even to the extent of handpicking the men for

the presidency and vice-presidency. It has brought about a cooperative labor leadership by including selected men in the CFR, TLC and Bilderbergers and by controlling their pension funds. Through its control of the CIA, FBI and armed forces, it has a corner on the violence market. Meanwhile, it maintains an accommodation with the Crime Syndicate (The Mafia), and even uses it cooperatively when it desires (Hammer 1975; Rolling Stone 1976). Through its control of the elite, Establishment news media and a combination of repression by the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service and the economic difficulties of sustaining alternative media, it is able to contain the mass dissemination of information and opinions which could threaten its hegemony.

Is there a prime center of power within the ruling class? This is difficult to answer with great clarity. The fact of ruling class centers of power cooperating rather than competing was noted in the early 1900s. Moody, Brandeis and the Pujo Committee observed that the Rockefellers and Morgans should be considered as one group despite occasional financial competitiveness because they were so intertwined and cooperative in basic interests. Later, in the late 1930s and early 1940s one of the TNEC studies used the term "the Rockefeller-Morgan Group."

However, it seems that the Morgan group had the upper hand politically until J.P. Morgan died, leaving no strong family line to carry on (Menshikov 1969). Although his partners continued, the Morgan power waned as they died, with the Morgan institutions falling into the hands of a coalition of various upper class corporate, legal and banking heads. Meanwhile, the Rockefellers were gaining in power as their control over financial institutions increased and as their family and business alliances spread (Knowles 1973). Having a succession of generations to assume the Rockefeller mantle helped greatly in consolidating and perpetuating their power. Although today the "Morgan" group still is significant, particularly in investment and control over various corporations, individuals within the group generally do not fill the key positions either in government or in such powerful political organizations as the TLC and CFR.

As far as other groups are concerned, particularly those which are regional, either they have become an integral part of the system (such as the Mellons or the Boston Group), have been beaten back when they have made a significant challenge to Cartel dominance either as individuals or as groups (such as the Kirby Group, the Hunt brothers, or Saul Steinberg) and recognize and accept their

secondary position in the system, or quietly try to build themselves up to get a bigger share of the pie (such as the Texas financial institutions) (Menshikov 1969; Knowles 1973). But even the Texans have interlocks with the New York banks and their major corporations, and the Texans seem to recognize the Eastern hegemony (Lemann 1983; Grove 1978).

No one can predict what the outcome will be of the situation of the Rockefellers, whose family dominance may come to an end with the passing of David and his family peer group. There seems to be no one in the family who is actively working on the economic side of the structure. Only John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV (a TLC member and Bilderberger) has assumed a public role, but that is on the political side as governor of West Virginia. No significant power is presented there so far.

But, whatever the future of the Rockefeller family as individuals, their institutions will remain and will continue to be controlled by members of the ruling class. If, following the Morgan to "Morgan" metamorphosis, the Rockefeller group becomes the "Rockefeller" group, the consequences will be much the same so far as the rest of us are concerned. The powerful John J. McCloy was the top man and performing well while David Rockefeller was serving his apprenticeship at Chase-Manhattan.

Regardless of who the top decision makers are, regardless of the range of points of view and approaches within the Cartel, the bases of the capitalist system and the people who benefit the most from it remain intact. At the macro level the intra-ruling class disputes are mostly disagreements as to which group of powerful capitalists will run things. At the micro level it can make a difference of the degree of the economic benefits which will go to the middle class, the extent of the social and economic floor or safety net for the poorer masses and the difference in the degree of direct repression and deprivation of civil liberties and for which groups.

And, finally, it represents, as Domhoff says, the range of opinion difference wherein lies our acceptable, legitimate arena of democracy and for acceptable discourse in the mass media. We will now look at the media in greater detail.

Chapter 3

THE U.S. MASS MEDIA: CONCENTRATION AND LEGAL CONTROL

Now that we have seen the place and role of the mass media in the American power structure, we need to look with much greater detail at other aspects of the news industry. Of particular importance is the concentration of ownership of the print and electronic media and the effects of this concentration. We also will evaluate the role of the government in relationship to the ownership and operation of these companies.

3.1 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OF MASS MEDIA

It is obvious that the mass media in the U.S. are profit making businesses which are owned by capitalists for the private enrichment of themselves and their shareholders, if any. But more analysis needs to be made in order to

ascertain the nature of these news-producing companies. What are the ownership patterns? Is there local, state or regional concentration? Are broadcasting stations owned by newspapers in the same town? Because each type of combination or aspect of ownership can have an effect on what we hear, see and read in the media, we must look at each medium and the types of ownership combinations.

3.1.1 NEWSPAPERS

Concentration of newspaper ownership and control can be considered from different aspects: the number of competing newspapers in a city; the number of newspapers which control the greatest amount of circulation; metropolitan, regional and national concentration; cross-ownership with other media; chain ownership; and sociology of owners.

First, a look at the whole industry. There are slightly less than 10,000 newspapers in the country, of which 1745 are dailies (Compaine 1982, 30). The dailies receive more than 90% of all revenues and employ the same percentage of manpower (Bagdikian 1971, 116, 117). It is the third largest U.S. manufacturing industry by employment (Washington Post 1977b) and the tenth largest in value of shipments (Bagdikian 1971, 116, 117). According to the

Washington Post (1977b) it is a "big and healthy business," receiving a return on sales twice the median for the Fortune 500.

In the daily newspaper business the ownership pattern is similar to that of major U.S. industry: a few large firms control a disproportionate share of the total market. In 1969, 8% of the largest papers had over half the circulation and the top two percent of the dailies had 30% (Leroy and Sterling 1973, 21,22). In 1978 the top 10% had 61.3% and the largest 1% had 19% (Compaine 1979, 21). (This represents a very slight downward trend since 1923.) That was for individual papers. More significantly, the four largest chains had 23.2% of the circulation in 1977 (Compaine 1979, 22). This concentration was taking place in a shrinking pie: circulation decreased 2.1 million from 1973 through 1976 (Washington Post 1977b), although there was an upward trend which by 1980 had lessened the shrinkage to about 950,000 (Compaine 1982, 30).

Another aspect of concentration has been steadily increasing. Since 1910 the percentage of U.S. cities with competing dailies has diminished as follows (Lyle, 1967, 19; Cirino 1974, 6; Mintz and Cohen 1971, 131; Grotta 1974, 500; Krieghbaum 1972, 158):

1910	57%
1920	33%
1930	21.5%
1971	2.5%
1981	2.0% (Compaine 1982, 37))

As of November 1981 there were thirty cities with competing paper ownerships (Compaine 1982, 38), down from sixty-four in 1970 (Mintz and Cohen 1976, 152). Twenty-seven states have no cities with competitive daily ownerships and of the fifteen largest cities only New York City now has more than two daily newspaper ownerships (Lyle 1967, 19; Kriegbaum 1972, 132).

Concentration has been made more severe, not just from the increase in monopoly newspapers and the death of other papers, but also from the growth in the number and size of chains. In 1971 more than half of the dailies were owned by chains, with 63% of weekday and 65% of Sunday circulation being under chain control (Kriegbaum 1972, 164). Seven years later, chains published 62% of dailies, a percentage which rose to 72.9% in 1980 (Compaine 1982, 39). Groups owned 19 of the 25 largest newspapers in 1971 (Mintz and Cohen 1976, 132)). In 1978 the ten largest chains received 38.6% of total revenue for all daily newspapers (Compaine 1979, 26), up from 25% in 1971 (Cirino 1974, 6). The four largest chains had 22% of the daily circulation (Compaine 1979, 26). The trend is further indicated by the following (Compaine

1979, 21):

1923	31 chains published 153 papers
1954	95 chains published 485 papers
1978	167 chains published 1,098 papers
1980	154 chains published 1,139 papers (Compaine 1982, 39)

The 1970s and 1980s have seen acquisitions in the newspaper business which parallel those of large conglomerates in other sectors of the economy: chains have been bought out by even larger chains. (Thus, the above statistics show a drop of thirteen chains from 1978 to 1980, even though the number of chain-owned newspapers increased.) A Gannett executive said that there is no limit to the number of papers his company would like to purchase, particularly in the monopoly cities (Washington Post 1977b). The specific reason for this is profits: a monopoly paper is three times more profitable than one in a competitive situation (Washington Post 1977b). As Otis Chandler of the Los Angeles Times and Times-Mirror media conglomerate said, "You can engineer your profits" (Business Week 1977b, 59). New York Times columnist James Reston agrees, remarking that owning a monopoly newspaper is a "license to steal" (Washington Post 1977b).

Newspapers are being bought up at the rate of fifty per year, and no end is in sight. The Washington Post predicted that by the 1990s fewer than twenty-four firms will own all daily papers, and market analyst John Morton said that there

is nothing to stop the acquisitions of independent dailies "until they're all gone" (Washington Post 1977b).

3.1.2 TELEVISION AND RADIO

At first glance it would seem that there could be no concentration of ownership in broadcasting because of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. No one may own more than seven television stations (no more than five of which may be VHF), seven AM radio stations and seven FM stations. The duopoly rule prevents ownership of more than one station of the same type in the same area of reception (except for public stations, which are exempt). There also are rules against cross-media ownership. (These will be discussed in greater detail later.)

And yet there is concentration. It takes the form of concentration of profits, viewers and listeners, in chain ownership, in cross-media ownership, and local and regional concentration. The fact that there are only three networks constitutes another form of concentration.

There is a great difference in the profits received by the companies which dominate the largest, richest broadcasting markets compared with those of owners in the smaller markets. Additionally, more than 90% of the most

profitable stations are network affiliates (Johnson 1970, 67).

The rise of chains in both radio and television has been a significant factor in the broadcasting industry. Nearly 75% of the TV stations are chain-owned and "roughly 90 percent" of all commercial stations are affiliated with one of the three networks (Sandman et al 1972, 48)). The growth in group-owned commercial TV stations from 1956 through 1982 is indicated by an increase in the number of chains from 60 to 158; the total stations chain-owned increasing from 193 to 563; and the percent of such stations growing from 39 to 72.7 (Compaine 1982, 324). There also has been an increase in the number of stations per chain (Rucker 1968, 194, 195; Compaine 1982, 324). These stations generally are in the richest markets. In the top ten TV markets, where 40% of all TV households are located, 40 of the 41 VHF stations are owned by chains. Of the 160 VHF stations in the top fifty markets, where 75% of all TV homes are located, 144 (90%) are licensed to chain broadcasters. The networks have their full legal allowance of five VHF licenses each and all but one of these is in the top ten markets. In 1968 only 12 of the 149 VHF and UHF major network affiliates were not held by chains, and none of these was in the top 23 markets (Rucker 1968, 196, 197).

The ownership of the most powerful, 50,000-watt radio stations is similar to that of TV stations. The chains control most of them (Rucker 1968, 194, 195).

3.1.3 CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP

One of the most significant types of concentration is that of cross-media ownership. It is from this type that most local and regional monopolies are found. As of 1971 (Sandman, Rubin and Sacheman 1972, 48; Sterling 1969, 235) single owners controlled at least one TV station and one newspaper in thirty-four of the fifty largest cities. In the top twenty-five markets, 34 of the 97 television stations were owned by newspapers. Every VHF station in eleven states is owned by either a newspaper or a chain. In 1979 cross-media owners controlled 30.4% of the TV stations, 7.0% of AM radio and 8.1% of FM radio stations (Compaine 1982, 318). If one includes all group ownership (cross-media, chains, conglomerates and other firms not primarily related to mass media), the total control of non-independent firms rises to a total of 58% of daily newspapers, 77% of TV stations, 27% of AM radio and 29% of FM radio. In the top 156 markets where 81.5% of the TV homes were located in 1967, only eight stations (5.13%) were

owned singly by broadcasters who had no other obvious special interests. The ownership was as follows (Rucker 1968, 195-197):

broadcast chains	127
newspaper chains	42
non-chain newspapers	17
the TV networks	15
insurance companies	3

Information as of July 1974 indicated that 79 owners of daily newspapers also owned TV stations in their own market. Twenty-seven of these also controlled both a TV station and a daily paper in other markets (Leuchter 1976, 340). (However, cross-ownership in the same market has been decreasing as a percentage of total cross-ownership--from 72% in 1960 to 46% in 1974 (Compaine 1979, 94)). In 1967 newspaper-owned stations dominated the NBC and CBS affiliations, holding 47 of the 103 total (Rucker 1968, 197).

3.1.4 CABLE TV

Cable television (CTV) has the promise of providing true diversity of ownership and content, but like the other mass media it has become concentrated in its ownership and program distribution. In 1981 broadcasters owned 38% of the

systems and newspapers and other publishers had 21%, although this cross-ownership is generally not in the same market (Compaine 1982, 386).

Ownership concentration has been increasing each year as the leading multiple system operators (MSO) buy out more franchises. The concentration of subscribers shows that the top four companies have 27% and the largest eight have 40.9% (Compaine 1982, 395). Although these percentages have not increased greatly the past six years, the major MSOs have increased their share of the major markets 75% from 1969 through 1981 as the big money has driven out the smaller investors (Compaine 1982, 394).

The most significant factor of CTV concentration is its vertical nature, with the major MSOs also generally being the prime premium program providers. With no effective governmental limits on ownership of systems or program services (except for the telephone companies), concentration¹ is accelerating (Compaine 1979, 312-315; Compaine 1982). Time, Inc., the largest MSO, also provides 80% of pay cable program distribution, with over three million subscribers on 731 systems in 1981 carrying Home Box Office (HBO) and Cinemax. Time, Inc., also has purchased half interest in the USA Network and has recently announced a joint venture with CBS and Columbia pictures to form a movie studio (Pollack

1982; Austin American-Statesman 1983a). The joint venture and buy-out situation has been changing rapidly from month to month.

Viacom (a CBS spinoff, but still within the CBS orbit (Network Project 1973, 7)) and Teleprompter (purchased by Westinghouse--known as Group W), which are the sixth and largest VMSOs respectively, own Showtime, which has 600,000 subscribers on 240 systems in forty three states. Other large media conglomerates have heavy investments in CTV systems (Compaine 1982, 312).

Until 1980 the FCC prohibited the TV networks from entering the field, although the Commission allowed CBS to start a program service, which since has folded. Now ABC has purchased the controlling interest in Entertainment and Sports Network (ESPN), is partners with Hearst in the ARTS and Entertainment Channel, and is reported to be joining Viacom in its ownership of Showtime (Boyle 1984; Pollack 1982), and ABC, Hearst and Viacom present the "Lifetime" program channel. NBC has been involved in bringing Bluebird program service to the U.S. from England. As mentioned above, CBS is getting into the business in a big way in its film studio joint venture.

Either the political climate has changed or the power of the electronic media corporations is being demonstrated

by the nature of these new conglomerate combinations. When the top movie companies teamed up with Getty Oil in 1980 to start a movie distribution channel, they were prohibited by an antitrust injunction (Compaine 1982, 273). However, the more recent announcement that Universal, Paramount and Warner are joining with American Express in Warner's Movie Channel has gone unchallenged, as has the CBS venture with Columbia Pictures and Time, Inc.

It is ironic that the type of dominant structure which has emerged in CTV program distribution--the vertical integration of program distribution, of franchise ownership and now of program production--is similar to that which existed in the film industry which the Supreme Court and Justice Department broke up in the 1930s and 1940s (Compaine 1982, 395, 435, 442). But as Congressman Henry Gonzalez of the House Banking and Currency Committee said on an Austin, Texas, public access TV program (Alternative Views), the Antitrust laws are dead. They are not being enforced, leaving an almost carte blanche situation for almost any kind of merger and joint venture.

We see the effect of government deregulation in the CTV field. It has resulted, not only in concentration of control of the franchises, but also in content, particularly in the premium channels. But, perhaps even more

significantly, it has brought together two of the mass media which in the past were operatedly separately, although there was a relationship in the showing of movies on TV. Now, however, the two media are joining to cartelize the cable program business. And so another new mass medium which held promise for diversity of ownership and program content is rapidly going the way of the other media and the rest of the economy: concentrated control.

3.1.5 CONGLOMERATE OWNERSHIP

The phenomenon of media conglomerates is one which must be considered in order to develop a clearer picture of the nature of media concentration in the U.S.. These corporations are of three basic types. One is the true media conglomerate which has its main focus in the media business. This would include companies such as Hearst and Newhouse which have holdings in newspapers, cable, and publishing of books and magazines. The other extreme is found in corporations such as Gulf+Western which is a huge conglomerate with many different types of unrelated corporations performing a variety of functions and with the media operations not providing a large percentage of revenues to the parent company. The third type is composed

of conglomerates which fall in the middle of these two extremes, companies such as RCA which has significant interests other than the media, although its overall emphasis is in electronics and communications.

Monaco (1978) has compiled information on the top twelve media conglomerates and has concluded that these companies have tremendous influence and control over what we see, read and hear. More specifically:

1. Three TV networks receive more than 70% of all TV revenues, and, through their affiliates, control 85% of commercial TV stations' programming.
2. Three companies have more than 70% of all recording industry revenues.
3. Seven of the ten major mass-market paperback book publishers are subsidiaries of one of the top twelve media conglomerates.
4. The nation's top three newspapers are owned by large conglomerates (New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times).
5. Three of the top five film distributors garner more than half of total film revenues. The largest six conglomerates dominate film distribution, and four giants have formed a joint venture for overseas distribution.

Monaco (1978, 24) concludes that "in any given year six of these twelve companies--ABC, CBS, NBC, Warner Communications and any two other film companies--account for more than half of the total non-print media market in the U.S." It is of considerable significance to remember that these media giants are multinational in nature, spreading their goods and services--hence, ideology and influence--in other parts of the world.

It would be beneficial to look at one conglomerate in detail--CBS. It has the following holdings (Monaco 1978; Compaine 1979; Network Project 1973):

1. the most successful TV broadcasting network (270 stations).
2. a radio network
3. five VHF stations in the largest markets
4. sixteen radio stations
5. a magazine empire which is fourth largest in revenues (in 1980) and its ten publications make it third largest producer in this medium
6. consumer and farm publications: is the leader in mass market paperbacks: third in sales in 1977
7. five book companies; second to Time, Inc., in revenue in 1978; third in revenues and market share in 1975 for college books; fifth in U.S. in books for

elementary through high school

8. joint venture with Time, Inc., (HBO) and Columbia pictures for film making
9. joint venture with Knight-Ridder to produce women's CTV programming on Daytime
10. has approval from FCC for Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) operations
11. CBS' spinoff, Viacom, is ninth in cable franchise subscribers.
12. Viacom is joining ABC and 20th Century Fox in operation of Showtime premium CTV channel.
13. In 1972 Viacom was distributing programs from sixteen locations to more than one hundred countries.
14. joint venture with ATT to make viewdata system
15. largest producer, manufacturer and marketer of records in the world
16. produces and sells musical instruments
17. toys and children's products
18. record and tape clubs
19. handicraft institute and tool making
20. stereo stores
21. music publishing and related companies
22. communications technology labs
23. business machines

24. film production
25. vocational-technical schools
26. video cassette and disc manufacturing, with joint venture with MGM for distribution
27. started, then folded, culture network on CTV (Levine, C., 1982)

Just as CBS' main interest is broadcasting, other conglomerates seem to have a primary focus (Compaine 1982). Time, Inc., is the giant of the publishing business, yet has huge interests in CTV franchises and program distribution. Hearst is primarily a newspaper empire, but has large publishing operations and has sizable investments in TV programming and franchises. Warner-Amex is primarily involved with making films, but also is the fifth largest CTV operator, has a premium CTV programming channel and is now the tenth largest publisher of mass market books.

ABC has become one of the world's largest multinational media conglomerates (Network Project 1973; Compaine 1982; Monaco 1978). It is moving aggressively into CTV programming and into publishing. It has purchased a controlling interest in ESPN, it runs the ARTS and Entertainment channel with Hearst, is joining with Fox and Viacom in the Showtime premium CTV channel, and has joint ventures with Warner in the video cassette and disc field and with Fox for film

distribution. It sells records, publishes music, and now is a significant book and magazine publisher. (Its large movie theatre chain was sold in 1977.) ABC has over 1500 affiliates in its four radio networks. Finally, it is the world's largest advertising medium, with ownership overseas in TV and radio stations, advertising agencies and sales services.

If the media giants have been moving into the publishing business to become conglomerates, the largest independent publishers have become conglomerates themselves, acquiring companies in unrelated industries as well as in the communications media. Sometimes these moves were attempts to fight off takeovers by the giants who were stalking cash-rich corporations. The acquisition fever was burning in the five years previous to 1982. Three hundred publishing mergers took place during this time, the same amount which occurred during the previous twenty years (West 1982, 298).

The merger movement has brought the control of the mass media into fewer and fewer hands. Not only have the giants become larger and have diversified into related fields, they have clasped hands in joint ventures. Thus, the mass media are becoming more and more cartelized.

3.1.6 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

Earlier we assessed the ownership in the TV networks by the Cartel institutional investors. Now we will look at Cartel ownership positions and interlocks of other media corporations, particularly the large conglomerates. There is significant ownership of broadcasting by financial institutions, the extent of which is not completely known. It is difficult, sometimes impossible, to obtain sufficient information because much basic data regarding ownership is protected by law. Additionally, many of these institutions simply either refuse to cooperate with congressional investigations or they only provide incomplete information (US Congress 1968; US Congress 1973; US Congress 1978a; US Congress 1978c).

There never has been a comprehensive investigation of total media ownership by these financial giants, although the Network Project made a detailed study of institutional ownership of the three networks in 1973. Congressman Patman (US Congress 1968, 503) stated in 1968 that banks often have significant holdings in the media. His study indicated that there were large blocks of stock held by banks in 18 leading newspaper and magazine publishing companies which owned 31 newspapers, 17 magazines and 17 radio and TV stations. The

investigation revealed director interlocks and stock ownership of the large institutionals in many media companies.

There were other indications of institutional investor interests in the media. A special audit of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith showed that as of 10 March 1967, it owned one percent or more of 14 broadcasting chains with holdings in 51 AM, 39 FM and 56 TV stations. Nine mutual funds had interests of one percent or more of two or more publicly held chains (Rucker 1968, 194).

The information produced by the Corporate Data Exchange (CDE) for the Metcalf Committee hearings showed that several institutionals had stock, not only in the networks, but in other multimedia corporations such as Times-Mirror, Cox, Gannett, Taft, Time, Inc., Metromedia, Capital Cities, Storer and Teleprompter (US Congress 1978a). The latest CDE (1980a) information reveals Cartel institution holdings in selected media corporations:

Gannett	14.24%
Knight-Ridder	15.00%
*Macmillan	10.50%
*Times-Mirror	13.50%
*McGraw-Hill	18.00%
*Time, Inc.	13.00%
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich	3.19% (Warner-Amex
has an additional 8.68%. In 1968 Patman (US Congress	
1968) reported stock positions plus interlocks by	
J.P. Morgan and Citicorp.)	
Warner Communications	7.50%
*Washington Post	13.28%
Field	(Knowles (1973) says the
	Rockefellers control it via stock ownership.)

* Director interlocks also

The large institutionals are also very heavily involved with the major film companies. Guback (1979, 229) states that there is an overlooked "narrow structure of ownership behind the companies that dominate the business." This includes stock ownership, financing of specific movies, and arranging for large loans. Examples are as follows:

**Columbia Pictures	11.3%
++*Fox	10.5% (plus 51% by
"Cede & Co." See below for explanation.)	
++*Cox	5.7%
*Fuqua	7.4% (Chase-Manhattan)
American Express	12.9% (Amex is Warner's
parent. Rawleigh Warner, Jr., is on the boards,	
not only of AMEX, but also of Chemical Bank	
and Mobil Oil--core Rockefeller companies.)	
+#Warner Communications	7.5%
Coca-Cola (parent of Columbia Pictures): four	
interlocks with Cartel financial institutions	

* Holdings in broadcasting, also
 + CTV holdings, also
 # CTV program services, also

One of the reasons that the extent of investments in the media (or any company) is not completely known is the widespread use by bank trust departments of nominees or street names as fictitious companies as a devices to hide the true investor or investors (Network Project; Spotlight 1979a; US Congress 1978a). For instance, in the Network Project study the top two investors were Kane & Co. and Cudd & Co. These are two nominees used by Chase-Manhattan Bank. Various nominees were used by other institutionals.

It was not until Congressman Wright Patman purloined a copy of the hitherto secret industry book which equated the nominees to banks that it was possible to determine more precisely the degree of institutional stock ownership in a company. But because new nominees can be started at any time, and since more than one institutional use a nominee occasionally, there is a continuous problem of identification. However, the underlying basic problem still exists. That is, who are the real investors? Individuals? Foreign governments? The Mafia? The bank itself (even though this is illegal)? Corporations? How much is illegal investment? Although the hidden investor behind the nominee perhaps may have the right to exercise voting power over his or her stock, usually the bank votes the stock, or it automatically is voted for the management.

There is another device set up by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and governed by the Federal Reserve which is used to completely hide stock ownership, even eliminating the middleman banker (Spotlight 1979a). The Depository Trust Corporation (DTC) is a limited trust company into which any investor may deposit stocks under the nominee Cede & Co. If the investor wishes to have complete secrecy, he may bypass the broker on the floor of the stock exchange by establishing a brokerage of his own. He then can utilize the entire nominee system of Cede & Co. in complete anonymity.

The extent of the use of the DTC is indicated by its 1977 annual report in which it was stated that the annual value of securities delivered through the DTC increased by almost \$50 billion for a total of \$357 billion. Fourteen banks in ten states started using the system that year, raising the number of participating banks to fifty-three, headquartered in twenty-three states. Many other banks also use the system indirectly through the accounts of correspondent banks which also use the DTC system. Broker-dealers particularly have increased their use of the system.

It has been frustrating to governmental investigators trying to ascertain the ownership of the media, particularly

by the institutionals (US Congress 1978a, 6). For broadcast stations the FCC Ownership Form 323 does not require a listing of owners of one percent or less, or in the case of institutionals, less than five percent. This means that an institutional can hold stock in the name of several nominees which all totaled comes to a percentage greater than the legally allowable. Also, no provision is made for consideration of such investors which are themselves intimately connected, such as those of the Rockefeller Interest Group or the Ruling Cartel as a whole.

The FCC handling of the subject of the institutional investor is very revealing (US Congress 1978a; Access 1976b). A 1953 order allowed one percent; in 1968 it was raised to three percent when it was found that there were widespread violations of the one percent rule. Later, after it was ascertained that the three percent rule was being ignored, the allowable was raised to five percent. In the Metcalf hearings (US Congress 1978a, 17) in 1974 FCC Chairman Wiley had to admit that the Commission in reality did not know the extent of institutional investment in broadcasting. In observing that the stockholding limit was being raised, Senator Metcalf remarked that, in regard to ownership of the networks, the banks "violated with such impunity" the ownership laws that "you changed the rules for

them and they are still in violation." Wiley answered, "There have been violations. There is no question about it." Wiley explained that the banks are merely passive investors and are required to file a disclaimer not to interfere in company business. Metcalf then remarked that the banks are not passive and that the "same few banks are dominant in competing companies in broadcasting."

Metcalf's concern apparently had little affect on the FCC. In 1977 the Commission raised the allowable ownership percentage of the institutionals from five to ten percent (Wall Street Journal 1977d). It also dropped the requirement for the institutional to agree not to interfere in management of the media companies (Access 1976b).

Another area of weakness in the FCC's regulation over broadcasting regarding concentration of ownership and control is that the Commission does not require reporting of interlocking directorates between licensees and financial institutions. As we have seen, there are many such interlocks (US Congress, 1978c, 6; Dreier 1982; Dreier and Weinberg 1979; Network Project 1973a).

It was noted in Chapter Two regarding the the U.S. power structure that the control of debt is very significant in the control of a corporation. Yet the FCC does not have information as to the identification of debt holders on a

regular basis. It also does not have direct reporting from financial institutions of their holdings in broadcast corporations. The Commission does, however, require that it be sent copies of mortgage or loan agreements which a group filing for a license has with a financial institution, if the debt agreement might restrict the licensee's freedom of operation. The Commission requires a copy of the loan agreement of a licensee only if it results in a change either in stock ownership or of representation on the board of directors. But there is little indication that the FCC closely scrutinizes or takes aggressive action on licensee loan agreements, although Commissioner Wiley said that the FCC "generally closely" looks at "those which new applicants have with lending institutions" (US Congress 1978c, 5).

There is a great deal we do not know about the extent of institutional investment in mass media corporations and the degree of control over those corporations which is exercised by the financial giants. This much we do know: the collective accumulation of stockholdings, interlocking directorates, debt holdings and financing of individual projects (such as films) indicates that the financial powers are in a position to exercise significant influence and control over the American--indeed, the capitalist world's--communications media. Considering that our

information is limited, the institutional control is probably much more vast than we realize at this time.

3.1.7 STATE, REGIONAL AND LOCAL CONCENTRATION

The significance of cross-media, chain and conglomerate ownership is very evident when studying the concentration of ownership at the state, local and regional levels. It often results in monopoly, oligopoly, or at least market dominance.

A case study of concentration in a state was made in Oklahoma in 1966 by FCC Commissioners Cox and Johnson (Mintz and Cohen 1976, 136; Johnson 1970, 53). There were 73 separate owners of 93 commercial broadcasting stations, 83 of which were radio and 10 were TV. But four of the owners had 56% of the total revenue and 88% of the media income of the state. Oklahoma had fifty daily newspapers, but the Oklahoma City papers had 35% of the daily circulation in the state. Three other firms accounted for another 34% of the paper circulation. The owner of the two Oklahoma City

papers also owned the large TV-AM broadcasting complex in the state capital. Of the other 49 towns with broadcasting stations there were 12 with media monopolies, and all the stations and daily papers, where there were any, were jointly owned. In seven Oklahoma cities the newspapers were owned by the Donrey Media Group, which also possessed the papers and single TV station in the border city of Ft. Smith, Arkansas, and the AM station in nearby Springdale (TV Factbook 1976). The FCC Commissioners mentioned other areas of regional concentration, but said that the one in Oklahoma was typical.

An example of cartel-like regional dominance in communications can be found in the situation in 1969 of the media holdings of the Mormon Church and its partners in Utah (Mintz and Cohen 1976, 148, 149). The Church itself is a conglomerate owner of various unrelated companies in many fields of business.

After the Church merged its Deseret News in Salt Lake City with the competing daily publisher, Kearns-Tribune Corporation, in a joint operating agreement, competing newspaper editions were dropped and the operating and business ends of the papers were merged. The Church owned and operated the local CBS outlets KSL-TV-AM-FM. Through various electronic means, KSL-TV reached thirty-five of the

thirty-nine towns in Utah, one county in Colorado and three counties each in Idaho, Nevada and Wyoming. The Church also owned TV and FM stations at Brigham Young University at Provo. There were other media ownerships in other parts of the U.S..

But the story does not stop there. The Kearns-Tribune Corporation, the partner of the Church in the newspaper business, also owned 35% of the NBC affiliate in Salt Lake City--KUTV-TV. This was in addition to other conglomerate ventures. The rest of the 65% of the stock in KUTV-TV was owned by Glassman-Hatch interests, owners of the only daily newspaper in Ogden--the second largest city in the state and located thirty-five miles from Salt Lake City. Other communications holdings of Glassman-Hatch were seven more TV and radio stations in Utah, Idaho, Montana and Hawaii as well as several cable TV systems.

The third television station in Salt Lake City was an ABC affiliate which was owned by Columbia Pictures. This station joined with the other two licensees (the Church and Kearns-Tribune/Glassman-Hatch) in a cable TV venture. The Utah Attorney General termed the situation a communications cartel.

It is in the cities where most concentration of ownership of the media is focused. Former FCC Commissioner

Nicholas Johnson is very concerned about this. An example of the absence of strong independent television voices in a major metropolitan area is in New York City (Sandman, Rubin and Sacheman 1972, 49). There are six commercial VHF stations. Each of the three networks owns one, two are possessed by chains (Metromedia and RKO General), and the remaining one belongs to the New York Daily News. There are several independent UHF stations, but their viewership is no challenge to the VHF giants (Sandman, Rubin and Sacheman 1972, 49).

In other cities the concentration is more marked. For example, in Atlanta the Cox media group has 80% of the advertising revenues in the print and electronic media (Howard 1976, 27). In Chicago two corporations have 70%; and in St. Louis two corporations have 80% of media advertising revenue (Niro 1974). The Justice Department has made unsuccessful attempts through the FCC to reduce media concentration in cities such as these (Bennett 1971; Broadcasting 1976b).

In many smaller towns, ownership of all the news media has been in one pair of hands. In 1967 there were seventy-three communities in the country in which one company or person owned or controlled all newspapers and local broadcasting outlets (Cirino 1971, 63). By 1974 this

number had dropped to less than twenty (Leuchter 1976, 340).

Nicholas Johnson's (1970, 52-55) concern stems from the fact that we are an urban people. Because nearly half of the people live in six states, those people and their politics are heavily influenced, if not dominated, by the large urban centers in their states, thus giving these places significant potential national influence and power. This means that media ownership or domination in even one of these cities is very significant. When there are interests of certain companies in more than one of these cities, it is very significant. The potential influence "is startling," according to Johnson. He states that twelve companies own more than one-third of all the TV stations in the major markets.

3.1.8 CONCENTRATION IN WIRE SERVICES

The Associated Press and United Press International play an extremely key role in the determination of the information which will be disseminated over the mass news media. At the start of the 1970s AP was serving 8,500 newspapers and television and radio stations in the world, and UPI claimed approximately 6,000 clients for news and picture services. UPI operated in 114 countries; the AP in

104. In the U.S., AP supplied services to 1750 publications and 3,100 broadcasting stations. Twenty-five percent of the U.S. dailies subscribed to both services; 45% received only AP; and 30% had only UPI (Cirino 1974, 173).

About 1,600 of all the daily newspapers and almost all broadcasting stations depend entirely on the wire services for foreign news. (But where do the wire services get their foreign news? Mostly from the government and press of each particular country (Cirino 1974, 173).) There are other news services such as those belonging to the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post, but they serve only scores or hundreds of outlets and cannot come close to matching the huge output of the two giants (Schramm and Alexander 1975, 535).

Who owns and controls the two major wire services? AP is a cooperative venture by owner-subscribers, but with their representation on the board of directors and their financial connection with stock and bond holdings, the representatives of the big, Establishment newspapers and the TV networks are in a position to dominate the company (Broadcasting 1976a; Armstrong 1979). (The participation at the director level by the networks is a comparatively recent phenomenon.)

UPI was the result of a merger between Hearst's

International News Service (INS) and Scripps-Howard's United Press, with the Scripps Company retaining controlling interest (US Congress 1967b, 264). After operating with large financial deficits for several years, UPI was recently sold to an independent group (Austin American-Statesman 1982a).

Regardless of ownership the content produced by the wire services reflect the interests and views of the U.S. transnational, capitalist system, a fact which causes great alarm and discontent in many Third World countries (Armstrong 1979; Ebert-Miner 1982).

3.1.9 CONCENTRATION IN NEWS MAGAZINES

Although the main news magazines have increased their circulation over the years, their impact on the country and people is minimal when compared with that of the newspapers and the electronic media (Domhoff 1967, 82). The main significance so far as the mass news market and its economic structure are concerned is that the corporate owners of the two leading news magazines, Time and Newsweek, are conglomerates which also possess substantial broadcasting, newspaper, cable TV and publishing businesses (Rucker 1968, 209; Compaine 1982). Perhaps of greater significance is that

the owners and top executives of these two magazines participate in the elite ruling organizations such as the CFR and the Bilderbergers.

3.1.10 PUBLIC BROADCASTING

The subject of concentration of ownership and control of the public broadcasting media is rarely discussed. And yet, in many ways the concentration is much greater than it is for the commercial stations. For instance, in 1976 thirty-one state governments operated 135 of the 266 public TV stations. Because public licensees are exempt from duopoly and multiple ownership rules, each state except Hawaii and New Hampshire was reported to have networks of three or more outlets. In 1982 there were 159 licensees operating 300 public TV stations in the U.S.: 52 colleges, 23 state governments, 15 municipal boards of education and 69 non-profit and civic groups (Koughan 1983, 24).

Another significant factor in the matter of control of the public stations is that members of the boards of trustees are over-represented by the business, legal and financial sectors (Network Project 1971, 32, 33; Cirino 1974, 216; Brown, L., 1971, 324). This is a reflection of how the local elites are in a position to dominate their

public broadcasting affiliates. With the state and local governments also under the control of business interests, it could hardly be expected that the public stations could play an independent, alternative role in their communities.

The history of the development of the public TV system in the U.S. (Network Project 1971) is similar to that of higher education in the country, except that the former's development was faster and was more closely and directly controlled by ruling class organizations, particularly by the big foundations. The Ford Foundation started the system in 1951, explored the medium's potential, constructed stations, established the network and closely determined what the programming would be. It even funded groups to function as lobbies in Washington, D.C. and to initiate national publicity.

Meanwhile the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television issued a report in 1963 which became the basis for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, at which time the Ford Foundation turned its offspring over to the government. Even after the government's Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) took over in that year, the Ford Foundation continued to provide funds to run the system. Congressional action to adequately fund PTV did not occur until 1970, but further contributions from CBS and the

Carnegie Corporation helped keep the system going. Additionally, the Ford Foundation continued to give millions of dollars, particularly for programming and to its favored stations and production centers.

But the Ford Foundation did not simply turn the new medium over to the control of faceless government bureaucrats. Cartel control remained, as is shown by the composition of the first board of directors of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (Network Project 1971, 17, 18). By law, the board must be composed of U.S. citizens from fields such as education, cultural and civic affairs, the arts, and radio and television, and it must be representative of various regions of the country, professions, occupations, and kinds of experience and talent appropriate to the Corporation's functions and responsibilities.

Of the fifteen members of the board, seven were interlockers with major corporations; six had interlocks with major financial institutions; five were members of the Council on Foreign Relations (Network Project 1971; Shoup and Minter 1977); one belonged to the CFR's sister organization for domestic economic affairs, the Committee for Economic Development (CED); one had been with the Cartel think tank Brookings Institution; five had connections with

foundations; three had participated in special Rockefeller organizations and three had been in positions which had special relationships with the CIA; four persons could be identified as coming from the American upper class; and seven members were interlockers with Cartel corporations and financial institutions. Four members had held high federal government positions and there was one state legislator. Four (at least) were lawyers. Four people had backgrounds in broadcasting and journalism, with one of the four also being in education. There was one musician and one union president. Finally, there was John D. Rockefeller III.

The three top men in the hierarchy were intimately associated with Cartel institutions. Frank Pace, the Chairman of the Board, was a CFR member, had extensive governmental and corporate experience at the highest levels, including an advisory position at Bankers Trust, one of the core Morgan financial institutions. He had numerous other Cartel interlocks, including two with Rockefeller organizations as well as with the Brookings Institution.

The Vice-Chairman, James R. Killian, also had previous governmental service, had held directorships in blue chip corporations, had been president of the elite Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was a member of the CFR, also. Both he and Pace were members of the sensitive Foreign

Intelligence Control Board.

The man who was selected as the first president of the CPB, John Macy, Jr., had held many governmental posts in the executive branch and had a previous, close working relationship with Frank Pace (as had the first CPB Vice-President), and had served with one of the Ford Foundation's spinoffs which were involved in the development of educational television.

Finally, many of the people on the first CPB board belonged to organizations which were interlocked with the Ford Foundation. To complete the circle, James Killian, the CPB Vice-Chairman, had been Chairman of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television--the organization whose report was used as the basis for the Public Broadcasting Act which set up the CPB. Thus, all the bases were covered by the Ruling Cartel. (Congressional hearings in 1975 showed that the situation had not changed, despite a few replacements of individuals on the board.)

The organization which is supposed to be the counterpoise to the CPB is the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), the Board of Governors of which is made up of representatives of the local stations. But the list of members from 1976 (TV Factbook 1976/77; US Congress 1975) shows that these people are certainly not representative of

a broad range of American people and interests, but probably do represent the interests of the local boards of trustees of public stations and their related business and professional institutions.

Three members were from financial institutions, five were from business (four from big business), seven were representatives from universities (only one from a small one), five were lawyers representing their cities, and one was an educator from a state government commission. Only four seemed not to be from recognizably elite or powerful sources.

When President Nixon tried to accomplish a combination of weakening and taking over public broadcasting in the U.S., the attitudes of the local stations and their controllers were mixed (Koughan 1983, 24, 26). They generally were more conservative than the national PBS program providers and did not want the centralized hand in Washington, D.C., sending them liberal programming with which they did not agree. They also wanted more money directly, free of PBS constraints. However, they did want to preserve public broadcasting.

If Nixon was not successful in 1973 in bankrupting PBS or taking control over it, he was able to take the power out of the centralized, elite hands and to give it to the local

stations. Although funds were reduced, the money which was left was sent to the stations, not to PBS. The program cooperative came into being in 1974, whereby, from a pool of two-hundred programs presented by producers, the stations would bid on them, depending on the content and the cost. The programs receiving the most bids would be the ones sent on the network (Koughan 1983, 24). This resulted in programs with the lowest common demoninator being shown. The shows selected were the cheapest and least controversial, with new programs or series rarely being purchased (Koughan 1983, 24, 26).

PBS no longer has a voice in what shows will be produced. It is only a provider of program scheduling and distribution. This is a 180 degree change from the framework established by the Ford Foundation with National Educational Television (NET)--PBS' precursor--in which programming decisions and distribution were centralized and the stations were mere passive affiliates. The ill will sometimes felt toward NET by its more conservative affiliates found triumph in the emasculation of PBS.

Even this did not please the Reagan administration, which demanded further cuts in funding (Aufderheide 1983, 9; Koughan 1983, 24). The already austere CPB budget was reduced by 20% (\$70 million) for 1983, down to \$130

million. More than one-half of the \$130 million goes to the local stations for operating expenses and program purchases. With a comparatively uncomplicated talk show like the MacNeil-Lehrer Report having an annual budget of approximately \$9 million (with AT&T providing a \$10 million grant), it is obvious that the money to provide more technically complex programming would have to be received from other sources (Austin Prime Time 1983; Albin 1984).

To place the funding in perspective, in 1983 all of public broadcasting received less money than did military bands, and the latter were given a nine percent increase for 1984. The CPB receives \$22 million per year to produce programs for national distribution, whereas the Pentagon public relations program receives \$30 million annually (Aufderheide 1983, 9).

For national programming the main sources of supplemental funds are from large corporations and foundations, most of which are Ruling Cartel organizations. For instance, of the 48 special programs or series financed by these institutions in 1976, at least 35 were underwritten by Cartel organizations, particularly by the oil companies (Broadcasting 1976c; Access 1976). By 1978 more than one-half of PBS' programming hours were underwritten by these sources (Koughan 1983; Weissman 1981).

But these sources are insufficient, particularly for local stations. Consequently, the public stations have been going to great and varied lengths to bring in more money. The following are some of the methods being used (Aufderheide 1983,8): leasing their facilities for production; selling liquor at public events; cooperative production deals with private companies; teletext services; pay TV joint ventures; and some are doing the previously forbidden--selling commercials. And, of course, the periods of seemingly interminable and embarrassing begging on camera. The dearth of funds has had its deleterious effect particularly on local programming, which one writer commented "has all but disappeared from public television" (Koughan 1983, 26).

Ironically, these financial problems are occurring when public TV apparently is enjoying its greatest degree of public acceptance and its largest audiences (Aufderheide 1983, 8). The viewership has doubled the last three years. Not only is the audience estimated at 5% of the viewing public each month, but also cable is helping to spread the PTV audience. Polls indicate that CTV subscribers are more satisfied with public programs than those found on the three commercial networks (Koughan 1983, 27).

PBS and various local stations have had a long history

of program censorship, non-clearance of programs on the net by affiliates and of avoidance of programming which would be controversial or which would not be acceptable to the local power structure and financial backers or, at the national level, programs which would be upsetting to government officials and especially to corporate and foundation underwriters (Network Project 1971; Koughan 1983, 26; Aufderheide 1983, 9; Texas Journalism Review 1975a; Quaintance 1983; Time Out 1978).

This has been made worse by the necessity of the stations having to seek more corporate backing. Not only must the program-producing entities please their underwriters, they also become more obsessed with ratings: they seek a mass audience and the lowest common demoninator in programming just like the commerical networks do. The irony is that the programming decision makers are heading the opposite direction from what PTV's audience is attracted to. Even some of the original corporate underwriters are restive, feeling that the high cultural image with which they want to be associated and the special audience which they want to reach will be diminished or diluted by the "massification program" by PTV executives (Aufderheide 1983, 8, 9). Furthermore, this also has caused a split between the stations which are more educational oriented and those which

are not (Koughan 1983, 28).

Another irony amid all the financial crises is that the castrated PBS has flourished financially and seems to have the rosiest future independent of the rest of public broadcasting (Koughan 1983, 23, 27, 29). Because of its access to the Westar satellite, it can either broadcast several channels of programming or it can provide individual services. By mid-1984 it is supposed to have twelve channels. Not only can it provide individualized programming to public stations, it can sublease channels and can sell various services to corporate clients, and it has entered into joint ventures with big conglomerates such as Columbia Pictures. It also has set up special channels for college instruction which are being picked up by educational institutions. Finally, there is a possibility that PBS could enter the subscription TV (STV) field. As a result of all these activities, PBS finished 1982 with a surplus of \$4 million while the rest of the PTV system was starving.

National Public Radio (NPR) is in the most precarious financial situation (Electronic Media 1983a). In addition to severe budget cuts, there apparently was great mismanagement, resulting in a \$9 million deficit and with the president of NPR being fired, Personnel have been cut; programs have been cancelled; and a proposal was made for

each radio affiliate to be assessed a certain amount to transfer \$1.6 million back to NPR (Loomis 1983). With NPR being under attack by conservatives both in and outside of Congress, the future of NPR is in doubt without a financial bailout of some sort. The fact that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting finally provided funds to keep the network going might have been at some cost to the relative independence of NPR.

What will happen to the public broadcasting system and what it will develop into is not clear at this time--mid-1984. PTV seems to be drifting more and more into commercialization. But one thing is clear, considering the history of the initial development of the system by the Ford Foundation; the fact that the members of the controlling structure of CPB come from the Ruling Cartel, and that the governing boards of PBS and the local stations come from the local elites; and given the necessity to please corporate underwriters, public broadcasting in the U.S. will seldom stray from the narrow range of subjects which it has displayed in the past. Controversy, if not eschewed, will be controlled.

3.1.11 PUBLISHING CONCENTRATION

Because this dissertation is primarily about the mass news media, the subject of concentration of ownership of publishing would seem not to be pertinent. But, as we have seen previously when discussing conglomerate and Cable TV (CTV) ownership, the media giants have moved into publishing. Therefore, we must look at this field of communications.

Publishing consists basically of two major categories--books and magazines, but there are sub-markets within these major classifications. Because relevant, accurate data on the industry has been available only comparatively recently, some of the information presented below is not so comprehensive and is in not so great a historical depth as is the material presented on the other mass media (Compaine 1979, 134, 251).

3.1.11.1 Books

Ease of entry has long been a hallmark of book publishing, making it historically one of the most competitive industries, although there were successful attempts at forming monopolies in the late 1800s (Compaine 1979, 49, 254-256). Most significant for our present day structure are the two merger waves which occurred in the

1960s and the 1970s which have made great changes in the industry.

The three main results of these merger periods are, first, the entry of media giants into the publishing field via acquisitions and, second, the mergers of softcover and hardcover houses (Powell, W.W., 92, 93). The large firms such as ABC, CBS, Hearst, and the movie conglomerates such as MCA (Universal) and Gulf+Western (Paramount) set up the possibilities for synergistic publication of books based on film or TV (and vice versa) and even record releases related to the movie and TV scores. The third trend is the entry into the U.S. market by foreign publishing companies, also via the merger route (Compaine 199, 46).

Writers who do not view the concentration with alarm point to the fact that there is still ease of entry into the market and that the giants compete among themselves. They say that the mergers are a good thing because they provide financial backing and professional management which smaller firms lack, and that buying them out keeps the smaller companies alive within the same walls of the conglomerate. They also point out that there has been an increase of the number of publishers from 1958 through 1976 (Compaine 1979, 92; Robinson and Olszewski 1980, 82).

Others say that such statistics are deceiving, in that

the growth in the total number of publishers has been accounted for by small firms and that the large firms have increased their market shares significantly but accounted for only four percent of the increase in the number of publishers. Additionally, these gross figures provided by the industry trade organizations in support of concentration ignore the submarkets, some of which are highly concentrated (Robinson and Olszewski 1980, 82, 83).

For instance, in the mass market paperback industry the top eight firms account for 81% of sales and the four largest have more than 50% (Robinson and Olszewski 1980, 82, 83). There is not the ease of entry here as in some of the other segments of the industry. In the significant elementary-high school category the giants dominate (Compaine 1979, 280). Similarly the college publishers are concentrated, with the top four having 40.4% and the leading eight having 63.9%. The main significance is that the markets for education in the U.S. are highly concentrated, with the same conglomerate names being at the tops of the lists of these submarkets as well as being among the overall leaders in publishing (Compaine 1979).

For smaller publishers the problem does not seem to be so much the costs of printing or the availability of material to publish as it is the lack of financial power to

compete in the areas of sales, promotion and distribution, including obtaining retail shelf space (Compaine 1979, 276).

Critics of the existing industry structure say that the mergers have reduced the number of independent companies, have given too much influence to the few huge corporations, and that new authors have difficulty getting attention. They say that the linking of the hardcover and softcover publishers with newspaper chains, movie conglomerates and TV giants (including Cable TV) has created enormous vertical media monopolies. These critics point to various studies which show that concentration in other fields results in reduction of product diversity and innovation (Powell, W.W., 1980, 90, 91).

The Writers' Guild concurs, pointing to the threat of a reduction of diverse and antagonistic sources and a rise of corporate pressure, not just on editors but on production. This pressure would be not only from the ideological point of view, but in favoring of authors and publications which fit into the synergistic multimedia patterns desired by the conglomerates (Robinson and Olszewski 1980, 82).

3.1.11.2 Magazines

The magazine industry has undergone a revolutionary

change, with the focus now on specialized publications with small circulation rather than on the mass circulation, general interest magazines. Historically, the field has been considered easy to enter, making it a highly competitive field. However, concentration is somewhat more pronounced than it is for newspaper and book publishing (Compaine 1979, 141).

The group-owned companies predominate, with the chains having an average circulation 89% greater than magazines of independent publishers. Although the top three consumer magazines are single publications owned by different companies, most of the top twenty-nine are published by the same media conglomerates we see in the other fields: Time, Inc., Hearst, ABC, CBS, Washington Post, New York Times, and Times-Mirror. Furthermore, these giants are also the largest publishers by revenue. The same phenomenon occurs when looking at the leading publishers of the subgroups such as business magazines or consumer and farm publications (Compaine 1979).

New magazines are generally started by independents; the giants do not want to take the risks. After the new magazines are successful, the conglomerates move in and buy out the independent publishers (Compaine 1979, 155, 156). The publishing of magazines is more vulnerable to the

capitalist market place than is that of books. Most magazines are directly reliant on advertising for their financial existence. While advertisers will support conservative and mainstream publications, the progressive and left wing magazines constantly carry on a struggle to remain alive and frequently have fund raising drives to maintain publication. However, many do cease to exist because of lack of revenue, no matter how informative or well-written the publication might be. With the financial support for books being the purchase price, it allows for greater range of information and opinion in that medium than in the large circulation magazines.

Publishing--particularly of books--is an industry where it is possible to print a new publication without undue expense, unlike the major investments required and great risks incurred to start a daily newspaper or the liabilities of starting a broadcasting station, with all the attendant problems of being selected and licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. Although entry into publishing is comparatively easy, survivability in an independent status is difficult. Meanwhile, many of the same multimedia conglomerates which dominate the other mass communication fields also are at the top of publishing.

Of particular concern should be the dominance of the

school textbook market from elementary through college by many of the same top publishing companies. Of course, textbook selection is a complex process, particularly for the el-hi level, because selection can be affected by the political processes in the local school boards and the state legislatures. Nonetheless, this concentration of ownership could lead to the conclusion that most of the books Americans are using in all (or most) of their school years are being published by the same small group of companies, corporations which also are in control of much of the other mass media. Writers who are not alarmed at this concentration and that found in other sectors of publishing either are not looking at the cartelization of the industry or are in approval of it.

3.1.12 CONCLUSION

Reading a listing of broadcasting stations and cable offerings in a city and looking at the number of newspapers which abound, particularly in a large, metropolitan area, one would think that there is a great variety of many media voices competing furiously in the market place and which are providing the public with a plethora of diverse and antagonistic views and information. Some researchers

present this as proof that there is no alarming concentration of media ownership in the U.S.. They say that there is an "umbrella" concept in which the large big city newspaper competes with the newspapers in satellite cities as well as local dailies, weeklies and even shoppers. The many broadcasting voices are also under the umbrella.

One such writer, Campaine (1979, 37, 38), further states that not only is the umbrella concept valid, but that we should look at each media industry competing against the other media industries, implying that determining ownership concentration is really an outmoded way of looking at the media. He claims that actually there is too much information which is swamping the American people with the greatest diversity in history. Furthermore, he says that there is no validity to the claim that increased diversity will provide better quality and greater quantity.

While it is true that people are bombarded every day with messages and information from their mass media, when the situation is closely inspected, one can see that the information comes from concentrated sources within an overall framework which narrows the possibilities before they are presented in print or on the air. First of all, the mass media are overwhelmingly capitalist, profit-making enterprises which compete for advertising and which must

please the advertisers in order to make those profits. Even the public broadcasting media are generally controlled by the necessity of pleasing their local business elites, whose representatives are on the stations' boards of directors and whose companies provide the bulk of the money donated for the life's blood of the stations. The other money comes mainly from the government, yet another limiting factor.

Within this total framework we find that the newspaper business is very concentrated, with few competing voices. In only a very few U.S. cities is there not a newspaper monopoly. At many state and regional levels we also find total media concentration of voices, readership and profits. With the great growth and dominance of chains and group ownership in all the media (including publishing), the number of independent voices is becoming smaller and smaller. Not only have huge conglomerates become the major voices in the media, these corporate giants are now linking with each other in various joint ventures, narrowing even further the possible sources of information and opinions, and raising the entry barriers to an almost impossible height for all but the giants.

It may be true that there are many radio stations and an umbrella of a few newspapers available, but they mainly use only two wire services. There are many TV stations in

the country, but there are only three major networks. There are newspapers in all the large cities, but only the Washington Post and the New York Times have significant impact on the decision makers in Washington, D.C., and New York City and on the producers of news at the three TV networks.

Unfortunately, people like Campaine are prisoners of their own assumptions. Just because there are many voices does not mean that there is diversity. If all the symphony orchestras played only Bach, Beethoven and Brahms, many significant composers and much great music would not be heard.

The umbrella concept could be viewed from another aspect. An umbrella is used to keep the rain off of us. In this case the rain could represent the total possible range of information and opinions to which the public could have access. The umbrella of the Establishment media is doing a good job of restricting what we shall read, see and hear, while the rain of alternatives is falling all around us but seldom penetrates the umbrella. After looking at the alternative press, listening to Pacifica Radio stations, and viewing the presentations on some public access channels of the cable, we can see what a narrow range of information is made available to the general public on the American mass

media.

The enormity of this interlocking relationship of concentrated media industries lies in the fact that it is the same few companies which to a significant extent select what is entered into our textbooks from elementary school through much of college, while they simultaneously greatly determine what we see on television, hear on records, listen to on radio, see in the cinema, read in the newspapers (particularly about national and international news), and read in our magazines.

And the concentration continues to increase. The control of information and the communicating of it is becoming more and more cartelized.

3.2 MEDIA OWNERS AND THE LOCAL POWER STRUCTURE

Because we have already assessed the position of the media owners in the national power structure, this section will concern itself only with the local power structure, although, as we shall see later, the local newspapers, particularly in the larger cities and especially with chains, are significant in linking local elites with the

national centers of power. First, however, it would be revealing to look at who are the publishers and broadcasters and their number one men--the editors and general managers.

The publisher is a businessman primarily and a man of wealth (with the exception of most of the owners of small, struggling papers), and has similar attitudes as other publishers (Sandman, Ruben and Sacheman 1972, 38). A fascinating study was made by Donohew (1965, 172, 173) in which 1,150 publishers in three states were asked whose opinions they respected the most. The results were as follows: merchants 25%, lawyers 14%, public officials 12%, bankers 12%, educators 8%, and newsmen 6%. Political affiliation made no difference in the response. The low repute the publisher has of his employees and the high respect he has for fellow businessmen and professionals show the class and economic solidarity of the publisher with his capitalist peers and the disdain he has for the proletarian professionals who work for him.

The publisher of the dominant daily is generally a very significant member of the power structure of the community, whereas the broadcaster is not nearly so prominent unless he already had ties to power positions. The newspapers have historically been an integral part of the founding and growth of their cities and they still play a significant

role in civic boosterism and city growth (Burd 1969; Donohew 1965).

There also is a difference in the position and activity of the number two media managers in the broadcast hierarchy--the newspaper editor and the broadcast general manager. The editor is usually prominent in civic affairs and is a journalist by trade, whereas the broadcast manager is primarily a businessman and does not participate in civic organizations to a significant extent (Altheide 1976). In the smaller towns the editors tend to be Democrats, but the electronic media managers are predominantly Republicans (Bohn and Clark 1972, 205).

The popular impression--fostered by the news media--is that the press plays an adversary, watchdog role, one in which the press objectively tells the truth wherever it finds it. If this is true, the news media would have to be outside the power framework of the community and nation in order to do their job and fulfill their promise. We have already seen that the mass media of national stature are deeply involved in the Ruling Cartel. We now will look at the local media and the power structure in their cities.

In this section we will look only at the place of the press in the power structure; the effect of this on content will be assessed in a later section. The role the media

play in the power structure generally has not been studied in great detail. Most of the books on local power structures and decision making in cities either largely ignore the media or do not give them a significant role in the community. On the other hand some writers (generally not political scientists, but journalists and communications experts) give the media a significant influence in the community, particularly in support of the local power structure and the status quo (Hvistendahl 1970, 474; Donahue, Tichenor and Olien 1973, 655).

At the local level the publisher or broadcaster may or may not use his or her power within the community structure. The option is theirs. There are several articles and books on this subject, but none of which includes the broadcast medium. The one exception to this is the study of small towns which showed tangentially that the broadcast station general managers consider themselves as somewhat important in the community, but, unlike the newspaper publishers who consider themselves, "strong local influentials," the broadcasters do not take an active role in the town's politics or power structure (Bohn and Clark 1972, 205). Naturally, in a city where there is cross-ownership, the publisher-licensee could exercise even greater community power. In Austin, Texas, a study of the

local power structure showed the publisher of the monopoly newspaper to be involved in the core political organ of the power elite (Wright 1983). His editor was an important operative at the secondary level of power in the city. The newspaper's editorials and political endorsements reflect the pro-growth, pro-business attitudes of the power structure.

There are some studies which are worth noting on the subject. One identified the publisher as one of the four top members of the town power elite. Another author showed that in Oberlin, Ohio, the publisher was sixth in the power group (Hunter 1956, 473, 474). In Dahl's (1961) book on New Haven, Connecticut, in the 1950s the publisher of the only two newspapers was a wealthy, aristocratic, very conservative man who could have a strong negative effect on public opinion, which made the politicians very cautious of arousing the publisher's ire. In a study of a Mississippi town of five thousand people there was a power structure which was composed of twenty top leaders. These men, however, generally concerned themselves only with special interests or problems areas which were important to them. Of the group of top twenty leaders it was only the newspaper editor whose participation and influence cut horizontally across special interest lines (Fanelli 1956).

In smaller towns and in smaller papers there can be some variations. In studies in Minnesota and Iowa about half of the papers were deemed to be within the power structure. Those which were part of the establishment did not carry much controversial news (Hvistendahl 1970).

A significant factor which may allow a publisher or broadcaster to take a more aggressive, critical stand in the community is economic security and strength. If the medium is strong financially, it can afford to be controversial. However, this can become a circular matter with the opposite effect. In order to be economically secure, a paper and station must please its advertisers. Many media owners have been threatened with reprisals by irate advertisers, even to the extent of being put out of business or placed in financial jeopardy by withdrawal of advertising by businesses whose owners disliked the editorial stance or news reporting (Cirino 1971, 6; Cirino 1974, 131-133).

In this case a monopoly situation would be helpful to the news medium, in that it would be economically secure from punishment by the advertisers. But this would presuppose that the publisher or broadcaster would be outside the community power structure, which in a monopoly situation, it is highly unlikely they would be. The paper would be in a stronger position to punish or ignore those

outside of the power structure. Not having the competitive pressure from a rival newspaper would make it easier for a monopoly paper to ignore or distort controversial news.

The relationship of chain ownership to the community power structure has not been comprehensively studied. Chain management can operate within or outside of the local establishment, depending on such variables as the corporate policy, the amount of backing of the editor by headquarters, and the degree of use of the corporate "deep pocket" to outlast irate advertiser retaliation. (It is anticipated that in the city where the corporate headquarters is located the chain owners are significant local elites, particularly if they have a newspaper there.)

There are various reasons for support or non-support of the local power relationships. A chain may want to increase circulation by being controversial and muckraking. A prominent media analyst believes that a locally owned newspaper is less likely than a chain to oppose the power structure, because the local owner is part of the establishment himself (Washington Post 1977b). One publisher disagrees, saying that some chains are more cautious, because local managers will play it safe because they do not own the papers themselves (Brucker 1973, 274). It is also likely that chains which are primarily interested in profits

will not want to upset the local notables.

Not only are the publishers and their papers very significant in the community power structures, the dominant newspapers in the large, metropolitan cities are significant in linking the local establishments with the national power structure. The directors are of particular significance, because the inside directors focus on the city, whereas the outside directors have their primary interests in other parts of the country and the economy, and they participate in organizations at the national and international power levels. The exceptions to the inside directors being only locally oriented are the owners of some of the large and more significant newspapers or media empires, people such as Sulzburger, Graham, Chandler, Hearst, and Cowles (Dreier 1979). These are people who belong to the CFR and attend Bilderberg meetings.

It is not just the fact that the publishers and editors hold positions in local elite organizations, their main significance is that, because they own and run ideological institutions, they shape public opinion, both in presenting information in a particular way and also--perhaps even more importantly--in preventing certain information and opinions from ever reaching the public eye, or, if they are presented, they are done so in an unfavorable or distorted

manner. Consequently, the people cannot know how their city is really run, with the result that the people cannot focus in on the power relationships so that they could possibly change them in their favor. Such press control also prevents (or at least renders it very difficult) for local groups to communicate with each other and with the public in order to obtain popular support (Bachrach and Baratz 1970).

3.3 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATION

Many opinions, observations, speculations and studies have been made over the years concerning the effects of various types of ownership situations of newspapers and the electronic media. Because there are so many variables, because so much of the subject matter and evaluations are qualitative and subjective, because much of the data is of a comparative nature, because media situations differ so much from city to city, and because the electronic media are ephemeral in nature, it has been very difficult to come to any strong conclusions and general agreement. Nonetheless, we should take a look at the situation. This section will consider mainly the economics. See Chapter Three on content

for further exposition:

There are three types of ownership situations involved. Sometimes they overlap; but we will consider them separately. The three are (1) the effect of a change from independent ownership to chain or group control, (2) a change from a competitive newspaper situation to one of monopoly, and (3) cross-ownership.

3.3.1 CHAIN/GROUP OWNERSHIP

One method of assessing the effects of chain ownership is looking at company policy and general corporate performance. The other method is to observe local performance after a transfer from independent ownership or when a small chain is purchased by a larger one. Group owners have varying reputations. Some look only at the profit and cost picture, not always to the benefit of the readers and community. Others build up the organizations; some milk them for profits (Lyle 1967, 20, 21; Business Week 1977b; Bagdikian 1972, 11, 12; Jones 1976, 174). Some chain owners give local managers a free hand (so long as profits are high), while others force their papers and broadcasters to follow certain policies, ranging from editorial approaches to criteria for personnel hiring, firing and

promotion (Washington Post 1977b; Brucker 1973, 274; Cirino 1974, 189, 190; Krieghbaum 1972, 94; Patrick and Howard 1974).

The most comprehensive study of monopoly and chain ownership was made by Grotta (1971). His conclusions were that consumers and advertisers receive no benefit from the presumed economies of scale when the papers changed from independent to chain control.

In an article on concentration in all communications media, Powell (1980, 97) found studies which showed that independent papers spent more money on expensive types of news and that there were other studies which showed that chains often raise the price at the newsstand and increase advertising rates when they take over, but overall they do little to improve the newspaper (Washington Post 1977b).

Because the profits in monopoly papers are three times those of competitive companies, the chains seek to purchase papers in monopoly situations. Ninety-seven percent of chain papers are in cities with no economic competition (Washington Post 1977b). This includes the towns with agency agreements, where the business aspects of the competing newspapers are merged, but the editorial and news functions are supposedly separate. Another aspect of group ownerships is that almost all of them are public corporations whose

stock is sold on the exchanges. This provides added pressure and incentive to squeeze the papers for the highest profits. If they also have outstanding loans to banks, there is additional pressure for ever increasing profits.

3.3.2 MONOPOLY NEWSPAPERS

A good case can always be made in theory about the dangers of monopoly in any field of capitalist endeavor. The realities of such dangers have been well documented for industry in general (Blair 1972 and 1978; Brandeis 1914; Green 1972 and 1973; Green and Massie 1980; Mueller, W., 1970; US Congress 1913, 1941, 1968, 1977). But there are also defenders of the desirability of a monopoly which is capable, responsive, efficient and productive (Blair 1972, 199, 200).

Only recently has the subject been studied very extensively, mostly with the print media. Very revealing are the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly when it was considering the Failing Newspaper Act (US Congress 1967b). The hearings revealed many instances of predatory, abusive behavior by the media which enjoyed a monopolistic position. In this sense it showed that the newspaper business differs little from other

capitalist endeavors in the drive for profit and market power. With monopoly profits so much higher, it is certainly worthwhile, from the owner's point of view, to attempt to effect a local monopoly, either by agreement with the competitor or by predation.

Many economists would say that if the monopolistic market structure exists, the predatory, monopolistic behavior will also exist. At the least, the temptation and means to use and abuse the monopoly position will be available when needed and will be used either overtly or as an implied threat. Other economists say that performance is the best test of the measure of the desirability of monopoly or oligopoly. The Warren Supreme Court favored the market structure test for determining monopolistic behavior (Green, 1972, 7).

Many of the studies of media monopoly, particularly regarding newspapers, and more recently involving cross-ownership, show opposing results, particularly concerning content. Grotta (1971) observed the effects of newspaper monopoly from several aspects: advertising space, newsstand price, subscription price, change in editorial personnel, size of the news hole, proportion of local news to total news, change in editorial news hole, change of local to total editorial comment, circulation change and

change in retail sales in the city. He found that there was greater circulation under monopoly, but that there was a correspondingly greater increase in the milline rate to the advertisers, "contrary to industry practice" (Grotta 1971). The advertiser not only received no benefits from consolidation, but paid a significantly higher price after newspaper consolidation took place. Although the monopoly paper increased its circulation, it was much smaller than the combination of it plus the publication which had ceased to exist.

Grotta also found that the number of editorial employees per one-thousand circulation decreased, even though there was some absolute increase in staff. Overall, the consumers paid a higher price, with no increase in quality and perhaps even a decrease in quality. The large scale economies were not passed on to the consumer. In another study, Langdon (Compaine 1979, 39) found similar increases in advertising rates in a switch to a monopoly situation. He also noted that wage rates are lower where there is no competing newspaper. Advertisers prefer a competitive situation. An Advertising Age (1979f) writer called a monopoly situation "a take it or leave it proposition."

An interesting difference of opinion exists between

those who are concerned about newspaper concentration and Campaine, who is not. Regarding the phenomenon of the combination rate offered by a single publisher of morning and evening newspapers in a city--either where there is a single owner or where there exists a joint operating agreement--Campaine (1979, 46-48) states that advertisers benefit because they can receive a lower rate for both papers than they could if each paper were competing and both were asking the full, traditional rate.

Barnett has a different view (1980, 72, 74). Traditionally there is a weaker and a stronger paper, with the healthier usually being the morning publication. The rate for the stronger paper--the one the advertisers really want to use--is set at an inordinately high level, and the rate for the weaker newspaper is only for a small, additional amount. Because it is almost irresistible not to advertise also in the weak paper, the advertiser is practically coerced into using both publications. Through use of the combination rate, not only can the weak paper survive--when it perhaps should not continue in operation--but also it is a good way to drive out any competitors, if they still exist, or to keep them out, if they are trying to gain a foothold.

Barnett points out that this is precisely the strategy

which a leading national advertising representative has advised his clients to use in order to force the advertisers to use both the strong and weak papers and at the same time to keep the competition out, particularly when those competitors are after the weaker paper's business.

In cities where unitized rates have been used from 1929 through 1950, the success rate of a competitor was only eleven percent. In the Times Picayune case, which has been roundly critized by antitrust people and others concerned with newspaper concentration, the Supreme Court upheld the unit rate by a 5-4 decision in 1953. (The Times-Picayune in New Orleans had used the combined rate to destroy its competitor.)

In Salem, Oregon, Gannett bought the two newspapers, precipitously raised the advertising rates and made other policy changes inimical to the interests of the advertisers. The latter rebelled and started their own shopper paper. Through various predatory practices, Gannett destroyed the shopper. Gannett did the same thing in Boise, Idaho (Compaine 1982, 70).

3.3.3 CROSS-OWNERSHIP

It is on the subject of cross-media ownership in a city

where there seems to be the greatest degree of disparity of opinions among researchers. There are studies which show that there are no differences regardless of ownership type, others which prove that the cross-media owners are superior, and many which conclude that the cross-media owners serve their audiences and advertisers less well than in a situation of competition.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that complex media are being studied where much of the material is subjective and where much human behavior is intimately involved. Also, there seem to be many problems in methodology, with many writers revealing the inadequacies of methodology of previous studies, particularly if the conclusions are at variance. For instance, Owens' (1973) study showed that where there was cross-ownership the advertising rates were higher. Lago and Osborn (1973), whose work was commissioned by the National Association of Broadcasters (and which supported the broadcasters' position favoring cross-ownership), criticized Owens' methods. Owens returned in kind (Wirth and Allen 1979).

In 1974 there was a survey of the literature made by the Rand Corporation (a Ruling Cartel think tank) on chain and cross-ownership in broadcasting. It, too, criticized most of the studies' methodologies. Its conclusion was that

"the form of media ownership generally seems to have a small impact on economic or content performance" (Compaine 1979, 100).

On the other hand, after reviewing many studies, including those from the FCC hearings in 1971, Linda Leuchter's (1976, 348) observation was that "no evidence has shown that joint operation economies arise from cross-ownership." Because it is a difficult subject to handle quantitatively and because she could find methodological weaknesses in all approaches and studies, Leuchter's conclusion was that most anecdotal evidence is probably more reliable and significant.

Different observations were made by Wirth and Allen (1979). (They were critical of both Owens and Lago.) Following their extensive study--and much to their surprise--they found that cross-ownership had a negative influence on broadcasting advertising revenues. Their conclusion was that, although they found fault with Owens' methodology in using time rate cards for stations, because this could be distorted by bargaining and by the fact that most advertising is now in thirty-second spots, not by time blocks, they nonetheless tended to agree with Owens' findings. Wirth and Allen's observation was that perhaps the anti-cross-ownership position of the FCC had been a

factor, because Owens' study had been made before the FCC's pressure could have been felt, whereas their own findings were reached afterward. Hence, it could be likely that in a cross-ownership situation, the media managers might be loading the price of the rates in their newspaper, where there is no competition, and less in their TV station, where there is competition and where the FCC might be watching. They concluded that, with the impending deregulation of TV and the lessening of interest by the FCC and other agencies in the executive branch, a rise in rates could be expected of the advertising time of the TV stations where cross-ownership is present.

However, it may be more likely that in a cross-ownership situation there would be no competition for the newspaper, but there would be for the TV station. Therefore, it would be more profitable (and more damaging to the competitors) to continue the cross-subsidization of the TV station, particularly if the ratings of the station were less than those of its counterparts.

3.3.4 CONCLUSION

There is nothing which can guarantee a good newspaper or broadcasting station. A blanket indictment cannot be

made for monopoly situations everywhere just as 100% approbation can automatically be given for media operating under competition. After being purchased by a chain some bad newspapers can be improved; or the management can be improved but content is not; or the paper is worsened in all aspects but for profit. The president for news of the Gannett chain said that only top professional people can make a good newspaper, and that fact "cannot be inflated by competition nor can it be diluted by monopoly" (Compaine 1979, 26).

This is only partly true. The problem is not that there are a lot of good professional people working in bad newspapers and broadcasting stations and vice versa, but that the media are businesses which are working within the profit imperatives of the capitalist framework. The anecdotal information and many of the studies reveal what can occur in places where competition is either meager or non-existent. This behavior does not vary much from that of corporations and other types of businesses in other fields. The media are businesses which are out to maximize profits. They generally will use whatever methods they can to achieve this end. That some owners of individual stations or papers and of some chains are more ethical than others and are more concerned to provide their primary and secondary

customers--the advertisers and readers/viewers, respectively--with a better product than some of the other owners does not necessarily mean that monopoly situations under them are better than competitive situations with some of the other owners. In all areas of capitalism it is generally observed, particularly by antitrust economists, that where there is competition, the public is better served.

3.4 ADVERTISING'S CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION

One aspect of the concentration of ownership of the mass news media is rarely discussed in writings in media journals but is hotly debated in the field of antitrust. This is the question of whether advertising, particularly on television, contributes to the development and maintenance of economic concentration.

This is not a new phenomenon. There are case histories which go back into the late 1800s and early 1900s which show how a big company would invade a market, advertise heavily, and drive out the competition. The subject is still very much alive today (Mueller 1973; Greer 1973; Compaine 1979, 110). The lines are generally drawn between the people who

favor antitrust on one side against the conservatives who favor complete freedom for the media.

People who claim there is no connection between advertising and concentration have made studies which show various concentrated industries in which advertising plays a moderate or inconsequential role, such as the sugar industry. As in the case with the debate over the matter of the economic and public service effects of media concentration, many of these studies have been financed by elements of the advertising media themselves.

People who try to show that there is a connection between the two are men such as Donald Turner (former head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department), Dr. Willard Mueller (one of the world's foremost antitrust authorities), Dr. John Blair (formerly head of the staff of the House Antitrust Committee), and the Federal Trade Commission.

What is not mentioned very often is the concentration of advertisers and advertising agencies. Some studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated that there was a concentration of large national advertisers which dominated the available time and space, and that national advertising also dominated the available time on local broadcasting stations (Schramm and Alexander 1975, 592; Blair 1972, 314).

Since these studies were made, a merger wave has hit the ad agency business, making concentration even more marked (Advertising Age 1979d and 1979e).

Much has been published and there has been considerable testimony before congressional committees about the relationship between advertising and concentration (US Congress 1966a and 1971; Advertising Age 1979c). This information reveals that advertising can have its greatest anti-competitive effect when a product is highly differentiated, when there are hidden qualities, and when there are emotional buying motives which can trigger consumer responses and action. However, even when these product aspects are not readily apparent, advertising can create some of these factors in the minds of consumers. This is particularly true of consumer goods, where it has been shown that high advertising results in greater profits. Former head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, Donald Turner stated that profits are 50% higher in highly advertised industries, representing monopoly profits (Greer 1973; Mueller 1973).

A big company can move into a market and unleash a massive campaign, using some of the following tactics: product proliferation, which can usurp shelf space; an advertising blitz; special premiums; and predatory pricing,

which is easy for a conglomerate or a company with a nationally marketed product to sustain through a combination of its deep pocket and its ability to raise prices elsewhere in the country or of other products within the company order to subsidize the local losses in the target market. The owner of a smaller, local company cannot compete and is usually either driven out of business, is forced to sell his company to the larger, invading corporation, or is driven to reach an accommodation which is favorable to the predator. After competition is destroyed, the prices can be raised back to even higher levels than before the war began. This phenomenon can be observed at the national, regional and local levels (Greer 1973; Mueller 1973).

Although the activity may occur at the local level, it has nationwide effects as it sweeps across the country. The coffee business is a good example (Greer 1973). Procter and Gamble bought Folgers, a regional marketer. P&G then swept the country, city by city, challenging the other major brand, Maxwell House, which is owned by another giant, General Foods. In the ensuing advertising and price war the smaller coffee companies were liquidated. The resulting concentration can be seen by the fact that in 1963 there were 261 coffee producers; in 1972 there were 162; and in 1979 there were 40. There are predictions that soon the two

giants will have 70% of the business and in few years they will be the only ones left.

This is not to say that in every case of failure of a smaller company the reason was the above scenario, but most antitrust people believe that what we have described is the major cause. This type of operation has occurred in every industry where the commodities lend themselves to this approach. These industries lost 12,000 firms from 1947 through 1972, with concentration steadily increasing.

Not only are small businesses driven out, consumers have to pay artificially higher prices in the form of monopoly overcharges. Antitrust writers estimate that the additional cost to the consumers for food is from \$10-\$15 billion annually. For the whole economy the monopoly overcharge is estimated at \$180 billion each year. Antitrust researchers claim that competition does have the effect of reducing these prices. Where the top four producers in an industry have 40% or less of the market, these monopoly overcharges do not occur (Greer 1973; Mueller 1973a; Green, M.J., 1973).

Nationally, it is vitally necessary for a business to advertise on the TV networks. But network policy heavily favors the large, particularly the conglomerate, advertiser. Not only do the large advertisers get more

favorable rates because of greater bargaining power and greater advertising volume discounts, but also the conglomerates (and a large company with brand proliferation) can always fill the time with one of their many products. A smaller or single product company cannot afford to do this; indeed, it may not want to advertise its product so heavily as the networks' volume discounts would permit it to do. Conglomerates are allowed to rotate their products advertised, but smaller companies cannot subcontract their time or rotate their time with another company as a package deal in order to get the volume discounts or to increase their bargaining power with the networks (US Congress 1966a; Advertising Age 1979c).

Regional companies cannot usually advertise economically on the networks because of the additional cost of deleting network material for the insertion of the regional announcement. Actually the small advertisers complain that prime time is generally not even available to them because it is already pre-empted by the giant advertisers with long-term contracts (Blair 1972, 311-321; Gordon, R.L., 1979; Business Week 1979). Even larger companies which want to expand find they cannot use prime time because incumbent advertisers are given first option for renewal (Business Week 1979). This is particularly a

problem for businesses which want to place their commercials on special types of programs, such as beer sponsors on sports programs (Advertising Age 1979c; Gordon, R.L., 1979).

Such are the hardships of smaller competitors. But there is a big problem for any potential competitor, large or small: entry barriers. When a product or industry is heavily advertised, it creates a considerably expensive barrier for new companies to enter the market, because they also must heavily advertise in order to attract attention. Even when the level of advertising is only at a moderate level, if the advertised industry is highly concentrated, the oligopolists can quickly turn on the advertising faucet if competition arises, thereby raising the entry barrier (Greer 1973). The big, established, nationally marketed company and the conglomerate can then absorb the losses until the potential competition is either destroyed or withdrawn.

This results in the low-high-low advertising phenomenon, where an industry or product is not heavily advertised at first. Then as economic concentration increases, advertising greatly accelerates. As the competition is destroyed, creating oligopoly or monopoly, the advertising level drops off. This is the behavior Douglas Greer (1973) stresses in answering people who say

that there is not a correlation between advertising and concentration, because some of the most concentrated industries and products are not the most heavily advertised. Greer analyzes several industries historically to show that the relationship of advertising to concentration is "positive at low to moderate levels of concentration, but negative at higher levels."

Greer's conclusion is that case histories alone cannot prove or disprove an economic generalization, but they tend to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between advertising intensity (and other promotional activity) and economic concentration. The relationship is not linear, but parabolic. Furthermore, the causal link is rarely simple.

Economist John Blair (1971, 312, 313) studied the relationships between TV advertising and concentration. He says that

Rivalry for display (shelf) space had induced leading advertisers to promote not only different products but different brands of the same product. The result has been the preemption of both the fixed supply of TV advertising time and the fixed supply of shelf space. . . . The preemption by large firms of the medium whose supply is fixed and which, in addition, has the greatest (advertising) pulling power should make higher concentration a certainty.

Former Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department Edwin Zimmerman agrees. He testified before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee in 1966 that the mere fact that there are only three TV networks with limited prime time is in itself an entry barrier (US Congress 1966a, 651).

The problem concerning TV advertising can affect even a large corporation. The Heinz Company complained in court in 1976 that Campbell was threatening to drive them out of a portion of the canned soup business because of Campbell's brand proliferation and its advertising and promotional blitzes (Wall Street Journal 1976b).

Blair analyzed thirty-three industries which were heavy advertisers to see if there had been increases in concentration in the fields. Of the 33, 25 recorded significant increases in concentration, while only 8 registered declines. Seventeen of the 25 had very large increases in concentration. For the country as a whole, the increased concentration in manufacturing was roughly matched by corresponding decreases, but the heavily TV-advertised fields increased concentration by more than three to one.

Blair (1972, 333, 334) finds support from the study made by Charles Ynew Yang on advertising and concentration from 1948 to 1958. Yang (1974) found that in the twenty industries where there was an increase in advertising (all

media) by the leading companies, concentration increased. Conversely, in those six industries where the concentration ratio declined, there had been an improvement in the advertising position of the smaller companies relative to the larger ones. Blair's final conclusion is that "there can be little doubt about the continuation of the upward trend in concentration among industries with high TV advertising intensities" (1971, 334).

The subject under discussion is a complex one. As with many social phenomena it is difficult to determine precisely the direct and indirect relationships involved. Concentration and advertising can be a two-way street. Concentration gives greater power--actual and potential--to advertising. Conversely, advertising can be a powerful tool in creating and maintaining concentration.

Advertising can be a significant factor, perhaps a cause, of mergers (US Congress 1971, 648). When a company or companies see that their advertising war is too costly and cannot destroy the competition, a merger or cartelization may be effected, with the competition either being taken out of business or allowed to remain in business under the control of the dominant company (Greer 1973, 319, 329).

Economic concentration is seldom caused by one factor. Generally there is an interrelationship of many factors at

any particular time in each case. However, the most reasonable tests--testimony before congress, regulatory agency action, and court cases--seem to throw the balance in favor of Blair's conclusion.

Of even greater significance of this subject in relationship to the concentration of ownership of the electronic news media is that the power to determine who receives advertising time, particularly on the TV networks, apparently can significantly determine the nature of specific industries and the structure and direction of the American economy as a whole.

It is well to remember that many of the men on the TV networks' boards of directors--the men in whose hands this power ultimately lies--are also directors of and own stock in, not only many of these giant corporations in concentrated industries which benefit so greatly from TV advertising, but also are on the boards of directors of banks which also have potentially controlling interests and significant holdings in these giant corporations. It is well to keep these facts in mind when considering the question of who is helped and who is hurt by the situation Blair and the others are analyzing.

3.5 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND MEDIA CONCENTRATION

There has been governmental interest in concentration of ownership of the media over the years, but very little action has been taken either to prevent or reduce it. The media have very powerful lobbies and spokespersons in the political world. The general studies on economic concentration made by congressional committees such as those of Patman and Metcalf have included the media. Also, former congressman Morris Udall has been particularly outspoken about newspaper ownership, but has not found any support in Congress to remedy the situation. Former vice-president Agnew railed against the concentrated control of the elite Eastern Establishment media, and the Nixon administration made threats to certain disliked media organizations. The Federal Trade Commission had a symposium on media concentration in 1976. But no substantive action has been taken as a result of any of the above revelations, threats and complaints.

The three main sources of activity on the subject have been the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Justice Department, and the courts. These actions have

resulted in policy pronouncements and decisions by the Commission and a few antitrust cases. Some of the FCC cases have ended up in court. The Justice Department has been an actor in a few of the FCC cases; it has participated in some of the antitrust cases in court; and it has initiated actions of its own. Even though many of these actions are interrelated, we will look at each area of activity separately.

3.5.1 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

The FCC is governed basically by the Communications Act of 1934. It gets into all areas of broadcasting, ranging from the technical areas and the selection of licensees to the nature of content. Historically, the Commission has been a pro-broadcaster organization (Brown, L., 1971; Cole and Dettinger 1978; US Congress 1978b). The commissioners have predominantly been either broadcasters or people who are sympathetic to the licensees. Nicholas Johnson, who fought for the public interest, was unique in his selection as a commissioner.

The FCC is one of the many regulatory agencies with the notorious "revolving door" of personnel with the industry it is supposed to be regulating (US Congress 1978b; Common

Cause 1976). Indeed, even though "public interest, convenience and necessity" is the basic commandment of the Communications Act which is to be followed by the Commission, the FCC did not even recognize the general public as having any right of standing to intervene or appear as a participant in deliberations until it was forced to do so by the courts in 1966 (*Citizen's Communication Center v. FCC*, 447 F.2d 1202 (D.C.C.A., 1971)). In its decisions the Commission has been loathe to crack down on licensees unless they are small stations, are stations or programs with left wing perspectives (such as the Pacifica stations or as in the Eastern Education Radio case), or are of the far right wing variety (such as in the Brandywine Mainline Radio case). The FCC has overlooked significant violations of the Communications Act or its own policy and has given approval of the most minimal levels of service in order to keep from coming down hard on licensees. Any action to the contrary has taken many years to effect and has sent shock waves through the broadcasting community (Cole and Dettinger 1978, 190-202; Johnson, 1970; Access 1982h; *RKO General*, 44 FCC 2nd 123 (1973)).

So far as ownership concentration is concerned, on the face of it there should be no problems because the regulations on ownership restrictions are simple and clear:

seven each of AM, FM and TV stations are the maximum a person can have, with no more than five of the TV stations being VHF. (The FCC recently recommended dropping these restrictions.) The duopoly rule (not applicable to public stations) prevents a person from having more than one station of a type in the same area of coverage. However, the Commission has permitted exceptions to this rule. Also, the FCC is supposed to consider ownership diversity as a positive factor in comparative license hearings (Emery 1971, 149-252).

As we have seen previously in the section under institutional ownership, the FCC does have restrictions on stockholder, officer and director relationships with licensees, but these have largely been ineffectual because of (1) the vagueness of the wording, (2) the lack of information about ownership as a result of non-cooperation of the owners and holders of stock and the lack of a computer system at the Commission which could handle the information even if it had it, and (3) because the FCC evaluates each case separately in reference to size, class of station, and extent of other competitive service in the area. These factors provide the Commission almost a blank check for decision making with its pro-industry bias.

The Commission has conducted investigations on

concentration over the years, has made some pronouncements and has even announced some actions to remedy the situation, but concentration still exists. The main, effective action the FCC took occurred in 1940 which resulted in NBC divesting itself of one of its two radio networks (Barnouw 1968).

There are four scenarios which the FCC actions seem to have taken since World War II.

1. The FCC announces that it will recommend certain steps to reduce or eliminate concentration. There is a great outcry from the industry. The FCC relents, goes no further with its action, and says that it will continue to consider each situation on a case-by-case basis. An example is the handling of regional concentration.
2. The commission simply violates its own rules and makes a rather weak justification in doing so. Example: breaking the duopoly rule and allowing a person to have more than one station in a market because the city had other stations.
3. It announces a new policy and invites comments, there is the usual broadcaster outcry, then the FCC retreats to a position which affects only a small part of the

industry--the small broadcaster. An example is the announcement of mandatory mass divestitures of cross-ownerships and multiple ownerships. After the industry pressure was brought to bear, only the ownership combinations in sixteen small markets were affected. However, all such combinations were outlawed in the future.

4. It announces a policy, then invites waivers for all violators and grants each waiver. Example: the restrictions on cross-ownership of broadcasters with cable systems.

Regardless of the expressed concern of the Commission over the phenomenon of concentration, in deciding specific cases the FCC frequently goes the other direction. It repeatedly has refused to allow hearings to the Justice Department's petitions to deny a license renewal, even when statistics show that there is great media concentration in a particular city. The Commission changed its standard from that of "public interest" to that of the antitrust laws when the Justice Department files a petition. The latter must show that there has been a Sherman Act violation before the FCC will permit a hearing for a license renewal (Bennett 1971). A frustrated Justice Department official complained that when they bring an antitrust suit against a broadcast

owner, the courts will tell them to take the case to the FCC; when they go the FCC, they are told to pursue the matter in the courts (Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report 1974, 674).

Meanwhile, using the case-by-case method, the Commission permits so many exceptions to a rule that the rule almost becomes inoperative. And with the deregulation fever running high in Washington, D.C., it may be that most or all ownership restrictions have become or will become moot (Access 1983a; Dallas Times Herald 1984).

3.5.2 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

The Justice Department has been very active over the years in relationship to ownership of the media. (Some of these activities have resulted in antitrust suits which will be discussed later.) It has many ways of trying to combat what it considers concentration and ownership abuses. Some of these methods are a preliminary inquiry, intervening in an FCC case, filing suit, dropping a case and reaching a settlement, and an antitrust case brought to completion.

One very significant case which Justice brought was in 1930 against RCA, General Electric, Westinghouse and AT&T (Barnouw 1975, 68). These giants had cartelized broadcasting

and had stifled competition and growth of radio through a combination of patent licensing agreements and the interlocking of directors and stock ownership. The government suit was delayed until the corporations could agree on a settlement, resulting in RCA becoming a separate, independent company and the others withdrawing from broadcasting, although they were given RCA debentures.

The proposed merger of ITT and ABC in 1967, which had been approved by the FCC, was opposed by the Justice Department (Barnouw 1975, 428-430; Johnson 1970). Faced with a suit, ITT backed out.

Another type of suit Justice will bring is the one in 1956 against NBC, where the network had forced Westinghouse to trade affiliates with NBC against Westinghouse's will (Compaine 1979, 91). The Department also files suits in individual cities where it thinks that media concentration is too marked (Emery 1971, 234-241; Compaine 1979, 87, 95).

It is mainly the threat of a long and costly suit which will cause a company to acquiesce to Justice's desires. However, the recent activities of the Justice Department which have not wound up in court have not had much effect on the structure or operation of the media. With the FCC generally not being favorably disposed to Justice's point of view; with the courts not being very responsive the past

several years; with the long length of time it now takes to prosecute a case; and finally, with the climate of deregulation extant, the activity of the Justice Department has percipitously diminished.

3.5.3 THE COURTS

The judicial handling of broadcasting is rather unique. Because the FCC is in Washington, D.C., the cases which are appealed from the regulatory agency go directly to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the primary forum for judicial review of broadcast regulation. The Supreme Court has seldom become involved in broadcasting issues--only the truly landmark cases. The cases involving the written media are handled differently from those of broadcasting, in that they occur throughout the country and follow the normal judicial paths.

The Washington, D.C., Circuit Court generally defers to the FCC in matters of technology, but on the public interest aspects of regulation of content and ownership, the court has been very activist. Over the years the liberal court of appeals has frequently been at odds with the industry-oriented, conservative FCC. But with the Burger Supreme Court being very conservative, the D.C. Circuit

Court frequently has found itself as odd-man-out, with the Supreme Court now supporting the Commission in reducing the general public's interests and more protective of those of the industry.

The Supreme Court has been involved in very few cases involving press ownership. It mainly has accepted cases concerning the First Amendment, access, and matters establishing the extent of FCC jurisdiction. However, there have been two significant antitrust cases decided by the Court which will be covered later.

The Burger Court has been very anti-free press the past years (Higdon 1980). Although it supported the newspaper industry in refusing to allow public access to newspapers in the Tornillo case (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 US 241 (1974)), and even though it ruled in favor (although not strongly) for the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, it has diminished the First Amendment protections of the press, has reduced access to news sources for the press, lifted source confidentiality restrictions, and has approved governmental and police intrusions into the news process.

3.5.4 ANTITRUST AND THE MEDIA

If concentration of ownership of the media is of such

ownership with the only TV station in town penalized anyone advertising in a competitive medium, the antitrust laws were successfully applied (*Kansas City Star v. US*, 240 F. 2d 643 (1957)).

However, in the seemingly anomalous Times-Mirror case the court struck down the sale of San Bernadino morning, afternoon and Sunday newspapers to the owner of the Los Angeles Times as a violation of Section Seven of the Clayton Act because the papers' readerships overlapped (*US v. Times-Mirror*, 390 US 712 (1968)). The court's decision indicates that it is all right to purchase existing monopoly newspapers, it is legal for two local papers to join to create a monopoly, but it is not permissible to create a new monopoly by such means as the Times-Mirror people had planned. More recently, the Justice Department stated that it would investigate Ruppert Murdoch's purchase of the New York Post, Village Voice, and the New Yorker, but no further action was taken (Washington Post 1977b).

The handling of antitrust in broadcasting is different from that of newspapers (Bennett 1971). Strange as it may seem, the FCC may not apply Section Seven of the Clayton Act (commonly referred to as the Celler-Kefauver Act) to broadcast mergers because of the last paragraph of the act. This is a rather vaguely worded section which seems to have

been thrown into the act as somewhat of a quickly devised afterthought. On the other hand the courts have ruled that the regulatory agencies cannot "repeal" the antitrust laws. In reality, however, Section Seven is difficult to apply to broadcasting, even though in the Associated Press case the court said that the antitrust laws do apply.

The FCC does have a club which it can use: character qualifications of a licensee. When a licensee has been convicted of antitrust violations (or any law), the Commission may revoke or deny a license. The FCC has had ample opportunity to apply this power, but it has failed to do so even in some of the most blatant cases. This is particularly noticeable where the licensee is a large corporation such as Westinghouse, General Electric, RKO (General Tire) and Paramount. The courts also may revoke the broadcast license of an antitrust violator, but this has not been done.

Despite the strong wording of the Communications Act (sections 313 and 314) regarding antitrust, and even though the FCC's 1951 report concerning character qualifications in regard to law violations was aimed mainly at antitrust matters and anti-competitive activity, the FCC's application of these laws, which is done on a case-by-case basis, is rarely made to the detriment of the antitrust violator.

This occurs particularly because the FCC does not consider consent decrees and nolo contendere pleas as pertinent and does not deem antitrust violations by a company as relevant unless they were directly involved with the broadcasting station itself. Furthermore, only repeated violations within three years of the litigation with the FCC are looked at. And, even at that, the Commission may consider extenuating circumstances. The Commission said in 1953 that one or even a series of antitrust violations do not ipso facto disqualify an applicant, because he still might be able to operate a station in the public interest (Emery 1971, 234-241).

In spite of the fact that the Justice Department has generally been unable to use the antitrust laws effectively in court in media cases, and despite being unsuccessful in eliciting a favorable response from the FCC on license denial petitions, it has been achieving some periodic successes in obtaining consent decrees and in threatening antitrust suits in situations where it has felt that media concentration is too high or where an increase in concentration is threatened (Emery 1971). With this power, plus the Newspaper Preservation Act provision that the Justice Department must approve in advance all proposals for newspaper joint operating agreements, the Department can

have great power if it wants to use it. It is entirely conceivable that an abusive presidential administration could use this power for its own ends. A threat of an expensive antitrust suit might make a media owner think twice before being too vociferous in his criticism of the government.

When the antitrust laws and their application to the press are looked at realistically, they have little, direct effect on the mass media ownership except occasionally in preventing the purchase of a position which would create a new monopoly (Jones 1976, 169; Washington Post 1977b). The Justice Department will not look into existing monopolies. It also will not touch chain and conglomerate ownership (Washington Post 1977b). The Federal Trade Commission confessed it will do nothing regarding concentration, particularly in towns with only one newspaper. The combination of vagueness and complexity of the laws, the great expense to both sides in litigation, the infrequent application of the laws and even less frequent convictions, the great number of consent decrees, the permissive aspects of the Newspaper Preservation Act, and the refusal of the FCC to take a hard line against antitrust violators, make the antitrust laws an insignificant factor in the world of the mass media. Furthermore, being in a deregulation frame

of mind now, Congress is turning its back on the whole problem of antitrust and concentration. The executive branch, particularly the Justice Department, has followed suit.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Over the years mass media ownership has become highly concentrated from many aspects at the local, regional and national levels. This continuing trend is being pushed from two sources. First, the media giants are becoming larger; second, the giants are joining hands in joint ventures. But the industry is probably much more highly concentrated than we are aware because of the ability to hide corporate ownership (particularly by financial institutions) through various mechanisms.

Monopoly ownership simplifies political and economic control of individual communities, because the media owners, particularly of newspapers, are firmly inside the local power structure. Although there are conflicting opinions, most evidence shows that communities usually receive less economic or informational benefit from any form of monopoly

media domination than they do under a system where competition is extant.

There is a reciprocal relationship between advertising and concentration, particularly on television. Locally, advertising has been used by big companies as a tool to destroy competition. Nationally, the wealthy corporate giants in concentrated industries preempt the limited (concentrated) time available on the networks, thus not only shutting out competition from access to a mass audience, but also producing an almost insurmountable entry barrier for prospective competitors.

There seems to be no end in sight to this trend in media concentration, which is parallel to (or a part of) the continuation of total economic concentration in the U.S.. The news media are not informing the public about the situation, and at the present time the government does not provide a counterpoise. Indeed, the government activity ranges from tacit approval to active encouragement.

Chapter 4

THE CONTENT OF MASS MEDIA: ELEMENTS FOR BIAS

4.1 INTRODUCTION: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF HEGEMONY

In studying the mass media, the "bottom line" is content. If there are freely and widely disseminated opinions and information representing the entire range of inquiry that is possible and if a mass medium and audience are readily available and accessible for people who desire to speak out, then there is no need to make such a thorough study of the mass media as is contained in this dissertation.

But, as we shall see, this is hardly the case in the U.S.. There are many factors which contribute to the control of information and media accessibility. This chapter will address these. The first factor is the general framework

within which the mass media operate and the role they play within it. Next, we assess the corporate aspects which contribute directly to content selection, distortion and bias. Then we look at the nature of the top media managers and owners to see who they are and how they exercise their influence on content, particularly as it results in the social control of the newsroom. Following is a more detailed analysis of the ways bias and censorship are effected--and by whom: the agenda setters, the gatekeepers, etc. We also take a close look at the making of news at the TV networks. Finally, we shall see if all these structures and processes result in an opinion spectrum being presented on the pages and airwaves which corresponds generally to the range of opinions which are found within the American ruling class. We also will analyze the role of the media in attempting to insure that all these realities, plus the true nature of the U.S. power system, are not disseminated to the citizens.

The nature of the content which we experience with the mass media is not just a simple matter of decisions of various people to permit certain information to be disseminated in a certain manner, although this is the final way material is entered into the news system. This stratum of news production exists within a larger framework of the

political-economic system which has its particular values. The system's ruling class works hard to insure that these values predominate.

There are varying approaches to how this is accomplished--and the role of the mass media in the process (Sallach 1974);--but there are two which seem to be the most adequate. Schattschneider's concept is called the "mobilization of bias," which is inherent in the social, political and economic bases of the system. It is reflected in a "set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 43, 44).

The concept of hegemony seems to be the most comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon. Marx provided the seminal idea with his famous statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (Sallach 1974, 165). This analysis was elaborated by Gramsci to describe the way in which "a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and

private manifestations" (Sallach 1974, 165). Because the dominant class controls the prime economic and political organizations of society, as well as the idea-producing and disseminating institutions, the ruling class will use these media to inculcate its values in the masses and to reinforce existing societal structures and relationships in order to maintain the ruling class' privileged position within the society. Along with this is the prevention of the dissemination of alternative views of reality, history, ethics, and social, political and economic organization.

The next hegemonic step is the self-acceptance or internalization of these ruling class values by the lower, dominated classes (Sallach 1974, 166; Veblen 1948). Or, failing complete acceptance, at least the underclasses must not be able to perceive any viable alternatives, and so will remain with confused, fragmentary and contradictory orientations which will present no threat to ruling class hegemony.

In countries with more dictatorial and authoritarian governments, direct, comprehensive censorship or media monopoly can be used to accomplished the above. But in more open societies, particularly where there is a range of opinions within the ruling class itself--such as in the U.S.--the press can operate more freely, so long as it does

not venture outside of the hegemonic limits. Indeed, in such a situation the system can be strengthened if the ruling class control is not publicly heavy-handed, because it gives the impression of the press as being "free" and "objective," and the "watchdog of the system." The people, thinking they are getting "all the news that's fit to print," are less likely to look elsewhere for information. Societal stability is thus maintained and the power relationships are not seriously challenged, or, if challenged, are controlled and contained.

4.2 MACRO-LEVEL INFLUENCES ON CONTENT

4.2.1 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP INFLUENCES

As the previous chapter has shown, there can be no doubt that ownership of the media is firmly in the hands of the capitalists and that the three commercial networks and the leading newspaper companies are securely controlled by the core, monopoly power sector of the U.S. society and operated for the Ruling Cartel's benefit. But there are varieties of press ownership which at the local level have significant effect on content, even though the total range

of material printed and broadcast will remain within the constraints of the capitalist corporate system.

The effects on content of cross-ownership, chain ownership, and monopoly media situations have long been debated (Compaine 1979; Bagdikian 1971, 1972 and 1980; US Congress 1967b). There are studies regarding each category which indicate that a particular arrangement is beneficial, and there is some research which shows the opposite. For example, some group owners seem to allow more editorial independence than others. Some milk a newspaper for profits at the expense of content, while others occasionally build up a paper. Of course, this partly depends on how bad a paper was before it was purchased.

However, when all studies are considered, the majority conclusion seems to be that independent newspapers in competitive situations and without cross-ownership provide for better media. We should look at the deleterious effects on content in different situations of media ownership concentration (Barnett 1973 and 1980; Howard 1974; Leuchter 1976; Owen 1973; Hvistendahl 1970; Ardoin 1973; Rarick and Hartman 1966; Wirth and Allen 1979; Sterling 1969; Wirth and Woolert 1976; Thrift 1977; Wackman 1975; Powell, W., 1979; Wall Street Journal 1978).

4.2.1.1 Chain/Group Ownership

1. News coverage and feature articles are fewer than with a competitive situation. Stories are shorter and there are fewer of them. There is less national news written by the staff and more from outside sources, particularly news services.
2. The newspapers in the chain tend to be homogeneous in content as well as in political endorsements.
3. The papers will be less likely to oppose the local power structure, because because they want to be good citizens and particularly do not wish to offend either the advertisers or the local power relationships, mainly because the distant corporate headquarters is too far away to have intense interest in local events--only the profits. However, there are strong opinions to the contrary, that the independent is less likely to go against the local Establishment because the publisher/owner is a part of it and has to live among his peers in town. The key factor may be local monopoly. If the paper has it, the company can withstand retribution by the advertisers' threats of withdrawal of business. However, the chain also could conceivably ride out the ire of the advertisers

because its deep pocket of other corporate interests could subsidize the intrepid paper until all was well again.

4.2.1.2 Newspaper Monopoly and Papers with Joint Operating Contracts

1. The editor is less likely to be aggressive and controversial.
2. When a joint operation is effected, the coverage appears to become much the same and the loss of two voices seems to occur.
3. There is less local news, fewer pictures and fewer opinion columns.
4. The most comprehensive empirical study of such a situation was made by Grotta (1971) who observed the effects of a change to a monopoly situation from several aspects. His conclusion was that the people as consumers, employees, advertisers and news seekers all were losers. The only gainer was the owner, who raised the rates and prices, cut the number of editorial employees and kept the extra profits. Grotta's conclusion was that monopolists will be

monopolists regardless of what economic or business field they are in.

4.2.1.3 Cross-media ownership

The effects of this type of ownership seem to fall into the range of from no benefit to serious problems, such as the following (Leuchter 1976; Compaine 1979, 40; Access 1976e; Sandman 1977):

1. There is a threat to objective reporting and editorializing because of the conflict between news events and the owners' economic interests.
2. Writers who are TV critics for newspapers indicated that if their publication also owned a TV station, their paper's policies prevented them from doing investigative reporting or editorializing and disallowed their commenting on public policy matters.
3. News content is similar in the paper and on the newscasts, because the reporters share facilities and sources.
4. The TV station carries less locally originated programming.
5. The TV station more frequently transgresses the

objectivity standard than a non-cross-owned station does.

4.2.1.4 Total Media Monopoly

Two studies were made in situations of total media monopoly (Stempel 1973; American Institute for Political Communication 1973). It was found that the media content was less comprehensive in the monopoly city and the people were less informed than the inhabitants in the towns with media competition. Additionally, the citizens of the city with single ownership of all the media took considerably longer to be able to make up their minds about candidates running for state and local office than people did who were living in a place where there were more media voices.

Another observed phenomenon was that the inhabitants of the monopoly towns had a higher opinion of their media than did the people living in places with competition. And yet, Campaine (1979) and the Washington Post (1977b) expressed the view that press concentration must not be so bad because people have not complained about it.

However, a different conclusion could be drawn: if people are deprived of a variety of information from a

diversity of sources, they not only will not be informed, but they will have no (or little) information with which to compare to what they are being exposed. Perhaps their blameless ignorance and civic pride would cause them to regard their media so highly. Or maybe we can see the results of the hegemonic process in a more pure form.

Concerning the lack of concern by the populace regarding media concentratiuon, the press itself almost never talks about it. How is the public supposed to know what they are missing? It is a circular argument to say that the monopoly press is beneficial because the people do not complain.

4.2.1.5 Conclusion

The controversy over effects of media ownership and concentration will continue as researchers find examples of one category or other which differ in some way with results from studies of another category. Corporations, individual managers and cities are all different. Nothing will guarantee a "good" newspaper or broadcasting station. But regardless of the ownership situation, the advantages and disadvantages work within the narrow range of capitalist political and economic exigencies, and their employees are

similarly socialized, have similar news attitudes and traditions, work within similar corporate structures, and gather information in similar ways from similar sources. Therefore, the content and editorial policy still will generally stay within "acceptable" limits as determined by local and national ruling elites.

4.2.2 CORPORATE ECONOMIC INFLUENCES

There are factors of corporate operations which have influences on media content. The supreme target--high profits--can greatly influence the amount of money spent on personnel and operations. Budgets may or may not correspond to the profit picture; but this is another area for corporate decision making which will have an effect on output. For the print and electronic media the rating and circulation systems are extremely important, particularly for broadcasting, and if the numbers and demographics are not what the managers want, the content of production frequently is changed. Advertisers can have significant influences on media content either by their economic support or non-support of firms or of individual programs or by threats of reprisals if the advertisers are displeased with the behavior or performance of the company.

4.2.2.1 Profits

Owning a newspaper or broadcasting station is generally a profitable venture; owning a media conglomerate is almost invariably very profitable; owning a TV network is extremely profitable. Of course the making of profits is the "bottom line" under capitalism. Because the media are businesses run by businessmen, profits are the prime consideration.

Although English media magnate Lord Robert Thomson called the ownership of a commercial TV station "a license to print money" (Washington Post 1977b), not all media operations are equally profitable. The independents make less money than their network affiliate rivals; the stations in the top twenty markets are considerably more profitable than those in the smaller markets; the UHF stations historically have had a rough time financially compared with the VHF stations; and the three networks' owned-and-operated stations are extremely profitable (Sandman, Rubin and Sachsman 1972; Johnson 1970; Malone 1977). Furthermore, the networks, themselves, are three of the most profitable companies in America (Fortune 1977; Wall Street Journal 1977b and 1977e; Pearce 1976; Johnson 1970).

Newspaper ownership also is lucrative, particularly in

the monopoly situation in which most of the press finds itself today. New York Times columnist James Reston called ownership of such a paper a "license to steal" (Washington Post 1977b). Monopoly newspapers make profits which are three times those of the papers in a competitive market. "You can engineer your profits," remarked Otis Chandler, head of the Times-Mirror, Inc., media conglomerate (Washington Post 1977b).

What are the ways in which the pursuit of profits can affect content? We have already noted that content can change for the worse with different types of ownership situations. It depends on the company. If it wants to maintain high profits and decrease the quality and quantity, it can. However, if an owner is not making what he considers substantial profits, there will be insufficient funds for superior content.

Halberstam (1976) shows that the TV networks, CBS in particular, have become primarily profit conscious the past decades. The two basic historical drives are for profit and broadcasting excellence, with the latter clearly diminishing over the years. CBS chairman Paley, with his huge stock holdings, progressively became more interested in the bottom line than in broadcasting excellence as time passed and as he was accepted into some of the upper strata of the power

elite. (fn) Halberstam charts the profits of the corporation, showing that for each of the first twenty-five years the company's profits (ending in 1952) were generally around \$4 to \$5 million. But by 1965, as the corporation developed into a multinational conglomerate, needed financial support from Cartel banks, and became an attractive commodity on the stock exchange, the news and public affairs programming became not just less important, but troublesome. Paley demanded a 15% profit increase each year. He complained to stockholders that in 1965 the profit would have been higher had it not been for news and coverage of special events.

Another aspect of the economic and profit nature of the networks is their position and performance within the conglomerate corporate structure. Because the broadcasting sector within such a structure is often such a disproportionate profit producer (Dingell 1973; Pearce 1976), it is possible that these profits could be siphoned off from producing higher quality programming and could be used instead for other, non-broadcasting purposes. This has happened at NBC (Epstein 1973). At ABC the network had its public affairs budget reduced because of the poor profit picture in other areas of the conglomerate operation. The network itself had been profitable (Brown, L., 1975;

Friendly 1967, 170). The Justice Department has been concerned that "given their combined market share and current levels of profitability, network control over owned and operated stations may well contribute importantly to the networks' ability to preempt program acquisition and, consequently, to distribute a disproportionate share of programming and to obtain a disproportionate share of broadcast revenues" (Wall Street Journal 1976d).

4.2.2.2 News Budgets

If profits are so healthy, what is the nature of the funding for news and public affairs? The network news departments operate under strict budgets. An example of a budget was presented in Epstein's (1973) study. On a weekly budget of \$7,000, exclusive of salaries, CBS was charging up to \$28,000 a minute for commercials, producing \$36 million in revenue and profits of approximately \$13 million.

If the profits are so large, why is the news and public affairs budget so small? One obvious answer is pure, capitalist profit maximization. But another reason is that the networks' managements believe that spending more money on gathering and presenting news will not result in an increase in audience size. They think that the size of

network news audiences is a product primarily of the carry-over of viewership from local news or entertainment programs and of the personalities of the network newsmen. The network executives also believe that the audience for news programs is older, less sophisticated, less educated, and not so affluent as the average audience.

One of the results of the budgetary shackles is a limit on where news stories are gathered--mainly in the major cities where the networks have their owned-and-operated affiliates and perhaps two or three major cities elsewhere. Otherwise, additional costs for crews and telephone cables are incurred. Another result is that producers plan for only one-half of the news program to be hard news, with the remaining time being taken up with "features," i.e., entertaining news from film strips from their libraries.

Because special events and documentaries usually have smaller audiences and cannot command high advertising rates, they generally are looked upon with disfavor by executives. But this is not always the case. Since the commercials missed during special events can be made up later, the net can show a comparatively inexpensive program (compared with entertainment programs) and still collect the money for the commercials. Documentaries come in handy when a network does not want to compete with a blockbuster show on another

network. One can be shown for one-third the cost of an entertainment program. Another desirable time to show a documentary is where a rival network also is showing one. But as a general rule, because the networks are in the business of attracting the largest possible audience, there simply will not be many documentaries. Another reason for avoiding such programming is that if they are too hard hitting or about subjects which are too sensitive, they can upset the advertisers, the high executives and the government.

An anomaly seems to be the CBS program 60 Minutes, which has been at the top of the ratings for many months in the early and mid-1980s. This may show that people are really interested in expose, muckraking programming. However, CBS had to survive many long years of low ratings while the audience developed. The fact remains, though, that normal documentaries shown on an aperiodic, special basis still have low ratings.

At the local level the same general economic setting dominates the news and public affairs (Altheide 1976, 6). Until recently, stations had been operating under the pressure of FCC requirements of a minimum level of news and public affairs. When these requirements were relaxed, many stations cut back on such programming (Access 1981a; Access

1981c; Access 1981j; Access 1982b). Now that all FCC requirements and restrictions have been lifted, it is highly likely that there will be even less news and public affairs programming, particularly by those stations of marginal profitability (Dallas Times-Herald 1984).

Unlike the network situation the local stations spend a disproportionate amount of their budgets on news. Generally it is the greatest single expense (Altheide 1976, 15). For many stations, especially in the smaller markets, the local news effort either operates in the red or barely breaks even (Altheide 1976; Author's conversation with Austin, Texas, station manager). But in the larger and many medium-sized markets the news operation can be very lucrative (Epstein 1973, 86; Kreighbaum 1972, 7; Kellner 1976, 23). However, it also can be very competitive, which explains why so many stations hire consultants to perform audience research (particularly on personality attractiveness of newscasters) and to make proposals for increasing newscasters' audience appeal, hence greater viewership size and larger profits. As a result, we see light news, happy talk and pretty young people (Wall Street Journal 1976a).

Because local news programs operate under budgetary constraints just as the networks do, they must be carefully planned in regard to time and materials expended. There

generally is sufficient time for personnel to cover the press releases, public relations announcements and other staged news which comprise at least one-half of the material, and also to cover some of the routine news (Altheide 1976, 16). Having small staffs makes it very difficult for local stations to perform much in-depth reporting, particularly on those subjects which would make for fine journalism but which have not been assigned by the local news directors for various reasons (Author's talks with Austin, Texas, TV news personnel). These limitations also keep any incipient muckrakers out of trouble with the station management and the local power structure.

It is frequently stated--even by TV personnel--that television news could be much better, but time and money are limited. But the fact remains that the sizes of the budgets and time made available are set by businessmen making rational business decisions. There is no doubt that both budgets and time could be expanded, particularly at the network level, if the decision makers so desired.

4.2.2.3 Ratings and Circulation

Because the mass media are in the business to make a profit from selling advertising, they must provide some

basis upon which to establish advertising rates and to differentiate themselves from their competitors. This is easier for the print media than for broadcasting. Newspapers and magazines at least can point to subscriptions and to sales from newsstands and route deliveries. What is left, basically, is how to select and measure the audience, the number of readers per unit sold, and the various demographics involved. But even this can lead to controversy (Wall Street Journal 1976c and 1977j).

For some newspapers, particularly in monopoly situations, audience quantity is not so important as the desired demographic make-up of that audience. Otis Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times and head of the Times-Mirror empire, candidly remarked that "American newspaper publishing is based on advertising . . . not a circulation base" (Washington Post 1977b). Therefore, the newspaper must seek the affluent reader, not just the poor masses.

However, the broadcasting industry, working with an ephemeral medium, has an immeasurably more difficult task than its print counterpart. Viewers must be counted so that advertising rates can be established and so that the advertisers know to whom their messages are being transmitted.

2

Enter the rating services. The industry uses the results of the rating system as the officially defined market. At both the local and national levels, profits and careers rise and fall with the ratings. What and whom we are permitted to see and hear are greatly influenced by the ratings. There are various factors involved in producing ratings of the most desirable kind. The most basic aspect is the lineup of affiliates. The more you have, the more viewers you potentially will reach. ABC was handicapped many years by this as well as by the second significant factor: these affiliates must reliably clear the network programs for broadcasting (Epstein 1973, 19-93; Friendly 1967, 271, 272).

Next, the demographics must be right. Advertisers primarily want to reach urban women having access to high incomes and being from 25 to 49 years of age (Washington Post 1977b; Kellner 1976). Even programs with high ratings can be cancelled by the networks if the audience does not have the desired demographic composition.

Finally, of course, the ratings must be high quantitatively. As a president of NBC said, "First place in the ratings is where you maximize profits" (Daily Texan 1977b). The vice-president of program research of NBC was even more blunt about it when he said that TV is in the

business of selling people to advertisers, making program content largely irrelevant (Pursch 1975).

The preoccupation with ratings has resulted in a program philosophy called the Theory of the Least Objectionable Program (LOP), a description applied by a former programming and research executive at NBC, Paul Klein (Kellner 1976; Network Project 1973). The basis of LOP is that the TV audience seems to be of constant size during prime time regardless of programming, although the composition of the audience varies. People watch the tube regardless of what is on it. Klein said,

LOP explains why some interesting programs die and some stupid programs seem to thrive. Place a weak show against weaker competition, LOP teaches us, and it inevitably looks good; it may even look like a hit--get huge ratings and a quality audience if the time period it fills has that audience. Place a strong show against a stronger show and, never mind whether it is far superior to a dozen other shows on the air in other time slots, it will look like a bomb. . . . The best network programmers understand this. They are not stupid. They like most of the stuff they put on about as much as you do. But they also know that a program doesn't have to be 'good.' It only has to be less objectionable than whatever the hell the other guys throw against it.

(Kellner 1973, 26).

The influence of the ratings extends beyond the immediate uses by the networks and ad agencies. Wall Street also keeps a watchful eye on them. Low ratings can cause

affiliates to switch to another network or to non-clearance of programs. In smaller markets where one station will have more than one network, the programs with the highest ratings will be shown to the exclusion of the offerings of the other network(s). Finally, low ratings not only can cause a decrease in ad revenue for the network, it also can cause the network to spend more money on programming and perhaps audience research.

There many critics of the rating systems, including people in the industry (Skornia 1968; Advertising Age 1978a, 1979a and 1979b; Altheide 1976; Kellner 1976; Austin Sun 1977). The main criticisms are as follows:

1. TV/radio sets are counted, not people.
2. Total preferences or general likes and dislikes are not ascertained.
3. People are considered as economic units, not as individual human beings.
4. When using audimeters, the only measurement is whether the TV set is on, not whether it is being watched or if the material is understood.
5. People who submit to being used for ratings are of a certain type.
6. The people are subject to the Hawthorne Effect: their

behavior is changed by the fact that they are being used for testing.

7. The diaries can be subject to hearsay, estimates and recall problems.

Government inquiries into the ratings systems have been highly critical, mainly because the samples are so small and the non-response rate is so high (Skornia 1968). Other shortcomings are that measuring equipments (mainly the Neilsen audimeters) frequently malfunction and that TV sets would be counted which were on only for baby sitting or security purposes.

The major rating companies themselves admit weaknesses in their statistics. Arbitron said that it provided only "at best rough approximations" of the TV audience and its composition (Kellner 1976). Even broadcasting salesmen are doubtful of the validity of the ratings (Althiede 1976). A study of Arbitron ratings of radio stations in Austin, Texas, revealed that all station managers had serious doubts about the accuracy of the information, even the managers whose stations benefited from the ratings (Austin Sun 1977). But, nonetheless, the advertisers put their money where the ratings are. What this means to Austin radio is that the top three stations (according to the ratings) prosper while the others change format and personnel and also cut budgets,

particularly for news.

Perhaps the most basic criticism of the rating system is that it generalizes, averages and homogenizes human beings. But people are distinctive in their individuality, their uniqueness, their changing needs and moods, their growth, and their diverse cultural backgrounds. But the rating system herds people into "markets," and then sells them like cattle to advertisers. In the ensuing cultural slaughter we all are net losers--except for the broadcasters and advertisers.

4.2.2.4 Advertising

Advertising is intertwined with the two subjects already discussed--ratings and profits. The mass news media must please advertisers or there will be no revenues, hence profits, hence company existence. Therefore, even though advertisers will disagree occasionally with content, normally the nature of content will remain within a range of acceptability of advertisers.

Publications from the alternative press--particularly from the left--have frequently disappeared because of inability to attract advertising support. This happens at the local as well as the national level (Trinkle 1981;

Guardian 1982b). It was this economic Achilles tendon which the FBI so successfully severed with its COINTELPRO program against the alternative press: seeing that advertisers, particularly record companies, ceased purchasing space in the underground papers (Mackenzie 1981).

There are many incidents of advertisers taking offense at media content and either making threats against the newspaper or TV or radio station or actually withdrawing advertising from the offender (Cirino 1971 and 1974). Additionally, there is always pressure on programs and editorial personnel from sales personnel within the media corporation itself.

In the electronic media, particularly at the network level, there has been a long history of advertiser involvement in the active determination of content. Sometimes advertisers have been at the initial stages of decision making regarding subject, content and treatment of programs, and the talent personnel involved (Network Project 1973b; Brown, L., 1971).

Advertisers try to create a universe--an ambience--around their programs to enhance not only the acceptability of their advertised products, but also to create a desired corporate image. Such relationships soon result in writers and producers either internalizing the

standards of the advertisers and the high media executives whose focus is on profits, or they learn what will be accepted and what will not and tailor their performances accordingly. This results in self-censorship (Cheek 1976; Epstein 1973, 57).

Another aspect of advertising, particularly at the network level, is that the high cost of commercial time on the networks has resulted in only the corporate giants being able to afford to advertise, thus marrowing the number of companies which can bring us their advertising and propaganda messages. The social and economic cost of this preemption of the scarce air time is inestimable.

4.2.3 MEDIA OWNER INFLUENCE AND CONTROL IN LOCAL AREA

Is the media owner (publisher/licensee) merely an objective capitalist who is only interested in profits and does not involve himself in content, or does he set policy for his staff to follow? If he does officially set policy, how is his control established and how does it affect the treatment of news? It is important to remember that it is the owner's option as to how his power is to be used in the newsroom and in the community. He may be active or passive. It is the owner's prerogative as to whom to hire, fire and promote. The owner may be influenced by members of

the local power structure, financial institutions, local advertisers and his peer group; but it is his decision making which is crucial.

Most research on the subject has been focused on newspapers, not local broadcasters. But the experience of the author in working in radio stations and in conversations with TV and radio news people in Austin, Texas, and the material presented in Altheide's (1976) book indicate that the owner-staff-content relationship of the print media and the electronic media are generally comparable.

4.2.3.1 Owner's Personal Influences

There are many reported cases of a publisher's personal intervention in matters of content (Johnson 1970; Kreighbaum 1972; Cirino 1974; Brucker 1973; Barnett 1973; Gerbner 1972; Washington Post 1977b). Studies show that the closer geographically the subject matter is to the paper, the greater is the tendency for the publisher to take a stronger, more direct hand. In the larger papers there is less predisposition for the publisher to supervise the editor closely. The publishers, particularly of small papers, are highly sensitive to news which might affect the financial status of the paper; hence, they would tend to

intervene more readily in this area than with general social issues. The next most sensitive area which would elicit direct publisher participation would be if he, his friends, his organizations or political party were directly affected (Bowers 1967; Lyle 1967; Bagdikian 1972; Bohn and Clark 1972).

If the publisher's control and influence were only restricted to the editorial page, the matter of publisher intervention would not be of such prime importance. But nearly every scholarly publication and journalism review indicate that in a large percentage of newspapers the editors give preferential news treatment to the politician or viewpoints endorsed on the editorial page (Cirino 1974, 188).

Most writers agree that the owner generally does not specifically set policy in writing and usually does not interfere with the day-to-day operation, particularly in large newspapers and local TV operations. However, his power and influence are such that a number of factors are at work which result in his ideas and policy being disseminated and generally adhered to (Madden 1971, 662; Silk and Silk 1980).

The publisher's relationship with his editor is significant. The editor is the owner's right-hand man

(Johnstone 1976; Bowers 1967, Wilhoit and Drew 1973). He is the transmitter and enforcer of policy. It is not just that the editor can be fired by the publisher, but that he has reached his position by adhering to the wishes of the publisher. The other personnel naturally see this, and, if they are ambitious and wish to advance within the organization, or if they want to get a good recommendation if they seek employment at another paper, they will adjust their work performances accordingly (Nixon and Hahn 1971; Friendly 1967; Metz 1976).

4.2.3.2 Social Control in the Newsroom

In any study of this subject the work of Warren Breed (1955) is always quoted. Even though it was written many years ago, it still seems to be the most comprehensive and accurate analysis of the subject of social control in the newsroom.

Breed says that each publisher has a policy and that it is followed. However, this is not automatic because of (1) the ethical norms of journalism which indicate that the publisher shall not force his ideas and ideology on his staff, and (2) the usual liberal bias of reporters.

The publisher's policy can be ascertained from reading

the editorial page and in observing which news stories are selected and how they are treated in the paper. New reporters are not told directly what the policy is, but instead are automatically placed in a learning process on the job itself. The reporter reads the paper and its editorial page; he has his stories blue-penciled; he talks with other reporters; he attends meetings of the staff; he observes the publisher and editor in public; he is encouraged to cover certain stories and not others; he notices that star reporters will cover certain events and not others; he receives praise selectively; he sees what type of orientation the veteran reporter has; occasionally he is gently reprimanded; and he notices who is fired, hired and promoted.

So he goes along with the organization and adheres to its policy for the following reasons: he feels gratitude for being hired; he is concerned with his own professional aspirations; he wants to share the norms of his reference group; he wants approbation; and the newspaper is an exciting, pleasant place to work where there is a great deal of informal camaraderie and psychic income. Of course, there is the possibility that the reporter agrees with the policy, although this is generally not the case.

4.2.3.3 Media Owner and the Local Power Structure

Most researchers, if they consider the local power structure at all in the relationship with the media, mainly make determinations as to the publisher's or licensee's place in the local Establishment. It is generally assumed that the content of the media will support the local power relationships (Nixon and Hahn 1971; Friendly 1967; Johnson 1970; Krieghbaum 1972; Cirino 1974; Barnett 1973). But there have been some studies on newspaper content in relationship to the position and degree of participation by the top media men in the local power structure. These showed that where the owner or publisher was prominent in the Establishment, the newspaper was less controversial (Bohn and Clark 1972), and did not play an adversarial role (Donahue, Tichenor and Olien 1973; Hvistendahl 1970). Additionally, even if a newspaper did become a watchdog, it would not be aggressive in reporting and commenting on matters which were sensitive to the strong, influential men and institutions in the community (Hvistendahl 1970). The key factor of course is that it is the publisher's option as to what kind of journalistic role he and his paper will play in the city (Dahl 1961; Fannelli 1956; Presthus 1961).

Presthus (1961) writes about two cities, their power

structures and the performances of their newspapers in relationship to local politics. In "Riverview" there was not a strong, dominant power structure of economic notables. The paper was owned and edited by a wealthy member of the Establishment. He was a dynamic leader who took part in the pluralistic, lively politics of the town. The newspaper reflected this with a great amount of local news and editorials.

The other city, "Edgewood," was the opposite: a tightly controlling, conservative economic elite dominated the town. There was no two-party activity. The conservative newspaper publisher kept the lid on his editor, resulting in no editorials and very little local news--which was buried in the middle pages.

Research shows that even controversial newspapers will not embarrass or oppose the local power structure, not only because the publishers are almost always a part of the power structure (particularly the large, dominant papers), but also because the bulk of the advertising expenditures usually come from the businesses owned by local economic notables (Cirino 1971 and 1974).

Little has been written about the local broadcasters and the community power structure. But George Hall of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters said that

because the people who constitute the power structure of the cities also control the dominant economic, political and cultural resources in the community--including the news media--"the power structure views broadcasting as an instrument for community good. There is no blunt censorship, but, since the broadcaster himself is closely allied with the power structure, he has the same attitudes" (Hall 1967, 26).

4.2.4 MEDIA OPERATIONAL INFLUENCES

4.2.4.1 Agenda Setting

Agenda setting is the process by which (1) either certain subjects and not others are brought before the public by the media or political bodies, or (2) the subjects which are brought to public notice and scrutiny are limited in scope (McAnany 1981, 107, 108). This is a process which the mass media and political entities routinely do. If a subject is not on the agenda, the public either is not aware of it, or, if aware of it, cannot focus attention to gain public support in order to take effective action (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). However, even if an item is on the media agenda but is not allowed on the political agenda, the same

result occurs--no effective action.

The process of agenda setting occurs from different directions. The prime news sources in political institutions try only to provide information on those subjects or aspects of subjects which they want the media to cover. Reporters, being dependent on these governmental sources for news (and frequently sympathizing and agreeing with the sources), will not expand the inquiry beyond the bounds set by the sources (McAnany 1981, 220, 221). In the opposite direction, the media place before the public only that with which they want the public to be concerned. Possibly even more important is that the core Establishment media also have an agenda setting effect on the congress and other federal government agencies, because governmental officials place great credence on what is presented in the New York Times, Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal and are guided by these newspapers' agendas and subject treatment (Epstein 1973, 37, 150; McAnany 1981, 225). (We already have mentioned that these same publications play the same role with the three TV networks.)

When the agenda setting of the media is added to that which is originated purely by political bodies, it can be very difficult to get public hearings by people with non-Establishment views or about subjects which are not

desired to be discussed by the power structure (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). People with agendas which include a basic analysis of the U.S. capitalist system and the interconnectedness of problems with the economic and political structures cannot freely get any platform—media or political. One of the reasons why people take to the streets and demonstrate is to expand the agenda to include their areas of concern and their opinions about them. To see what subjects are not on the Establishment media agenda, one can read the alternative press. More will be said about this later.

The process of agenda setting can be very specific or very broad in nature, embracing all of the aspects which affect media content. The concepts of hegemony and mobilization of bias show agenda setting at a macro level. Other aspects have been discussed previously and some will be analyzed in the following pages as we see various people in different media positions at work in the filtering and molding of media content.

The following are some of the subjects which are either not on the media agenda or, if they are mentioned at all, are not given significant in-depth analysis.

1. The big, U.S., transnational financial institutions and their power in national and international

affairs.

2. The mass media themselves. (The networks admit that they do not cover this subject because they do not want the Fairness Doctrine requirements to force them to discuss the subject, resulting in them having to present self-critical material or spokespeople (Epstein 1973).)
3. The U.S. power structure and ruling class.
4. The total framework and effects of multinational companies, both abroad and in the U.S..
5. Economic concentration in the U.S..
6. The Bilderbergers, Trilateral Commission, Council on Foreign Relations, and other elite ruling class organizations.
7. Corporate and U.S. ruling class penetration of and cooperation with government, and the consequences of this in laws, policy and administration.
8. A comprehensive analysis of regulatory agencies' relationships with business. (Occasionally the media mention a specific instance or agency, but never in the total framework.)
9. The root causes of inflation, recession and stagflation and the roles of the giant corporations and financial institutions within the monopoly capital

framework which are the bases of them.

10. The manipulation and rigging of the stock market.
11. Positive aspects of alternative political-economic-social arrangements.
12. The framework of connections of organized crime with big business and high-level politicians.
13. Any Marxist perspective.
14. The distribution of wealth and income in the U.S..
15. The true nature of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in supporting the multinational exploitation of countries, and the interconnectedness of these two institutions with the U.S. power structure.
16. The history and control of the Federal Reserve System.
17. The full, comprehensive nature of the CIA, and even most of the details of its activity, such as its covert support for right wing death squads and its teaching of torture methods to foreign army and police personnel.
18. Interlocking directorates.

Certain aspects of some of the above topics may rarely be discussed or mentioned in a piecemeal and distorted fashion, but never in a comprehensive way. Also, even if any of the above were discussed in a satisfactory way on one


occasion, the information would not be entered into the permanent media perspective of the operation of U.S. society in relation to current events.

4.2.4.2 Gatekeepers

A great deal has been written about gatekeepers in the determination and dissemination of mass news (Krieghbaum 1972, 91). Gatekeeping has elements of agenda setting and censorship. The gatekeepers are the individuals who make decisions either on broad policy or on specific choices as to what information is to appear in print or on the air and how it is to be treated.

A good display of the quantity of information filtered by a series of gatekeepers is shown in the study by Cutlip (1953) containing the total amount of Associated Press news copy which was available daily compared with that which finally was printed in a Wisconsin daily newspaper. The 100,000-125,000 words which originally entered the system (plus 6,000 of state news) were cut by national and state AP bureaus and the local editor until only 12,848 words would be presented to the consumer, who would read about 1,683.

Figure 1 shows a general model of the gatekeepers in a newspaper. It could also be valid for a local TV news



NEWS GATEKEEPING AT A TV NETWORK




Figure 2

operation by substituting the appropriate television personnel and media inputs for those of the newspaper. Figure 2 displays the personnel positions involved in a TV network newscast and the associated sources of influence and feedback.³ As these figures show, the information is highly filtered by the time it reaches the ultimate consumer.

Like any model, these are oversimplifications. Leroy and Sterling (1973, 150-167) try to provide more complexity into the presentation in their "cybernetic" model of gatekeeping, one which does not emphasize the individual or position so much as the social and organizational context of individual behavior. They see a newspaper or a TV newscast as an output of formal and informal organizational processes centered in the newsroom--a complex communication-decision making network populated by members of a trained and socialized subculture whose individual acts are governed by powerful norms.

Because there are more things happening in the world than could ever be placed in a newspaper or on the airwaves, gatekeeping is unavoidable. The key question is what and whose values and norms predominate.

4.2.4.3 Kingmakers

The subject of the influence of the mass media in winning and losing political campaigns is very complex. Trying to determine the fairness and bias of the media and their impact on the public is a difficult, if not impossible, task. It seems that almost anyone can make an analysis to show that his or her candidate or party received unfavorable and unfair treatment at the hands of the networks and major newspapers.

It is made even more difficult by the great complexity of the television medium with its visual and aural impacts, by the self-proclaimed objectivity of the networks, by the government requirements of equal time and fairness, and by the packaging of candidates by advertising agencies which results in an image campaign of media manipulation rather than one of issues and real personalities. A further complication is that the ephemeral nature of the broadcast media makes them more difficult than their print counterparts in studying in detail the effects of their efforts.

If the transmitting end of the problem is complex, the receiving end is even more so. There are many opinions and schools of thought as to what happens when messages reach or

fail to reach the receiver. There is disagreement as to the significance of the various media in the total framework of the existence of other sources of influence on people.

There also seem to be differences of media impact on elections depending on whether they are local, state or national and whether the vote is on a non-candidate matter such as a referendum, where voter knowledge of the subject is low. Most research shows that the local news media, particularly the newspapers, have a great impact on the outcome of local elections, but progressively less influence as the election is for offices further away from the city (Robinson, J., 1974). A study of public opinion concluded that "relative availability of news items about two candidates has a clear effect on the exposure preferences by individuals with no pre-existing opinions," but for people who are already partisan, the availability and treatment of news makes little difference except for reinforcing opinions or for motivating people to participate (Atkin 1971). This means that in local non-partisan campaigns or in elections where little is known about the issues or candidates, the mass media may have a significant impact.

However, other research may show more impact of the media than the above would indicate. A comprehensive review was made of press coverage and endorsements of elections in

seven Texas cities from 1960 through 1971 in which it was noted that the candidate which was endorsed won nearly ninety percent of the time (McClenghan 1973). This may, of course, show that the people are simply following the lead and line which the media have been presenting all along, not merely just at the time of the campaigns. This would indicate media hegemony at work.

But, regardless of what the academic researchers indicate, the huge amounts of money spent by the political parties (and the continuously effective results to advertisers on TV) indicate that political campaign decision makers believe that the mass media, particularly TV, have a tremendous impact on people and election results.

Probably the most significant aspect of money and the media in relation to elections and society is not in kingmaking but king prevention. There are three main factors. The first is money. Even a rich person cannot finance a complete national campaign (and most statewide campaigns) without the help from other wealthy people and institutions. A poor person must sell himself or herself to the rich and powerful. Without money a candidate cannot buy exposure.

But exposure is not just a matter of money. There must be access to the media. The media frequently refuse access

to candidates with the funds to pay for space or time (McNeely 1982; author's conversations with third party candidates). Furthermore, the media will not give equal coverage to the activities and ideas of the non-cartel candidates, and the coverage which is given usually is of a negative nature. Even though there are FCC requirements for equal time, these are always either suspended for a presidential election or the requirements are circumvented by such methods as having debates presented as "news events" sponsored by "independent" groups. And frequently the "major" (Cartel) candidates merely refuse to participate if the alternative candidates are to be given equal access in a planned debate.

Probably the most basic aspect of kingmaking is one which goes on all the time. With voters constantly being bombarded by the standard, limited perspectives of the media, a candidate who is non-standard (meaning if he or she falls outside the Cartel range of approval) can sound very dissonant, even threatening or subversive, to the public which is conditioned to hear the usual ruling class line. Hence, the hegemonic process and agenda setting are significant, basic factors in the matter of kingmaking.

4.3 MICRO-LEVEL INFLUENCES ON CONTENT

4.3.1 DECISION MAKING AND BIAS AND CENSORSHIP

In all the facets of media content discussed so far, bias and censorship are at work. They could be considered at the micro level of content control, with hegemony being the macro stratum. Bias and censorship are the tools of kingmakers, gatekeepers and agenda setters. Some bias and censorship are unconscious, being hegemonically instilled, whereas some are conscious decisions.

Bias and censorship are interconnected and mutually supporting. There are various forms of each: cultural, institutionalized, socially induced, and technical. They come from many sources and influences, directly and indirectly: individual, governmental, advertiser, pressure group, corporate, the media personnel's perception of the nature of the audience, the professional "news perspective," peer group pressure, affiliated stations, competing media, elite newspapers such as the New York Times, budgetary exigencies, and the ratings race.

Even though these factors form a constantly changing, kaleidoscopic relationship, they exhibit a definite

framework by which one can notice the major sources of dominant influence and the places where the primary power lies in determining what we see on the tube and in the print media. One can also observe the effect of dissidence on this framework and how the output from this dissidence is handled by the media in the attempt to control or co-opt it in order to make it conform to the desires and needs of the corporate elite power system. One can also see the contradictions in the system where the media are forced to deal with subjects in their role as news and entertainment producers when they perhaps would rather ignore such events.

The next few pages should show clearly that there is no such thing as "objectivity" on TV; nor is it technically possible, no matter in what country the mass communications set-up is located or under what economic, cultural or ideological system there may be in existence. In the U.S. there is a definite, continuous attempt to censor, limit and distort as much information and opinion as possible on TV which run counter to the needs and ideological underpinnings of the American monopoly capitalist system as perceived by the corporate moguls and their subordinates. But this control is not always one-hundred percent complete and effective because there are contradictions in many of the

corporate goals and in the ideas of what constitutes news and good programming on the part of the professionals producing them. Also, there occasionally are events of such great public importance that they cannot be easily controlled, distorted or covered up (Molotch and Lester 1974). It is these factors which help us to see the nature of the censorship and bias and the various sources of them. Reading the alternative press makes it considerably easier to spot distortions, omissions, lies and disinformation.

To show the many sources and levels of bias and censorship we will look extensively at the operations of the TV networks. Actually, bias and censorship in broadcasting have been with us since the early days of radio (Barnouw 1966 and 1968; Hicks 1971). Prior to World War II broadcasters were loathe to permit labor news, any material they could label "red", and any reference to sexual matters. Engineers were given authorization to switch off anyone who deviated from the owner-approved list of subjects and words. Scripts were mandatory except for describing public events. (This practice continued into the 1950s.) Sponsors had a large hand in controlling content. Blacks were rarely on the air and then only in stereotypical roles where they had to sound like "negros." CBS Chairman Paley carefully censored a broadcast on the 1943 riot of Blacks in

Detroit and permitted the southern stations not to carry the program. After World War II there was the McCarthy Period during which the more liberal commentators, writers and actors were fired, gagged or blacklisted.

A news tradition was slow to develop in the electronic media, because very little news was broadcast until the advent of World War II. Advertisers were not interested in such programming, and the few who did sponsor such shows wanted to control content. The networks were particularly concerned with their staffs doing any opinion peddling and brought pressure on them to be "analysts" rather than "commentators," to show no emotion in their voices, and to use simple, short sentences.

We will now look at the various strata of the corporate structure which are involved in the making of a newscast, and we will assess the types of influence and control they have in the bias and distortion of content.

4.3.1.1 Owners, Directors and Executives

Under the hegemonic umbrella of capitalism and the U.S. ruling class, the first level of bias is on the board of

directors. These people are interested not only in the profitability of their corporation, but also in its place in the overall power structure, regardless of whether the company is a national network or at the local, licensee level. This is the key level of power, particularly at the networks, because it is here where basic decisions are made on programming, budgeting, personnel policy, investments and corporate expansion (Kendrick 1969; Brown, L., 1971; Network Project 1973). It also is here where primary interface occurs with the non-broadcasting powers of the corporate and government elite. It is at this level, not only where measures are initiated to institutionalize various biases and censorship in the form of company policy, but also where the most influential and basic critique takes place on what is telecast. (Indeed, Les Brown (1971, 182) claimed that the directors give approval to each new program.) This does not mean that the boards of directors and the highest executives (who are also on the boards) get their way one-hundred percent of the time, but those personnel who go against their wishes very often or who "win" too many small battles will find themselves without jobs, not promoted, or transferred to less desirable positions. Even the sainted Ed Murrow of CBS was not immune to this treatment (Kendrick 1969; Friendly 1967).

There is another source of pressure which has not been studied in any systematic way, and probably never will be so long as the existing power structure remains in the U.S.. This is the peer group pressure which is found in the social circles within which the high executives and members of the boards of directors travel. No outsider knows what changes or non-changes in content and personnel have been made within the social clubs and watering holes of the various directors, and in the many elite political, civic and cultural activities of the upper class in which the media moguls participate. The Silks (1980) report that publisher Sulzburger of the New York Times is frequently under pressure from his social peers. The same observations could be made regarding local stations.

The stratum just below that of the owners and directors is that of the high executives--the presidents and vice-presidents of the various functions and departments. Here the basic policies are transmitted and the more specific critiques of what is aired are carried out. Pressure is applied through written policy and verbal directives as well as informal contacts while passing in the
4
hallways during the workday.

4.3.1.2 Government, Advertisers and Affiliates

Before moving to the production strata of network news, we should mention three other sources of influence on the news process. Advertisers and ad agencies have been discussed previously in their affect on content. They in turn are influenced by governmental sources and by pressure groups desiring to eliminate sponsor support of specific programs or program types or to object to specific types of advertising campaigns.

The government is another source of influence on the broadcaster, particularly the networks. There are many factors in the government-broadcasting relationship, stemming from various sources: the FCC holds life and death grip on licensees, although it rarely uses the death sentence; the Fairness Doctrine and various aspects of the Communications Act are continuous thorns pricking the corporate skin; in a "national emergency," as determined and declared by the President of the U.S., the government may take over the broadcasting facilities of the country (Executive Order 11490, 28 October 1969); broadcasters, particularly the networks, are highly dependent on the government for information, particularly regarding military and diplomatic matters; various congressional committees which are involved with oversight on broadcasting observe

what is telecast and are sensitive to the desires of well-organized and vocal pressure groups; network personnel are frequently called to testify before these committees (So are the FCC Commissioners.); the Justice Department puts pressure on the government agencies which have direct relationships with broadcasting; network advertising is scrutinized by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); some rates for cable and satellite usage are determined by the FCC; and the President and his White House staff can initiate letter writing campaigns to the networks if they are displeased with what they see on the tube.

Less bureaucratic relationships between government and the networks can be found in the fact that many high network officials and news personnel have held important governmental positions; some network executives have had personal, friendly relationships with the President of the U.S.; and for many years there has been a continuous relationship with the CIA among journalists and media executives. Maybe more important are the personal, informal contacts and communications of high governmental officials with network executives at the highest levels (Brown, L., 1971; Halberstam 1976).

A significant source of pressure on the networks is the affiliates. The licensees and managers, being primarily

businessmen and basically conservative (Epstein 1973, 80; Sandman, Ruben and Sacheman 1972, 38; Donohew 1965), are vociferous in their denunciation of various news and public affairs programs as well as entertainment shows. The networks are sensitive to this because the stations can, and often do, refuse to carry certain programs, thereby diminishing the audience and depressing the ratings and revenues. The stations will even change affiliation to another network. There is a growing tendency, which has been used only selectively in the past (backed by approval of Congress, the courts and the Justice Department), to permit the affiliates to preview programs before they are transmitted. This allows the stations either to refuse to carry them or to censor portions of them. With this in mind, there is a lot of self-censorship on the part of the program-producing sector of the network operation so that problems with the affiliates will be either avoided or at least minimized (Epstein 1973; Friendly 1967; Brown, L., 1971).

4.3.2 PROGRAM PRODUCTION AND INCORPORATION OF BIAS

4.3.2.1 Structural Factors

The above sources of influence on content all flow eventually toward the program-producing elements of broadcasting. The structure of the system and the technical, social, psychological and fiscal interactions result in the impossibility of having objective, unbiased news. Network executives have written and testified before Congress and elsewhere that television does no more than hold a mirror up to society (Epstein 1973, 13-16).

The truth is that the "mirror" is a complex, subjective, human and technical construction. Decision making and gatekeeping proceed every step of the way from the real world to the tube world, modifying and distorting at every step. Leaving aside for a moment the question of decisions involved in what events to cover, let's look at how they are covered technically. Assuming there is a live broadcast, the decision must be made as to how many crews with what equipment will be used. Next, it must be determined where the cameras will be located. Then, with several cameras in place, it must be decided what the cameras will be focused on at any particular time. Fourth,

with several cameras showing various pictures, it must be determined which camera or cameras will be put on the air and in what sequence.

Already several layers of human subjectivity have intervened between reality and the viewing audience without a word being spoken on the air. All this is exclusive of the subjective decision to cover this particular event and not another one.

If the event is covered by a filmed or taped report, reality suffers even more, because, even after the human decides when and at what it will press the button to start the camera rolling and shooting what the eye sees through the lens, the editing process follows. It is this which gives the film and tape media their feeling of reality. Because only a tiny percentage (about five percent) of the footage taken of an event actually winds up in the edited, telecast version, even the NBC Vice-President for News said that "film is not reality, but an illusion" (Epstein 1973, 18). The same could be said for edited tape as well as film.

The next built in cause of bias is the time constraint. Because of the limited number of minutes in a half-hour newscast or public affairs program--about nineteen minutes in a newscast--some material must be left out. What

you see is the result of one or more person's decisions. The order in which each story is presented as well as the length of the story are also subjective decisions.

But the images you see on news and entertainment shows are subject to further distortion, censorship and bias which are attributable to the complex, bureaucratic group production of the programs. This results not just from individual decision making on specific matters, but also from the adherence to policy set from above.

At the executive level there are several types of activity which result in the desired news and program effect. General policy is established in writing. ⁵ Examples are as follows:

1. News stories must be in narrative story form, i.e., have a beginning, a climax and an ending (even if the reality of the event does not reflect this).
2. News will not be presented which will be upsetting or create alarm in the audience.
3. Each story will be of as wide an interest as possible to please the mass audience.
4. Controversy will be presented in a binary fashion with "both sides" being presented and without showing a result or solution (More than two views would be "confusing" to the audience).

5. A general ratio will be determined as to the mix of "hard" news (the immediate, timely reported events) and "soft" news (the material which is filmed in advance and which can be inserted almost anytime).
6. The transmission of information is not so important as "experience," i.e., emotions.
7. The producers should not wait for news to happen and merely react to it, but should anticipate what is important and guide the news resources to develop material for these preconceived, significant events or themes.
8. The handling of a news story must be carefully planned in advance, not only by the staff, but also on the scene by the crew.
9. Every attempt must be made not to be controversial or to give "extreme" viewpoints (As CBS' Paley said, "Play it down the middle" (Epstein 1973, 169)).
10. Select and accent stories which have action and are visually exciting.

Thus, the news is forced into a preconceived straight jacket. Epstein (1973, 41) believes, after making his long and detailed study of network news, that "the total news output of an organization is largely determined by general rules, routines and policies."

To understand more clearly the total degree of bias and censorship in TV news and special events, it is necessary to look at the structure of the news operation and how it functions within all the previously stated policies and pressures. The structure is set up to provide the utmost in control, as Figure 2 shows. The newscast is a complex, team effort in which the "rules of the game" are well known and internalized by subordinate personnel.

The players are as follows:

1. Top executives determine the time and money allocation for news; they also select the leading news personnel to be hired and fired.
2. The budget officer is also outside of the news department. He plays an important role in monitoring expenses.
3. The vice-president for news is the interface man in the operation, because he is the one who must implement corporate policy, but at the same time maintain professional standards and develop good programs. (Fred Friendly at CBS found this to be an impossible job and resigned.) The VP for news must see that his programs stay within the assigned

budgets. He approves long-term assignments and develops plans for coverage of special events. He decides what themes and aspects of ongoing stories are to be emphasized and which are to be downplayed or deleted. He conducts continuous critiques and holds daily briefings with the executive producers and their deputies. He also maintains close contact with the high executives above him in the corporate hierarchy.

4. The executive producer of the news programs makes the final decision as to which stories at what length will go into the program. From the initial selection of from 50 to 100 possible stories, he selects 8 from the final 10 to 12 presented to him. His deputy eliminates "stray" stories which do not fit in with the established news themes.
5. The producer is the key man in all news operations. He is the person with the most direct, continuous control over each program, not only from the aspect of news content, but also social control. He is the man on the spot who ensures that the individual programs conform to allocated budgets and policy guidelines. The producer determines which stories are to be covered, subject to final approval by the executive producer. He decides what type of stories will be

commissioned, which correspondents are to be used, which cities are to be featured, the visual treatment desired, and the preferred newsmakers to be interviewed or spotlighted.

6. The assistant producer previews all the available film in the morning and evaluates it for visual impact.
7. The assignment editor selects the original slate of events to be covered and the crews which will cover them. He may have assistants in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. This is an around-the-clock position through which all information is funneled. The assignment editor makes the agenda from which the final approval of news stories and treatment is made by superiors.
8. The field producer is the site supervisor of the news crew. He determines which aspects of the event are to be filmed.
9. An editor can also be assigned at each site who works with the field producer or correspondent and who writes the rough narration.
10. A writer prepares the lead-in for the story.
11. Next are the camerapeople and sound technicians.
12. Last is the correspondent/newsperson who writes the smooth narration and delivers it on the air or on

film/tape.

13. A chief film editor at network operations headquarters supervises the film editors in the field.

Hence, the network news is truly an intricate, team effort. But this does not mean that each newscast is the result of free and equal professionals working toward a collectively evolved effort. All performances must stay within the prescribed policy. This is maintained by frequent, sometimes continuous, coordination and communication among the various production personnel and operation levels to insure that standards are met.

But more than social and content control are the goals of this framework and operation. In such a complex medium requiring extensive coordination, the establishing of policy and maintaining of control simplify production. Otherwise chaos would reign. But the key aspects of it all are these: who sets the goals and policy, who ultimately controls the operation, and what are the end results presented on the tube?

4.3.2.2 Newspersons' Roles: Reporters and Correspondents

A great deal of attention has been paid in the past to the alleged bias of TV news reporters, both individually and

collectively. Epstein (1973) believes this has been overemphasized because the organizational and social aspects are the primary influences, resulting in the on-camera personnel not having much room in which to operate. Walter Cronkite agrees so far as news is concerned and Mike Wallace concurs in the area of the program 60 Minutes (Anton 1978; Levin 1977a).

Epstein (1975, 201) claims that a very basic form of control of newscasts is through personnel policies, particularly in regard to newsmen. He says,

It is usually not necessary to control newsmen through tight editorial and writing supervision: the networks' policies of recruitment and advancement assure that only newsmen that give precedence to organizational over personal values will succeed in network news. . . . Indeed, all three networks act to filter out correspondents who have a high degree of personal commitment on issues or appear to the audience to have a bias, and to advance correspondents who hold or adopt a style of presenting the news that fits the networks' requirements.

This is supplemented by a form of blacklisting which occurs at the producer level. Certain correspondents are rarely, if ever, given a story to do or--more importantly--finally allowed to be aired, if the producer has prejudices against them: too controversial, not "sexy" enough, or his or her work does not fit the desired image or

conform closely enough to corporate policy. This not only leads to a star system of correspondents, but also lets all newsmen know what they have to be in order to be seen on the tube and to be advanced in their careers.

Another method used to keep correspondents "neutral" is to rotate them in jobs and assignments, not only so that they will not become emotionally involved or become too closely tied with the source or target, but also so that they will not become expert in a particular field. This ensures that they will not be very knowledgeable and perhaps be tempted into the proscribed land of "advocacy," and that they will not be apt to become emotionally involved with their subjects. The networks want generalists who know either no more or only slightly more about the subject than the average person watching. According to the NBC vice-president for news, the news should be "seen by an outsider on behalf of outsiders" (Epstein 1973, 137). Also an "American perspective" must be given, not that of the local people or government, unless, of course the local government supports U.S. policy. There are few examples of specialization--such as the White House reporter--but these stand out as the exceptions.

This does not mean that the newsmen cannot make some wrinkle in the mythical straight jacket of objectivity

through voice inflection, raised eyebrow or the spoken word. It does mean that this area for manipulation is quite circumscribed, generally, unless one has the stature of Walter Cronkite, and even he says he did not have much freedom to be deviant (Anton 1978).

Cronkite may be understating his power. It was considered a crucial event when, after returning from a trip to Viet Nam during the war, Cronkite openly came out against the conflict--a significant departure from his past treatment of the war. Even President Johnson was appalled (Halberstam 1976). (However, Frank Reynolds was removed from the ABC evening news when he became too dovish, even though the network said that it was a case of low ratings (Brown, L., 1971, 222).)

However, if the newsperson continues to exhibit individual, subjective behavior or presents information or points of view which contravene corporate policy or which bring too much adverse attention to himself or herself, the person either will be fired, transferred or blacklisted. This can also occur with principals in entertainment programs such as Ed Asner (Guardian 1982a). Even the renowned Ed Murrow, although made a member of the CBS board of directors, was eased out and given a government job in order to eliminate his muckraking. Thereafter, at CBS all

documentary production was done by committees and under heavy corporate supervision (Kendrik 1969; Friendly 1967).

4.3.2.3 Program Formats: News Interview Programs, Talk Shows and Entertainment Shows

News Interview Shows

All the network programs such as Meet the Press operate in the same manner so far as guest selection and treatment of guests are concerned (Nix 1974). Interviewees generally fall into one of three categories: Administration spokespersons, prominent politicians, and heads of state of friendly nations. They are invited for their prominence and for the likelihood of their name drawing a good audience.

Nix concludes that these programs are basically conduits for any Administration to disseminate its point of view, even to the extent of permitting the Oval Office to supply hostile questions to anti-Administration guests. The politicians who are selected to appear are those with what the networks consider to be large constituencies (mainly senators) and who are considered as possibilities for running for presidential nomination. (The same criteria are used for selection of people for news interviews (Epstein

1973).) Controversial people are seldom asked to appear, and when they do, they are not treated with the same deferential respect and easy questions with which the Establishment figures are (MacNeil 1968, 156). Additionally, the types of people selected to be on the questioning panel are quite circumscribed, being a combination of reporters from the network and representatives from the safe, Establishment newspapers.

Perhaps some quotes from some of the network participants of these shows would be more revealing of the attitudes behind the nature of the programs, the content exhibited during these programs, and the people who participate on them (Nix 1974, 70, 71):

CBS panelist: "If you had (Establishment people) one week and (non-Establishment people) the next week, I think that would be a distortion. To overemphasize the extremes would be a mistake".

CBS co-producer: "We'd love to get into the world of ideas but there's always some screaming news story that we care more about. And there are only so many Sundays."

ABC producer: "With just a half an hour a week you really . . . cannot bring people on from the full spectrum (emphasis mine). They may not be interesting, articulate or representative."

Talk Shows

Much the same type of filtering goes on for guests on talk shows (Tuchman 1974, 119-135). Guests are generally celebrities whom the producers hope will bring in large audiences. Pre-interviewing is carried out to decrease the probability of the guest introducing political topics. If political or other controversial discussions take place, guests are advised as to what subjects are to be avoided and even words they cannot use. Occasionally, the invitation to appear is rescinded if the network, advertisers or local affiliates raise too strenuous objections. This even occurs on programs such as Donahue, where the emphasis is not on celebrity guests. Where programs are taped, such as with Donahue, creative editing can sometimes accomplish what pre-interviewing failed to do (author's conversation with Madalyn Murray O'Hair).

Prime Time Entertainment Programs

We have been talking about bias and censorship mainly in the news and documentary productions. For public affairs programs the networks would never admit that there was a censoring process, only an "editorial" function. But for entertainment programs there are acknowledged censors (Levin 1977b and 1977c; Diemer and Waz 1981; Cheek 1976; Tuchman

1974, 19-31; Talbot 1977; Grossberger 1976).

There is a continuous battle between program writers and producers on one side and the network censors on the other. The latter rarely lose because they have the power; however, they do grudgingly change or give-in over a period of months or years on certain issues, subjects or terminology. The pressure comes not only from the originators of the programs (mainly from Hollywood), but also from various special interest pressure groups, from the government (particularly Congress, the FTC and FCC), from advertisers and ad agencies, from program rating information sources and public opinion polls, and from a general "feel" of the audience as perceived by the network staffs. All this is filtered through the censors' middle and upper-middle class attitudes (Levin 1977b).

With what do the censors preoccupy themselves? From the general to the specific--from program ambience to specific trends and specific words and sentences in specific programs. There are certain words and behavior which will be deleted. Some controversial subjects will not be allowed to be dealt with in entertainment programs. Actually, any controversy is avoided by the networks, if at all possible (TV Guide 1977b).

The Fairness Doctrine is usually given as an excuse for

this; but the main reason is apparent when studying the rating system and its effect on programming and profits. The networks simply do not want to offend anyone if possible so that the viewership, hence profits, will not suffer. Additionally, most advertisers as well as the networks do not want anything in their programs which will have a deleterious affect on the desired euphoric, credulous attitude of the audience when commercials are shown. Last of all, and most basically important, is the need to try to keep the Establishment "line" intact, or at least to maintain control over content to ensure subjects, plots and characters are within acceptable, safe limits.

Except for news and documentaries the censors are responsible for everything which appears on the tube, even commercials (Levin 1977b; Diemer and Waz 1981). There is a heavy filtering process of scripts, with daily battles of censors with program production personnel, particularly writers. The censors are mostly middle class, ranging in age from twenty to fifty, with the average being in their thirties. They are hired because they are intelligent, they are not involved, they are not crusaders, and because they supposedly have that prime requisite of being "objective."

The censors feel that the "Hollywood creative community," as they superciliously label the writers and

producers, is only a small segment of the population, and "if we didn't object, they would always be pushing their philosophies on TV" (Talbot 1977). The chief censor at CBS said that he solicits a wide range of opinions. "I'm an advocate of everybody." He indicated that everyone gets his say. But, of the total population, "I ignore the 10-15% on each side and shoot for the 70% in the middle" (Talbot 1977). The NBC chief censor says, "I'm a dirty old man. I've got to think dirty" (Grossberger 1976). (He is a church elder.)

An extremely important facet of the censorship phenomenon is the attitude of the censors toward the audience and how they perceive the viewers' attitudes, tastes and reactions. The NBC chief censor stated that the audience is still very puritanical (Grossberger 1976). Another censor believes that you must be careful in entertainment programs as to how characters are treated, because people "take TV dramatic characters as authorities" (Talbot 1977). Censors do not think that people want relevance, but escape.

What are the types of things which are censored? They fall into certain categories (Talbot 1977; Grossberger 1976; Levin 1977b; Cirino 1971 and 1974; Deeb 1976; McNeil 1968:

1. "Dirty" words or swear words. Some words can be used

on some programs, but not on others. Also, there cannot be very many in one program or in a series. A scorecard is kept by the censor to see what the program's quota is and how many of what words have been used.

2. Controversial relevance. There could be no dramas about the Viet Nam War while it was going on.
3. People censoring. Smothers Brothers were dropped. Pediatrician and peace activist Dr. Benjamin Spock and actor Robert Montgomery were not allowed to speak freely about the Viet Nam War.
4. Intensity. A writer was told his script was "too intimate" and "intense," causing people to experience the same feelings.
5. Unstereotypical behavior. A hero was not permitted to cry after he failed.
6. Reality. A program about contemporary young people in the 1960s could not show any hippies or anyone who was out of work or struggling to make ends meet.
7. Taboo behavior. A son could not say that he loved his father because there might be homosexual overtones.
8. Pressure group influence. A program had to be re-written to please the Gun Lobby.
9. Gender double standards. An ex-husband could tell

about his sexual affairs, but his ex-wife was not allowed to do the same thing.

NBC censorship policy states that "speech should be consistent with standards that prevail throughout a substantial portion of the television audience" (Grossberger 1976). Because this is so vague, the censors must decide for themselves, using "good taste, written policy and the thinking of NBC's top executives" (Grossberger 1976). The latter is very significant, because many controversial matters are kicked upstairs for resolution.

There is another phenomenon which makes the program production and censorship situation even more complex. That is testing. Many scripts and pilot programs are rejected or highly modified as a result of the testing process. This consists of independent companies showing the pilot programs to groups which are composed of carefully selected people whom the company thinks are representative of the average viewers, particularly the prime target: women from eighteen to forty-nine years of age.

The vagueness of official guidelines, the pressure from the creative community and outside groups, the personalities of the censors, the obsession with the ineffective testing programs, and the corporate relationships and decisions all result in a strange hodgepodge of false relevance,

blandness, pseudo-hyper-violence (placed in scripts gratuitously at the demands of network executives in order to give the programs "excitement" (Deeb 1976)), and little reality or relevance.

The censors claim they are just following the tastes of the mass audience and protecting us from the "Hollywood creative community." They also believe that they are making progress in presenting more sophisticated material and real language all the time, a little at a time. They also say that they are constantly testing and pushing the allowable limits.

The writers and producers say that great issues and events of the day are avoided; reality is avoided; relevance is avoided. The great tragedy they see is their self-censorship (Pursch 1975). They either become hacks who do the networks' bidding, even though they may struggle against the system, or they quit the medium (Talbot 1977).

4.3.3 COVERAGE OF THE POWER STRUCTURE: BIAS AND CENSORSHIP

4.3.3.1 Coverage of the Trilateral Commission, Bilderbergers and Council on Foreign Relations

In a previous chapter we mentioned that the

Bilderbergers, the Trilateral Commission (TLC) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) are at the core of the U.S. Ruling Cartel political power institutions and that members of the Establishment mass media participate in these organizations. If this be the case, certainly these groups would fall into the category of "all the news that's fit to print." However, there has been an almost complete blackout of the Bilderbergers, with only the smallest coverage of the other two organizations in the mainstream press. The three groups simply do not exist for the TV networks. So far as is known, no documentary has been produced on them, and only the Trilateral Commission has been mentioned in newscasts--one time each by CBS and ABC (Vanderbilt University Library 1981).

The member selection process is vital to this result. Not only are the participants highly screened before being admitted to membership or even to occasional attendance, but it is made very clear that the meetings are secret and that any violation of the secrecy pledge will result in the person either not being asked to attend any further meetings or in being expelled from the organization (Liberty Lobby [1975]).⁶ So far there have been no major defections.

Bilderbergers

The most significant phenomenon of the Bilderbergers from the mass media aspect is that there has been a definite and generally successful attempt at effecting a news blackout of the meetings. Although many reporters, editors, publishers and heads of the TV networks have attended the Bilderberg meetings over the years, only a tiny amount of information has been published. The former front man for the Bilderbergers once remarked that the reason they asked publishers and the top men from the networks to attend was to insure that their employees did not print or broadcast anything about the organization.

It has been mainly through the intelligence-like operations of the right wing organization Liberty Lobby and its active publicity and pressure on Congress and the news media that the Bilderbergers have relented slightly, but only to the extent of having a perfunctory press conference after the meeting is over. The only mainstream publications to have occasional articles on the Bilderbergers have been the Atlantic Monthly (Lydon 1977; Novak 1977) and the "men's magazines" such as Oui (Karpel 1977a), Penthouse (Karpel 1977b) and Gallery (Wemple 1977) which occasionally do some populist muckraking. Except for Wemple's story these few articles focus primarily on the Trilateral Commission and mention the Bilderbergers only in passing. (So far as is

known, no representative from any of these publications has ever been to a Bilderberg meeting.)

Censorship has been a continuous, conscious effort from the very beginning of the organization. The New York Times Index shows only two entries, and a computer search indicates that the Times has had only four stories. A similar search shows three other articles in Establishment papers and magazines since 1972. One was a tiny notice that the meeting in 1976 was cancelled; another was an answer to a Liberty Lobby write-in and ad campaign in the Washington Post against a congressman who had attended a Bilderberg meeting; and the third was an article by the maverick, Libertarian columnist Nicholas von Hoffman (1975), the latter's article being the only one with substantial information in it.

There has not been a complete news blackout in the entire U.S.. A trickle of information has been available, mainly from right wing sources (See Endnote 6; Chesterton 1967; Schlafly 1964; Skousen [1972]; Sutton and Wood 1978 and 1981; Quigley 1966).⁷ A significant breakthrough occurred in 1974, mainly as a result of the unrelenting efforts of the Liberty Lobby in putting pressure on the wire services and various newspapers in the country. Articles in the Chicago Tribune, the first mention in the Associated

Press, and stories in the Scripps-Howard chain (two months after the meeting) occurred in 1974. Both the UPI and AP covered the 1975 meeting along with representatives of Reuters and Agence France Presse. (The AP also provided secret news service to the 1975 meeting.) The Liberty Lobby was the only other U.S. representative.

This, of course, was all on the outside. Inside the meeting were two columnists--Sulzberger from the New York Times and William Buckley from the National Review. Nothing about the meeting appeared in either of those two publications.

Still, the almost complete blackout remains in the Establishment press, with the New York Times saying in 1976 in response to a Liberty Lobby letter that the meetings are "closed to the press" (Liberty Lobby [1975]). CBS also responded by saying that there was no news value in the organization. So, the Bilderbergers go unreported and the general public does not know about them. Such is the power of the media.

Trilateral Commission

Because the TLC is only semi-secret and because it publishes books and papers, the media cannot ignore it to

prominently.

Another curious phenomenon occurred during the short-lived period in the 1980 Republican nomination campaign when Reagan accused his opponents, including Carter, of being Trilateral Commission members. The New York Times mentioned this, but according the Post Index, the Washington, D.C., paper did not. Interestingly, whereas the Post provided a great deal of information and data and only poked fun at the conspiracy theorists, the Times, in articles as well as on the editorial page, curtly and rather irascibly dismissed the people who raised the issue as radical kooks, even though one of these people who discussed the TLC in a letter to the editor was Nobel laureate and peace activist George Wald (New York Times 1980c; Rockefeller 1980). It was this situation which finally prompted two of the three networks to mention the TLC for the first (and last) time.

The Council on Foreign Relations

Because the Washington Post Index does not have a category entry for the CFR, one must find articles indirectly, such as in looking under the name of David Rockefeller. This method only provided one article from 1976

through 1982--a story prompted by Henry Kissinger's non-reelection for the CFR board (Washington Post 1981). Although referring to the CFR as the "leadership elite" of America's "foreign policy establishment," the article did not go into the total significance of this statement and the terms used. However, the writer did provide interesting insights into the internal political and personality conflicts within the Council.

The New York Times articles are eighty-four in number since 1962, but only two are extensive in showing the nature and power of the organization and its members: the large number of members in various governmental administrations; the interlocks of the CFR personnel in social clubs, multinational corporations and the huge transnational banks; and some of the great decisions which originated in the organization (Lukas 1971; New York Times 1966). Although saying that the Council significantly influenced foreign policy the past thirty years, the writers scoffed at the left and right wing "conspiracy theories." Hence, the coverage is much like that about the Trilateral Commission. The articles are interesting from another aspect: they reveal the great number of Times writers who are members of the CFR, none of which wrote the articles which appeared in their newspaper.

Conclusion

Coverage of these three elite Ruling Cartel organizations places the Establishment newspapers in a bind. If they report the information straight and provide historical background, the conclusions are obvious: the controllers of the large multinational corporations, the largest banks and the elite Wall Street law firms form a small, cohesive group which places its members in the key ruling positions of government and which largely determines foreign policy. But this must not be allowed. So, two actions are taken. The first is to try to minimize the significance of the groups by calling the organizations "establishment booster clubs" (Washington Post 1977a) and saying that the organizations are merely places where innocuous, informal discussions by concerned citizens take place. The second action is to resort to name calling: the people who see the reality are labelled paranoid kooks from the radical fringes of the opinion spectrum.

The TV networks have the easiest solution. They simply do not report on the organizations.

The significant factor is that the key Establishment media have not shown the Ruling Cartel in its whole form or

even in most of its partial aspects. By not revealing the existence of a system of economic, social and political interlocks in which the mass media play a significant, though secondary role, the media are hiding and obfuscating the existence of the Cartel. Thus, they are playing their expected role as part of the system.

4.3.3.2 The Best Censored Stories

In 1976 Carl Jensen, Associate Professor of Media Studies at Sonoma State University in California, started "Project Censored." Its aim was to "explore and publicize the extent of censorship in our society by locating stories about significant issues of which the public should be aware, but is not, for one reason or another" (Jensen 1983). The goal of the project was to stimulate more media coverage of these issues and to alert citizens of the existence of these phenomena so that the people could demand better coverage from the media they use.

Although the panel which chooses the Top Ten stories (plus about fifteen which are considered under-reported) varies from year to year, there are a few who have appeared several times. With minor exceptions the people come from the liberal, educated stratum of society and from the

Establishment media such as the New York Times, CBS and Washington Star. At least one has attended a Bilderberg meeting, and others have written muckraking books about the media. Included are such well known names as Ben Bagdikian, media author and professor from the Journalism School at the University of California at Berkeley (and an ardent foe of public access); Mike Wallace, of CBS' 60 Minutes; Nicholas Johnson, media author and former activist FCC Commissioner (and originator of public access requirements on cable); Robert Cirino, media author and teacher; a consumer advocate; a president of the liberal lobby Common Cause; Hodding Carter, who was former State Department spokesperson in the Carter administration and who now has a program on PBS analyzing press coverage; and Ed Asner, the TV actor and star of the liberal program Lou Grant, whose political activism in the actors' union and in support of the rebels in El Salvador resulted in his show being cancelled by CBS (Guardian 1982a). The only person who might be considered a true radical is Noam Chomsky, professor at MIT. It is from this group that the Ten Top Stories emerge.

The result is a compilation of the more gross and comprehensive, systematic corporate and governmental scandals which have been covered up by the traditional media. The stories range from severe violations of civil

liberties and ecological disasters to the dangers of nuclear war. The civil liberties selections include the corporate war against unions, the conditions in U.S. prisons, and the support of repressive regimes abroad. Many stories result from the corporate drive for profits regardless of the consequences to the health of the people or the ecology of the earth. Some of the events, noted particularly the "Other Censored Stories of the Year," mention the role of the big banks and David Rockefeller. The panel does not merely look at isolated events, but puts some of them together to make a broader picture, such as the role of multinational monopoly capitalism and militarism as the main reason for the Western world's economic troubles and the cause of the destruction of competitive free-enterprise. The panel even listed the Trilateral Commission one year as a top censored story.

It is ironic that, with a very few minor exceptions, the sources of these stories were from the alternative press--such publications as the Progressive, Inquiry, In These Times, The Nation, Mother Jones and even the "men's" magazines such as Penthouse. So, it is not as if the information were hidden and not available to the Establishment media. Even after the representatives of the traditional press participate in Dr. Jensen's panels and

become fully aware of these stories, their employers (and they, themselves??) continue to ignore the censored and under-reported material.

Yet, there is even more information which could be available to the panels if they had the desire to use it. They could look at magazines and newspapers which are further to the left of the liberal, Democratic Socialist and New Left publications. They could consider the the Marxist Guardian and the Socialist Workers' Party's Militant. Additionally, they could review the right wing populist newspaper Spotlight. Each of these publications could provide more Top Ten Stories.

However, the lists show that one cannot be informed without reading the alternative press. Project Censored is a damning indictment on American mainstream journalism and the smug attitude implied in the statement "All the News that's Fit to Print."

Perhaps the supreme irony is that Professor Jensen has written a book based on Project Censored, but all thirty publishers who have been approached have rejected it. As Jensen says, "The U.S. press simply is not excited about providing coverage to research that is so critical of it."

4.3.3.3 The Permitted Opinion and Information Range

All the various aspects of media content control mentioned in this chapter result in the narrowing of the range of information and opinions presented or favorably reported on in the traditional media. There are several revealing studies at various levels in the media bureaucracies, research which deals with different aspects of the media and which substantiates the information range restriction and which indicates why this occurs. First, studies of the media owners, particularly at the local level of individual publishers, show that they are affluent, prominent, conservative businessmen with similar attitudes (Sandman, Rubin and Sacheman 1972, 38; Donohew 1965). Political affiliation makes no difference. At a lower level it was shown that newspaper editors and TV news editors have attitudes that are much alike (Clyde and Buckalew 1969).

When it comes to hiring news personnel in TV, it has been observed that the people employed have middle class values and adhere to the Protestant work ethic (Fang and Gervail 1971). Epstein's (1973, 189, 205-215) study showed that network correspondents had similar profiles of background and attitudes. There were no activists or advocates, and they had few connections with political organizations or causes. Their viewpoints were moderately

liberal or moderately conservative. Many took a detached, non-ideological stance.

If these attitudes and socialization of TV personnel are much the same, if the news sources are basically the same, and if the same corporate and news values exist in all three networks, it stands to reason that the newscasts would be similar in content. A study (Lemert 1974) using 1971 material showed that 70% of the stories in weekday newscasts was duplicated by another network and 58% was duplicated on all three networks. A very similar study two years later (Fowler and Showalter 1974) revealed that 41% of the stories was carried on all three networks, three-fifths were duplicated by two newscasts, and one-third of the stories were exclusive. The correlation of appearance order of the stories in the newscasts also was significant.

In the print media, research into the nature of content of columnists reveals the following evaluation of 1,861 columns (Cirino 1971, 180, 181):

- 29% very conservative
- 20% conservative
- 42% middle-of-the-road/mildly liberal/mildly conservative
- 8% liberal
- 1% very liberal

Cirino's (1971, 167-213) research is particularly relevant. He established a categorization of opinions,

placed them in a spectrum, then observed how much newspaper space and air time each of these categories was permitted on the media. His spectrum was as follows:

1. Radical Right (John Birch Society, Carl McIntire [The Liberty Lobby would also be in this category.])
2. Solid Conservatives (William Buckley and most southern politicians [Ronald Reagan and his Reaganomics supporters like Congressman Jack Kemp could be included]
3. Moderate Conservatives (Nelson Rockefeller, Time, Newsweek, Los Angeles Times and the three broadcast networks)
4. Moderate Liberals (Hubert Humphrey, most Washington and foreign correspondents and newspapers such as the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the New York Times
5. Solid Liberals (I.F. Stone, Dick Gregory and Dr. George Wald)
6. Radical Left (Students for a Democratic Society [SDS], Communist Party USA, and the Black Panthers).

Cirino notes that the only real competition among ideas allowed in the mass media is between Moderate Conservatives and Moderate Liberals. Since the Radical Right and Solid

Conservative viewpoints have much in common with that of the Moderate Conservatives, some of their opinions are heard. However, the Radical Right is generally frozen out of direct, continuous access to the national mass media.

But, since the Radical Right has great financial support from corporations, foundations and wealthy individuals, and since many local broadcasting station owners and newspaper editors and publishers sympathize with the Radical Right point of view (and perhaps need their advertising revenue), spokespersons for the Far Right are able--and allowed (a very significant fact)--to purchase time on local radio and TV outlets. A 1971 comparison of major radical groups on the far ends of the opinion spectrum showed that the top ten Radical Right groups had 1,806 radio and 150 TV outlets compared with 44 radio stations and one television outlet for the top Radical Left groups. Cirino also notes a 1967 survey which showed that the Radical Right elements made over 10,000 TV and radio broadcasts each week across the country.

As a result, Cirino says that the nation "is awash" in the Moderate Liberal, Conservative and Radical Right points of view. Those people and groups with Solid Liberal and Radical Left opinions are almost frozen out by comparison. Still, the Radical Right and Solid Conservatives seem to

have a valid complaint when it comes to the major mass media, particularly TV. Cirino documents many cases where people were denied access to newspapers and broadcast media even when they were willing to pay for time and space.

But the right has advantages the left does not: money and access. Yet, when the Solid Liberal groups try to purchase broadcast time or newspaper space, they are frequently turned down. Even when the TV networks present a documentary which is controversial and critical of some of the opinions or institutions highly regarded by the right, the conservative owners of the affiliated network stations occasionally refuse to carry the programs. This occurs on public TV as well as with commercial television. The result is that most Americans have access to only a narrow range of opinions and information, a range which is supportive of the status quo.

4.4 CONCLUSION

What we see and hear on the mass media is a result of an extremely complex process of decision making. There are many strata of inputs, filters and controls at the macro and

micro levels. They range from the highest level of the capitalist societal umbrella--which is the most basic part of the total hegemonic system which supports the existing social, economic, political and power system--to the lowest level of the individual employee who makes a decision as to which piece of information will be included in the day's or week's output. In between is a dense, interactive relationship of many factors: the type of corporate ownership and management; the personality of the media owner; basic capitalist requirements for profit; the socialized newsroom and various "rules of the game" in producing programming and printed content; and the outside influences such as the government, advertisers and people and institutions which can exercise some power and influence over the media corporation.

The whole framework and process comes to focus particularly during the functions of agenda setting and gatekeeping. Sometimes it is a matter of socialization, sometimes of corporate policy, and occasionally of direct censorship. But the end result is the same: informational output is restricted. The most blatant censorship occurs on matters which relate to the basic nature of the U.S. power system itself, especially the existence and activities of the basic Cartel organizations such as the CFR,

Bilderbergers and TLC.

Domhoff (1971) and Weinstein (1968) have noted that the spectrum of legitimately recognized opinion within the American ruling class ranges from conservative to moderately liberal, and it is within this spectrum that our democratic process takes place. (Molotch and Lester (1974, 57) assert that an "issue" is an area of disagreement within the ruling class.) Anything on either side of these boundaries is "radical" and thus proscribed. Domhoff (1979) shows how the policy formation process in the U.S. narrows the range of acceptable options and opinions by the interaction of the Cartel's elite organizations and by the interface of them and their members and followers in the government.

The Establishment media legitimate this by responding favorably on the results. Alternatives are eliminated either by not reporting on them or by severely criticizing them or brushing them aside. This interlocking political-media relationship serves to exile to the alternative press the kind of information and perspectives which are out of the Cartel-controlled spectrum. We have seen this with the Sonoma State material and with Cirino's studies. Because the masses of the people and the government personnel do not read the alternative press, they remain unknowledgeable of, sceptical of, or hostile to the

material which is not endorsed by the Establishment media. Thus, alternatives are not considered, reality is hidden or obfuscated, ruling class hegemony is reinforced, and Ruling Cartel control is maintained.

Chapter 5

ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT MEDIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

There exists one medium which, if it becomes fully developed and used, can present an alternative to the Establishment press: public access cable television. One measure of the significant potential of this new communications experiment is the hostility to it on the part of the national and local power structures in many parts of the country. The more effectively public access is used, the greater will be the attempt to co-opt it, weaken it, or destroy it.

Public access television is a recently developed medium and is only one of the many means the people have used to try to obtain a large, mass audience for what they have to say, both at the local and national levels. The subject of access to the mass communications media has received

increasing attention in the U.S. the last two decades. Individuals, government regulatory agencies, various citizen groups, organizations representing the owners of the mass media, students of law and journalism, and particularly members of the bar have expressed great interest. The subject is creating increasingly expanded attention and controversy.

There are different types of access which are discussed in relation to the mass media, only one of which is the type which will mainly be considered in this dissertation.

1. Access to the communications service--people having radio, television and newspapers made available to them in sufficient quantity to provide for certain information and entertainment needs.
2. Access to information--the problem of newsmen being able to obtain information they need in order to do their job.
3. Access to an audience--the means by which people other than those who own and operate the communications facilities may be provided time or space in these facilities to present their views.

This third form of access is the one which is the

subject of this chapter and can also be considered from four aspects.

1. Direct access--where space and time from the media are given to individuals or groups to make use of as they desire in communicating directly to the audience.
2. Indirect access--where the media provide news coverage for people or events which the media consider newsworthy.
3. Combination of direct and indirect--where there is an agreement made by a broadcaster with local citizen groups in which the broadcaster provides for increased direct and indirect access to subjects, opinions and speakers of the local groups. This also includes the hiring of personnel from the groups, people who in turn might be more likely to provide further access for their organizations.

There is another category of access which is found when individuals take direct action in some communications form, circumventing the established media in order to create greater dissemination for their ideas than can be provided merely by direct conversation. In this category would be such methods as bumper stickers, posters, graffiti,

telephone campaigns, sky writing, pamphleteering and the use of bulletin boards.

This chapter will mainly consider direct access to the mass media and will concern itself primarily with the electronic media--broadcasting and cable television. However, other forms of access will be mentioned because all forms are tied together in various ways, particularly in the legal sense.

5.2 NEWSPAPER AND BROADCAST ACCESS: THE LEGAL HISTORY

5.2.1 HISTORY OF ACCESS THROUGH 1967

When the framers of the Constitution and the First Amendment considered the matter of free speech and a free press, they basically had in mind protection against prior restraint rather than freedom of expression as is generally the prime concern today. They believed in the common law at the time which was that the printers should be held criminally liable for what they produced, including being prosecuted for libel for statements against the government (Georgetown Law Journal 1973, 5-10). But, over the years this changed to a concept of freedom of expression. This

has developed in the courts to such an extent that generally a newspaper now may be convicted for libel only if there is malicious intent, meaning that the material is published with reckless disregard for the truth (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964)). Hence, the press today is considerably freer to print without penalty than it was when the Constitution and the First Amendment were developed, although recent libel cases have been decided against the press, narrowing its freedom of expression (Daily Texan 1982b; Higdon 1980; Columbia Journalism Review 1983a).

The press itself also was very different in the late 1700s from that which we find today. There were many more newspapers per city and per capita than there are now. Advertising was a negligible factor. Public debates were carried on in newspapers via letters to the editor and by a multiplicity of partison papers. It was not very expensive to start a newspaper then, unlike today, and therefore it was not too difficult for someone with something to say to find a printed outlet (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947, 14; Georgetown Law Journal, 1973, 5-10).

Modern technological and economic factors have made a
1
revolutionary change in the press. The news media have not only become truly mass in nature, but also big business. Because of government restrictions on the number of TV and

radio outlets, not everyone who wants to be a broadcaster may become one. Because of the considerable capital requirements to start a newspaper and the great risk involved in trying to compete with established papers in monopolistic situations which are found in most American cities, it is extremely difficult to successfully start a daily newspaper (US Congress 1967b). Cable TV provides many channels for diversity, but requires great initial expense as well.

Almost all commentators on the nature of the press today view with concern, not only the concentration of ownership of the mass news media, but also the limited sources of basic information: the government, two main press services, three major TV networks, and monopoly newspaper positions in most cities. This is not a recent development. The Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1947 (104) indicated that concentration of ownership was the "greatest danger" to freedom of the press and communications.

Whereas the newspaper editors and publishers can generally print whatever they wish, modified only by laws such as obscenity and libel, the broadcast industry operates under restrictions of federal law and the Federal Communications Commission. Because there are not sufficient

frequencies available on the broadcast band for all persons who wish to own stations, the Communications Act of 1934 places responsibility in the FCC to determine who will receive licenses. The main, basic requirement of a licensee is to operate in "the public interest, convenience and necessity." The vagueness of these terms has been the center of many court battles, and the application of it has led to changing interpretations over the years. Just as the Supreme Court has greatly changed its thinking in other areas of law--such as what constitutes interstate commerce² and the relation of manufacturing to commerce --so also has the court changed its interpretation as to what the relationship should be between broadcasters and the consuming public.

For many years the broadcaster was considered basically a custodian or fiduciary for his frequency. The only access requirement was the equal time provision for political candidates which was part of the Communications Act of 1934. However, in 1947 the Hutchins Commission (organized and partially funded by publisher and Ruling Cartel member Henry Luce) took a view which called for modifications of this broadcaster power. Although it took great pains to say that there was no right of access to the media for every citizen, it did say that a framework should be devised so that each

"idea shall have its chance". It called for the broadcasters to be common carriers of public discussion, but not to be available for free access. Despite the disclaimer of not being open for access, the commission made several statements throughout its report which urged access for minorities, the right of reply or retraction, and in general for the media to be "free to all who have something to say to the public" (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947, 8, 23, 101, 103, 129).

From then until 1979 there was a slow but steady journey in the courts and the FCC toward greater access. It mainly has been lurking in the shadows cast by the Fairness Doctrine. The latter was created by the FCC's change in policy toward editorials. Prior to 1949 the Commission had prohibited broadcasters from being advocates (Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 FCC 333 (1940)). However, this was changed from a prohibition to an encouragement. The FCC stated in 1949 that there should be editorialization with "reasonable limits" and "subject to the general requirements of fairness" (Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949)). The Commission said that there is a right of the public to be informed rather than just a narrow right of an individual licensee to air his or her own views. This was in keeping

with the Supreme Court decision in the 1944 Associated Press case that people have a First Amendment right to receive information from the widest possible diverse and antagonistic sources. The FCC required that stations not merely refrain from denying time to speakers with opposing viewpoints, but to actively seek them out. Although the broadcaster also has the obligation to provide fair and balanced information, the Fairness Doctrine mainly comes into play when the station facilities are used for discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.

The Fairness Doctrine goes even further. And, once again, the subject of access is interwoven with the doctrine. When a person comes under attack on a station's facilities, the person must be notified of the fact and be given a chance to reply .

When the Fairness Doctrine and personal attack provisions were contested in 1967 in the famous Red Lion case, a unanimous Supreme court not only attested to the constitutionality fo the FCC rule, but went further in expounding overall rights of citizens and relationships of consumers to broadcasters.

Red Lion is such a landmark case and Justice White was so wide-ranging in his opinion that many people are able to read many things into it depending on which point of view

they wish to support. Some broadcasters and lawyers viewed it as an abridgement of constitutional rights of the broadcasters and as a big foot in the door for governmental regulation of programming (Robinson, G.O., 1967; Schenkkan 1974; Blake 1969). It was viewed by the Supreme Court as a confirmation of the primary role of the broadcaster as fiduciary and controller of his airwaves, even though he must be socially responsive and objectively fair in his presentation of controversy (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee 412 US 94 (1973)).

Proponents of access saw Red Lion as a significant step forward for their cause (Nord, 1970; Barron 1969c). The Court (390) said that "it is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experience which is crucial here". Even more directly, Justice White (401) said that Congress would not abridge the freedom of speech or press if it passed legislation giving "time sharing" or "other devices which dissipate the power of those who sit astride the channels of communication with the general public." The Court (400) stated that there should be sensitivity to "the legitimate claims of those unable without government assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views."

In June 1967, before the Red Lion case was decided, there appeared in the Harvard Law Review an article by Jerome Barron law professor at George Washington University. The article, which was entitled "Access to the press--a New First Amendment Right," started a discussion and debate on the subject of access which has continued to the present among journalists, judges, broadcasters and lawyers. Because Barron was the most outspoken proponent of access at that time, we will review more fully his point of view and³ then present the arguments of his opponents.

Barron said that the free market place for ideas via the mass communications media does not exist. It is only a romantic tradition just like the idea of a free market existing in economics. Because of the antipathy of the people who control the mass media to ideas other than the bland, innocuous ones which enhance the medium for advertising, governmental intervention is necessary if novel and unpopular or unorthodox ideas are to be assured a forum. The law now only protects people who have control over the mass media. Barron quotes various Supreme Court justices who state that full and free discussion of ideas in the mass media is fundamental in our Constitution and to our form of government. Because this is not practiced by the mass media, we have access by riot and demonstration and the

phenomenon of the underground press.

Barron found hope in Justice Black's statement in the Associated Press case that freedom of the press from the government is "no sanction for repression of that freedom by private interests" (Barron 1967, 1654). Even with the slight access found in the U.S.--the right to reply to personal attack which occurs over the air, and equal time for politicians--this does no good for groups and ideas which are ignored. Barron sees hope in various court cases in which the judges or justices stated that there is a need to protect the rights of the public, particularly where there is a communications monopoly or where the media will not perform in the public interest because it would be bad for business. In such cases the government could intervene on behalf of the public. (Barron (1967,1659) noted that the right to reply is commonly used in Europe and South America.)

Barron called for an expanded interpretation of the First Amendment to provide for an affirmation of the rights of the public in the communications process, not just for the owners of the mass media. There should be an interpretation that there is a First Amendment right of the people to speak, to have an audience, and to be heard. The second interpretation expansion needed by the courts (or a

law passed by Congress) is that the mass media are quasi-public in nature. Not only are they in monopoly or oligopoly situations in most parts of the country, but also the functioning of the government and the basic information the public needs in order to carry out its duties as citizens in a democracy require the greatest degree of information from the media. Furthermore, the news media benefit from favorable legislation and from administration by government agencies. Hence, the media should not be considered as purely private enterprises but as agencies which should be more responsive to the people and to government intervention on behalf of the people. This can best be accomplished by providing access to the media by citizens.

The critics of Barron focused on two basic questions: how would access be implemented and operated, and how would this be done without considerable government control. Ben Bagdikian (1969, 11) press critic and journalist, said that access would be bad because it would bypass the traditional professional expertise of the editor, it would be chaotic to implement, and it would result only in confusion to the audience. Furthermore, the Fairness Doctrine in broadcasting was sufficient to provide the information the citizens need. Clifton Daniel (1970) of the New York Times

said that the need for access is exaggerated and that the media can take steps to cure any ills or imbalances which occur. He also indicated that implementing access would be an impracticality. Almost all critics of access claimed that it would lead to too much governmental intervention. Justice William O. Douglas was particularly severe in his judgement on this point (Schenkkan 1974, 76, 78, 79). CBS' Walter Cronkite thought that access not only is a foolish and dangerous proposal, but that broadcasting should be de-regulated altogether and complete freedom should be given to the press (Georgetown Law Journal 1973, 131-135). Cronkite's boss agreed, saying that the press "is doing a sufficient and responsible job now" (Barron 1973, 311, 312). The editor of Editor and Publisher (1967) claimed that there is no need for access because minority views are in fact being expressed. Two journalism professors at the University of Missouri stated that the main problem with access was that government intervention would be required to determine who would speak for which groups. The problem would be just too complex because of the extremely pluralistic nature and great size of this country (Gillmor and Barron 1969, 148-150).

But Barron has not been alone in his pro-access orientation. He has many supporters, the most prominent of

whom is Nicholas Johnson (1970; Johnson and Westen 1971), a former FCC commissioner who was instrumental in initiating the first access requirements. Johnson also is a critic of the Fairness Doctrine.

The subject of access to the mass media is part of a general struggle by citizens for access to other media of communications, particularly the "public forum." One of the results has been to produce court cases of significance, not only from the point of view of their possible application to the press, but also from the aspect of noting the varying yardsticks used by the courts for different media.

There have been several cases in which people have attempted to use public facilities as a forum for dissemination of information. The federal court of appeals ruled in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F. 2nd 83 (2nd Cir., 1968) that a group had the right to distribute leaflets and talk with people in a bus terminal. This judge cited a previous case which was decided by the Supreme Court in which it was stated that a pamphleteer had the right to enter the streets of a company-owned town because, when an owner opens up his property for use by the general public, his rights become circumscribed by the rights of those who

use it (Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946)).

In a case in California (Barron 1973, 100), the State Supreme Court ruled that railroad station officials could not prevent people from using the station for political communication just as they could not prevent people from using parks and streets. (The only proviso in this case and the bus terminal case was that there could be no interference with the flow of traffic.) However, in 1966 the Court held in a 5-4 decision that jailhouse grounds could not be used for political protest (Adderly v. Florida 385 US 39 (1966)).

In the significant Logan Valley case, which reached the Supreme Court, pickets were given approval to enter a privately owned shopping center because that was where the audience was. Justice Marshall said that there are some circumstances where privately owned property may be treated as public property for First Amendment purposes (Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 391 US 308 (1968)).

In 1967 the Supreme Court ruled in the Kissinger case that the New York Transit Authority could not refuse a subway ad merely because it was controversial and because the Authority officials did not agree with it. They could not refuse the ad, particularly since they had accepted

other posters of a strictly non-commercial nature.

A somewhat similar case to Logan Valley involving handbill distribution occurred in Portland, Oregon (Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972)). In 1968 the trial judge ruled (consistent with Logan Valley), and the appeals court agreed, that there was a right of access. However, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court in 1972, the Nixon appointees had changed the flavor of the Court. In a 5-4 decision it ruled in favor of the owners of the shopping center, saying that there had to be a definite relationship between the object of the protest and the site of the protest.

Proponents of the right of access to the mass media would argue that these court decisions upholding the right of the public to have communications access to public and private property which is open to the public should be extended to the mass media. They contend that the broadcasting industry is publicly sanctioned and supervised, and it is operated under the banner of public interest, convenience and necessity. The newspapers are public in nature because of their receipt of governmental legislative favors and because of their intimate relationship with the information needs of the citizens in a democracy. Additionally, the press opens its pages and air time to the

public, and it provides the public with information and entertainment to everyone who wishes to see and hear. Cable TV (CTV) operates with a governmental franchise and uses public streets and rights of way to string its cable. They all open their facilities up for commercial speech by advertisers. Hence, they all are public in the same sense as in Logan Valley (Georgetown Law Journal 1973, 83).

Opponents of access would counter this by saying that the above cases are irrelevant because the press is specifically exempt by its special constitutional status. The First Amendment clearly states that the government shall enact no law abridging the right of freedom of the press. Additionally, there is the Fifth Amendment prohibiting the government from taking private property for public use without just compensation.

Advocates of access have had a rough time in the courts in their attempts to gain access to newspapers. In cases where people have sought guaranteed access to the letters-to-editor column, the courts have ruled in favor of the newspaper (Pierce 1972, 60; Barron 1973, 45, 46).⁴

The main argument surrounding the newspaper cases is the question of whether the publication is of a state or private nature. In the cases where the newspaper is clearly privately owned, access has been denied (Chicago Joint

Board; Resident Participation of Denver). However, where there has been a determination that the paper is of a public nature, the decisions have generally gone against the press⁵

. These cases have been with newspapers in a state university (Lee v. Board of Regents), in a public high school (Zucker v. Pamitz; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District), and in a bar journal of a state university (Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool). The only exception is found in a case where the judge ruled that access was not mandatory if the editor exercised fairness and reasonably good judgement (Avins v. Rutgers).

The preoccupation of the courts in these cases with the matter of the public or private nature of the media to which access is being sought is based on the Fourteenth Amendment which says that states must give equal protection to citizens, but does not mention that private individuals must also give such protection. Because a corporation is considered as a private person, there is the need to prove that the privately owned facilities were performing public functions and that the school and bar publications were agencies of the state. The attempt to jump the gap from private to public nature of privately owned newspapers has not been successful in court so far.

5.2.2 HISTORY OF ACCESS FROM 1968 THROUGH 1972

The years from 1968 through 1972 saw a great increase, not just in the discussion of the subject of access (particularly in the legal profession), but also in the activity of citizens groups trying to obtain special favors, including access, from the broadcasters whose licenses were coming up for renewal. The subject of access was discussed in most law journals and other legal publications during this time as well as in some popular publications. The merits and demerits of access were argued as public unrest became acute; the potential of cable television was being discussed; the FCC was grappling with the subject of access and its first cousin, the Fairness Doctrine; and significant court cases were decided or were winding their way up toward the Supreme Court. Jerome Barron continued to publish defenses of the idea, and Commissioner Nicholas Johnson made his opinions publicly known, frequently through dissents to FCC decisions. Their opponents were quick to answer. Meanwhile, the medium with the greatest potential for access, CTV, was developing quickly and creating a great stir in the broadcasting industry and in the legal profession.

The Red Lion case opened the gates for individuals and

groups to appeal to individual stations, to the FCC and to the courts to provide services which they thought the Fairness Doctrine and the court's decision authorized. This led to two types of struggles: the federal level of the courts and the FCC, and at the local level with individual broadcasters.

The seminal case was *Banzhaf v. FCC* (405 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. (1968)) in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that cigarette advertising in television required counter advertising--free. The three reasons given were, first, that the broadcasters' public interest requirements necessitated reply time against a public health hazard. Second, the issue was controversial, a criterion of the Fairness Doctrine. Third, the First Amendment contained a requirement for communicating ideas and equalizing opportunity of access to the media.

Although the FCC and the court insisted that this was a special case and was not to be used as a precedent, subsequent cases have in fact relied on Banzhaf as a precedent. In two situations, one decided by the FCC (In Re Wilderness Society) and one by the court of appeals (Friends of the Earth v. FCC), environmental groups were allowed access to answer advertising because the commercials had raised controversial issues.

Anti-war groups, however, did not fare so well. In two cases the FCC and the court of appeals declared that because there as considerable news coverage of the Viet Nam War, the Fairness Doctrine requirements had been met. There was no right of access for those groups to explain the alternatives to military service (David Green v. FCC; G.I. Association, Stephen P. Rizzo v. FCC; Barron 1973, 182; Hanks and Lazar 1972).

There was further pressure on the FCC and the TV networks from groups and individual members of Congress to counteract the easy access which President Nixon was able to obtain to announce and explain his policies (Barron 1973, 160-172; Pierce 1972, 47-55). Under such pressure the FCC negotiated with the networks to provide some time for the groups, emphasizing that it was a matter under the Fairness Doctrine, not the right to access. All this was complicated by requests for time to answer some of the people who had been given time to answer the President. In the case of one group--the Congressional Black Caucus--the FCC refused the request for access, saying that if Congress needed a law requiring access, it could pass one (39th Annual Report/Fiscal Year 1973, 41).

Two cases were of more significance than others because they struck at the heart of the access problems and were

eventually decided by the Supreme Court. The Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) challenged a broadcaster's refusal to sell time to a spokesman to oppose President Nixon's address on 3 June 1970. The FCC supported the broadcaster; the BEM appealed the decision. The court of appeals heard not only the BEM case, but also a similar appeal of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) which also wanted to buy time for presentation of political and social commentary, but was refused by the TV networks and the FCC. The DNC had asked the FCC to create a general right of access. In a 2-1 decision the D.C. Circuit Court decided in favor of the DNC and against the FCC. Judge Wright said there was a First Amendment right of limited access to the mass communications media.

The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the case would not be decided for two more years. In the interim, articles on access were published in great number, and the FCC announced it planned a comprehensive inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine and access (Notice of Inquiry, 30 FCC 2nd 26 (1971)).

Meanwhile citizens were applying pressure for access and other concessions from local broadcasters. In 1967 there was a court decision which radically changed the relationship between citizens and broadcasters. A citizen

group in Jackson, Mississippi, had petitioned the FCC to grant a hearing permitting a challenge for renewal of the license of a local TV station (WLBT) because of the station's continuously segregationist viewpoint and the exclusion of opposing opinions. The FCC ruled that the petitioners were merely members of the public; hence, they had no standing with the Commission because they had no economic interest in the operation of the station. In disagreeing with the FCC the D.C. Court of Appeals said that individuals and groups of citizens had such sufficient interest in the performance of the broadcasting stations that they were entitled to challenge license renewals (*Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 359 F.2nd 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).

Consequently, during the next few years citizen groups and individuals all over the country exacted concessions from their local broadcasters, many of whom were fearful of challenges to their licenses (Jaffe 1972, 791)⁶. The agreements covered many subjects including access in direct and indirect ways (Johnson 1970, 194-203; Barron 1973, 194-198; *Daily Texan* 1974a). Frequently there were concessions to minorities about hiring practices and giving on-camera jobs to representatives of the minority groups. Additionally, there frequently were demands that the station

present more programs which reflected minority groups and interests. The positions of minority groups vis-a-vis the broadcasters were strengthened by placing their members on advisory boards for the stations and by assisting the stations with their FCC requirement of making a study to ascertain the problems and needs of the community (Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 FCC 2nd 650 (1971)).

There were some agreements which provided for direct access (Johnson and Westen 1971, 623, 624). A Sandersville, Georgia, station provided access to "significant" community groups (Schwartz and Wood 1972, 1-19). Public station WGBH in Boston started to give thirty minutes, five times a week to groups and individuals (Jaffe 1972, 790). In Pittsburgh and a few cities in the San Francisco Bay area some agreements were reached for providing access for periodic 50-second spot announcements, resulting in an average of seven messages per week (Hanks and Longini 1974). Some stations provided a slight degree of access by reading listeners' letters over the air (Jaffe 1972, 790). Newsmen on public TV station KERA in Dallas read the phoned-in comments of their viewers in response to stories just presented in the newscasts.

The broadcast industry generally attacked this

activity. Robert Jencks, president of CBS broadcast group in 1973, criticized the citizen groups, saying that they only represented themselves, not the entire community which the broadcaster must serve. He claimed that the American population is too pluralistic to allow such programming fractionalization, thus undermining the mass audience appeal of broadcasting, which is the basis of commercial television (Barron 1973, 236, 237).

Although the FCC made some procedural decisions facilitating the work of the citizen groups by extending the time for filing the license renewal and by requiring the broadcaster to announce when his license is up for renewal, the Commission has generally not been hospitable to citizen groups, particularly in providing evidentiary hearings. It has been claimed that the FCC does not have the personnel to have such hearings for each petition to deny which is filed by the citizen groups (Barron 1973, 246, 248).

5.2.3 HISTORY OF ACCESS FROM 1973 TO 1976

The years 1973 and 1974 were ones of setback for the supporters of access. The Supreme Court ruled to reverse the court of appeals and to support the FCC in the Business Executives Move/Democratic National Committee case

(BEM/DNC). The high court also determined in the Tornillo case that the Florida law of right of reply in newspapers was unconstitutional, thereby dashing the hopes for a foot in the door for access to the newspaper medium (Miami Herald v. Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974)). The FCC announced the results of its review of the Fairness Doctrine and access, a report which clearly was in support of the former against the latter. And, finally, the FCC began to take a firmer stand against citizen groups and their agreements with local broadcasters, particularly those agreements which permitted access (Broadcasting 1975b, 30; Broadcasting 1975c, 24; Variety 1975, 43).

In the BEM/DNC case the decision was not so clear cut as the 7-2 vote would indicate, because five of the seven majority justices wrote opinions. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that, since the 1934 Communications Act (paragraph 153 (h)) states that broadcasters are not common carriers, and since it always says that the FCC cannot censor or interfere with free speech, there was no right of a government-imposed system of access, a system which would abridge broadcasters' First Amendment rights and lead to day-to-day government control of broadcasting. Burger stated some of the standard arguments against access, arguments which were in agreement with the FCC position:

access would dilute the rights and effectiveness of control and responsibility of editors; political spot advertising is not a suitable medium for intelligent treatment of complex issues; because the activity of the broadcaster is not "state action," his production is completely as a private enterprise; an access system based on the purchase of air time "might allow the wealthy to monopolize or at least mold public discussion;"⁷ the Fairness Doctrine insures balance, retains traditional editorial responsibility, maintains public accountability when licenses are renewed, and screens out irresponsible speakers; since the audience is a captive one, it must be protected from the risk of harmful propaganda.

The two dissenting justices made the following arguments: the banning of access makes a mockery of the oft stated goal of free and uninhibited discussion; merely relying on the Fairness Doctrine is inadequate because the broadcasters lack the desire for the expression on their stations of unorthodox and varying views; the First Amendment rights of potential speakers to have a forum and to be heard are violated; the editorial judgement of the broadcaster is not involved with political advertising because, since the broadcastors already turn over their air time to some members of the public (the advertisers)

political advertising is merely providing air time for other citizens; the broadcasters are private censors; it is a violation of the First Amendment for the broadcaster not to give time to some people when other citizens with opposing views receive time; there is no compelling reason why there should be governmental control if a system of access were established.

One of the key issues was to determine if broadcasting constituted state action. If it did, then the non-broadcasting cases in which courts had granted public access might apply to broadcasting. Chief Justice Burger ruled that broadcasting was not a public function, saying that the FCC is merely an "overseer" and that broadcasters are "free agents" (BEM/DNC, 116, 117). The broadcasters have primary responsibility, with the Commission having only review authority.

The court did not completely extinguish the hopes of people who favored access. At the end of his opinion Chief Justice Burger, noting that the FCC was taking another look at the Fairness Doctrine and access, said that Congress or the FCC that is both practicable and desirable" (BEM/DNC 1971, 170-204).

The reaction in the legal profession to the case, as reflected in law journals and reviews, was generally one of

disapproval. But most writers thought that the subject was still an open matter because of the diverse court opinions and the fact that the court indicated that some sort of access could be developed by Congress or the FCC.⁸ (Interestingly, most legal commentators seemed to favor some form of access; however, most journalism writers were highly critical of the scheme.)

Most commentators thought that the court ignored too much evidence of government control of broadcasting, and that there is no doubt that broadcasting is state action. They believe that there is certainly more state action than in the many non-broadcasting cases where there is no government action at all except that the area is open to the public. The second factor the court ignored was the many non-broadcast cases (with private as well as public defendants) in which the courts ruled that where advertising once exists, a prohibition of controversial advertising is a First Amendment violation. Another precedent ignored in the decision was that non-commercial speech is more protected by the First Amendment than commercial speech. There are also many cases which could be precedents for governmental affirmative action for access for paid political advertising. The court skirted the matter of equal rights protection of the Constitution because the broadcaster may

be discriminatory in accepting some spot announcements (mainly commercial) and rejecting editorial spots. The court of appeals decision which was overturned noted three such cases.

Generally, the commentators were of the opinion that the decision confused the situation more than clarified it. Canby (1974) particularly was concerned about the status of public broadcasting in light of the court's decision. Since PBS and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting are heavily and directly involved with the government, is access mandatory for non-commercial, state supported broadcasting? If so, the only question remaining is a determination that⁹ the public stations are appropriate forums for access.

Cornish (1974) said that there is a First Amendment internal conflict between the rights of the broadcasters and the public. In the Associated Press case the Court said that freedom of the press from government interference was no sanction for repression of rights by private interests. The Court in Red Lion indicated that the rights of the broadcasters are secondary to those of the public, and it attempted to provide more public debate and exposure to ideas. This attempt has "been stymied" by the BEM/DNC case.

The legal commentators who disapprove of access were

more or less pleased with the Court's action. The decision clarified the First Amendment relationships in broadcasting, they said. The Amendment is a limit on government, not an imposition of affirmative action to ensure freedom of speech (Loper 1974).

The next big blow to the advocates of access was the Supreme Court case of Miami Herald v. Tornillo. The decision must have been particularly disappointing to Jerome Barron, because he argued the case before the court. In no uncertain terms the unanimous court struck down the Florida law of right to reply in the press, a right which was extended only to political candidates whose personal character or official record was assailed in the press.

As in the BEM/DNC case Justice Douglas was the only member of the court who flatly stated that the First Amendment prohibits any interference of the press by the government. This includes the Fairness Doctrine as well as access. Parallel to the broadcasting case Chief Justice Burger said that the Florida law was an invasion of the First Amendment rights of the editor/publisher, whose judgement and responsibility are supreme. Also, as in BEM/DNC, a determination was made as to whether the newspaper industry constituted state action. Despite the

assistance of the government to the newspaper industry--certain exemptions from antitrust, tax breaks, special mail rates and limited protection from libel--these are devised only to enhance the press' function of providing information to the public. To the cases Barron presented--where the courts had approved public access to private facilities which were open to the public--the Court replied that in these cases the property involved still was private property despite the fact that the "public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes" (Lloyd v. Tanner, 2229) Justice Powell clarified these cases further and interpreted them very narrowly where the public aspect was concerned. Burger said that deciding what was to be in print and on the air is the editor's job. That editors "can and do abuse their power is beyond doubt, but that is not reason to deny the discretion Congress provided." The newspapers were given a free hand. As Justice Blackman said, "We have opted for a free press, not free debate" (Broadcasting 1974f, 56). Replying to the claim that such an interpretation could have a chilling effect on public debate, Justice Renquist remarked, "The Miami Herald can chill anyone if it wants to" (Broadcasting 1974f, 56).

Although the subject of the difference in handling of the broadcast industry compared with newspapers was brought

up, the court clearly decided to maintain the double standard. For the newspaper industry there will be no Fairness Doctrine, equal time or right of reply to attacks. As the Chief Justice wrote in a previous case about the difference between the two media, "A newspaper can be operated at the whim of the owners; a broadcast station cannot" (Office of Communication of the Church of Christ v. FCC 359 F 2nd 944 (D.C. Cir. (1966))). However, Justice White seemed to have some misgivings about this vote to support the newspaper. After noting the result of the Tornillo case and the Supreme Court's decisions in the major libel cases, he remarked that the people are "left at the mercy of the press" (Tornillo, 323).

It is no surprise that, in 1974, when the FCC finally published the findings of its two-year review of the Fairness Doctrine and the subject of access, the conclusions were similar to its statements in the previously mentioned cases which had been appealed to the Supreme Court (39 Code of Federal Regulations, 25372-26382 (1974)). The Commission strongly reaffirmed the Doctrine and just as strongly criticized the concept of access. The report generously quoted the favorable court decisions.

There were some key provisions of the report which

merit mentioning. Since each station has the full responsibility of the Fairness Doctrine, it must "encourage" presentation of opposing viewpoints. Time is to be given free to a group if it cannot pay for it. Editorial advertising is subject to the Fairness Doctrine, but institutional advertising is not. The Commission criticized the D.C. Court of Appeals for spreading the Banzhaf cancer to the Friends of the Earth case. In the future the FCC would apply the Fairness Doctrine to commercials only for those which obviously and meaningfully discuss a public issue.

The Commission specifically rejected the Federal Trade Commission's recommendation to provide access for spot announcements to rebut commercials which explicitly or implicitly are controversial, which make claims which are in scientific dispute, or which are silent on the negative aspects of a product. The FCC said that the FTC should use its own powers to police advertising.

Getting to the heart of the access issue, the FCC acknowledged that the Supreme Court said in the BEM/DNC case that the Congress and the Commission "can experiment with new ideas," including access. However, the Commission said it could not conceive of any "scheme of government-dictated access which we consider both practicable or desirable."

The best system is the Fairness Doctrine, which leaves journalistic discretion in the hands of the broadcaster. However, stations may provide access as they see fit in order to meet their Fairness Doctrine responsibilities. The public does have a right of access--the right to hear ideas which are given access via spokespersons selected by the broadcasters, who are the "trustees of the public."

The whole situation seemed to have placed the pro-access Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., into an anti-access vice of the FCC and the Supreme Court.¹⁰ Now that the FCC knew it had the backing of the Supreme Court, it seemed likely that the Commission would take a stronger and more decisive role in its administration of the Fairness Doctrine and particularly access.

And this is what appeared to happen. In mid-1975 the FCC proposed that broadcasters be insulated from citizen groups and their agreements with these groups (Variety 1975, 43). The Commission said it would reject these agreements when they "curtail a licensee's fundamental responsibility and discretion" (Broadcasting 1975c, 24). More specifically, in a proposed rulemaking, the FCC said that citizen agreements cannot curtail broadcaster responsibility to the

larger community. It is not good for a station to set a fixed amount of time for, or a specific program directed to, a particular segment of the community. Nor is it advisable for a station to broadcast a particular number of citizen-initiated or issue-oriented messages at stated periods of time. The broadcaster does not need to feel he has to make these types of agreements. The activity of the citizen groups has resulted in too many petitions to deny, bringing a large backload of cases for the Commission. However, the Commission encourages "dialogues with citizen groups" (Broadcasting 1975b, 30).

Meanwhile the Congress was buzzing with proposals and statements which concerned the press and access to it. Various members of Congress were pressing for more access of their own to counteract the easy access of the President (Broadcasting 1974a, 23). Senator McClellan proposed a Fairness Doctrine for newspapers, because the concentration of ownership of the news media had resulted in an absence of dissemination of diverse views. Other congressmen were agitating for free access to the media for politicians during elections (Broadcasting 1974b, 28). The networks countered with a proposal for greater TV access to Congress for live coverage (Broadcasting 1974c, 48). A House group of sixteen congressmen claimed that, as part of the Fairness

Doctrine responsibilities, broadcasters should run spots to counter the oil company institutional commercials (Broadcasting 1974d, 60-63). A bill was introduced to give equal time to an opposing spokesperson every time the President went on the air and discussed a controversial subject (Broadcasting 1974e, 7).

Individual opinions varied greatly among congressmen, academics and influential members of the executive branch, ranging from eliminating all restrictions on broadcasters to making them equal with the newspaper industry (Oettinger 1974; Moss 1975); eliminating the Fairness Doctrine and instituting access (Johnson and Westen 1971; Broadcasting 1971, 11); keeping the Fairness Doctrine and also creating access (Barron 1973); and keeping the Doctrine and eliminating access--the FCC position.

Meanwhile the Fairness Doctrine itself seemed to be in trouble if it were tested again in the existing Supreme Court. As Schenkkan (1974) pointed out, the composition of the Court had changed from that which provided the unanimous Red Lion decision. Only four members of that court were left. One Justice definitely was against the Fairness Doctrine; another had almost arrived at the same conclusion; two others were more inclined toward access and viewed the Fairness Doctrine as a poor solution; two others were

question marks, but could be leaning away from the Doctrine; and three continued to roar the virtues of Red Lion.

All the above circumstances plus the facts of continued citizen group action and the statement of the Supreme Court in BEM/DNC that it would not look unfavorably if Congress or the FCC came up with a reasonable, limited access scheme, seemed to indicate that the subject was still alive, although it suffered serious setbacks in 1973 and 1974. However, only the matter of access to the broadcast industry seemed to be alive. Tornillo appeared to have ended the attempt to obtain access to the print media.

5.3 CABLE TELEVISION: ACCESS HISTORY FROM 1976 TO THE PRESENT

5.3.1 INTRODUCTION

By the end of 1975 cable television (CTV) was seen both by friends and foes of access to the press as the proper place for public access. With its large, multichannel capacity, CTV can have the ability to provide for all standard TV broadcasting channels, local programming and many other services of one-and two-way communications which could revolutionize much of the mass and private informational and

communication process (Bagdikian 1971).

A rather surprising phenomenon is the approbation given to CTV access by some of the foes of broadcast access. After a thorough and balanced review of press access, and following his criticisms of it, Lange (1973, 91) concludes that cable access is good. "For all those who want the ability to speak with a fair chance to be heard by anyone who may be interested, cable television can truly prove to be the 'television of abundance'" Even the Chief Justice Burger, who led the Court's fight against access, expressed his approval for the FCC regulations of CTV (BEM/DNC, 93 S.Ct., 2100). And yet, many of the same, basic questions and issues which aroused so much controversy and objection regarding the subject of access to the mass media also apply to CTV.

The end of 1975 found the status of public access clarified by the courts: for newspapers--none; for broadcasting--only for candidates for federal office and victims of attack; for cable--a green light. The courts showed four different standards which are used for the various media categories of CTV, broadcasting, newspapers, and general non-mass media communication. An argument used to defeat access in one medium was used to promote it in another medium. Precedents in one form of communication

were not transferred to another. The definition of state or public action, ownership or interest widely varied from medium to medium. One court of appeals and some state supreme courts frequently seemed to be more pro-access than the Supreme Court.

The U.S. executive branch had its divisions. The FCC was consistently against broadcasting access, but the FTC was for it. (On a closely related subject the Justice Department was very concerned about the concentration of ownership of the media, but the FCC showed much less interest (Schenkkan 1974, 750).¹¹)

Congress, although having occasional cries for access, was mainly either for congressional access to counteract the easy availability of the media to the president or for obtaining more access to the media for its members during elections.

Meanwhile, in the 1970s the pressure for access was growing at the local level where citizen groups were making more and more demands on broadcasters and exacting many concessions, including provisions for access. The FCC was trying to discourage these groups and was encouraging the broadcasters to resist them.

During this time of agitation and confusion most people seemed to approve of the idea of access on CTV. It was to be

the major arena for conflict regarding access during the next period of access history.

5.3.2 CABLE TV ACCESS: LEGAL HISTORY

The period 1976 to the present is a rather curious one, in that access went in different directions. With access to broadcasting no longer an issue, the Fairness Doctrine came under strong attack, so strong that it seemed to be almost a dead letter as the proponents of deregulation held sway. Indeed, the FCC itself is now recommending the abolition of the Doctrine (Access 1984). As the backers of access turned more to cable TV, they suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Supreme Court which ruled against the FCC's requirements for access (*Midwest Video v. FCC*, 440 US 689 (1979)). They also had to fight off continuous attempts in Congress to either outlaw access or to severely cripple it (Access 1982i). Meanwhile, radio became deregulated by the FCC, with backing by the courts (Access 1983a).

Despite these problems, access began proliferating and booming all over the country as more and more cable systems began to offer access channels to their communities and the people started to produce programs (Harrison 1981). The cable industry itself was showing two faces: one lobbied in

Congress against access; but the other offered magnificent access provisions and facilities when trying to get franchises awarded to them or when attempting to have their franchises renewed by communities (Cablevision 1982d). However, occasionally, after receiving the lucrative awards, they dragged their feet or refused to fulfill some of the agreements, particularly if the provisions were not spelled out in detail in writing, or they tried to diminish the extent of access after they got the franchise and operated it for a while (Access 1983b; Letter to author from James Bond; Access 1984; Feinstein 1984).

In addition, a new medium was on the horizon which had the potential for providing additional, diverse voices in broadcasting--low power TV. Direct broadcast satellites, although further down the road as a practical reality for mass use, nonetheless was another method of potential competition for cable and broadcasting and a further possibility for public access in the future.

But, regardless of the setbacks for access, one thing is clear: the access movement is starting to accelerate and it may be very difficult for the Ruling Cartel and local power structures to contain it.

In the latest court cases regarding access the Supreme Court ceased emphasizing the relevance of "public fora" cases which were discussed previously. As we have seen, in the public forum situation citizens have a right of access for public speech and discussion to state-controlled places such as a street or park, in public libraries and schools, in the streets of a company-owned town, and even on private property if the owner opens his space for public entrance and use. If CTV could be interpreted as constituting "state action," it would be subject to regulations which place some limits on the operators' First and Fifth Amendment rights. Because the Supreme Court ruled that neither the print nor broadcast media constitute state action, they cannot qualify for being a public forum.

The Court made this determination despite the fact that there are limits on the freedom of broadcasters in the provisions of the Fairness Doctrine, equal time for candidates, and in the right of response to personal attacks. However, a district court ruled in 1980 that a university's public TV station was required to show the documentary Death of a Princess, a controversial program which the University of Houston station would not clear for broadcast in a city with powerful oil interests and financial connections with the oil producing Arab countries

(Harrison 1981, 648). However, the whole question of state action regarding PBS stations has not had a constitutional challenge yet.

The relationship of CTV to the public forum interpretations arose in the most important court case of this period--Midwest Video Corporation v. FCC (440 US 689 (1979)), commonly called Midwest Video II to distinguish it from a previous case of a similar name in 1976. We will discuss it in detail because of its great importance to the subject of public access. But first, it would be useful to review the previous unsuccessful challenges to the FCC's regulatory authority over CTV in order to understand the Supreme Court's radical departure from its previous decisions that Midwest Video II represents.

The first case was US v. Southwestern Cable Co (352 US 157 (1968)). This suit arose in response to the FCC's initial steps in limited regulation of cable television, then referred to as CATV--Community Antenna Television. When the subject of cable TV was first raised, the FCC refused to step in, because cable was not considered as being the broadcasting area where the FCC had its mandate. The Commission preferred for Congress to make a statement or to pass a law showing its desires on the subject. When Congress did not, and with pressure mounting from the

broadcasters to clip the wings of CTV before it became a true competitor, the FCC entered the vacuum, setting minimum standards requiring the franchisees to carry the local broadcasting stations on their channels (Stern 1981, 189, 194).

In 1968 Southwestern Cable company challenged this limited action by the Commission, claiming that not only did the FCC not have jurisdiction over cable, but that the regulations requiring the operators to carry the local broadcast signals constituted making operators a limited common carrier, something which was not allowed by the Communications Act of 1934. The Supreme Court ruled for the Commission, saying that the FCC rules were "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of broadcasting.

Accordingly, in 1969 the Commission issued regulations (Schwartz 1982, 1014) for the cable industry, among which were requirements for the systems with more than 3,500 subscribers to have local origination facilities. In 1971 Midwest Video Company challenged these rules. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the operators, but the Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of the FCC, saying that the Commission could "regulate CATV with a view not merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over

broadcasting" (US v. Midwest Video Corporation, 406 US 649 (1972), commonly known as Midwest Video I).

Consequently, the FCC issued more regulations (Schwartz 1982, 1015), this time increasing the number of local origination channels to one each for public, education, government and leased use. This would be applicable for systems in the top one-hundred cable markets. (However, the Commission's support was weakening. The Midwest Video I decision was 5-4, with Chief Justice Burger supporting the FCC, but with great doubts.) In 1976 the FCC modified these requirements, making them applicable for systems with over 3,500 subscribers and demanding a 24-channel capacity by June 1986, with the old systems being grandfathered until the franchises elapsed (59 FCC 2nd 294 (1976)).

The access requirements were made more flexible, in that if the channels were not active, the operator could use them (Harrison 1981; Schwartz 1982). Additionally, the franchisee could combine the channels into general access instead of having them dedicated for the above specified four uses. It was further required that the operator must provide equipment for access users at reasonable cost and that there would be no charge for the first five minutes of time, with subsequent time being at a "reasonable cost." The channels must be made available on a first-come,

first-served, non-discriminatory basis and the operator was not to have editorial control over the channels, although he could prescribe rules to prevent obscenity, indecency and lotteries. (The Washington, D.C., Court of Appeals stayed the provisions on indecency and obscenity upon challenge by the American Civil Liberties Union (American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, No. 76-1695 (DCCA, 1977); Schwartz 1982, 1015).)

Midwest Video again challenged the FCC's authority and actions. Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals once more agreed with the operator, in a wide-ranging opinion which has been highly criticized in law journals and reviews (Midwest Video v. FCC 571 F. 2nd (Eighth Cir., 1978)). The court ignored the previous Supreme Court decisions by saying that cable was outside the FCC's jurisdiction because CTV was not broadcasting. It also stated that the Commission's rules had placed an illegal common carrier requirement by forcing operators to have access channels but with no content control and by being forced to carry programs on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis. This deprived the operators of their First Amendment rights and gave the government control of content and access. The franchisees' Fifth Amendment rights were also violated because the government was taking

away the operators' property (channels) for public use without just compensation. The appellate court reached the conclusion that cable TV and newspapers were the same; therefore, the Tornillo case was applicable, making access unconstitutional. Finally, the court claimed that there was no state action involved; hence, the government could not intrude.

The FCC appealed. But despite the two previous favorable rulings by the Supreme Court, the Commission's chances were not so rosy as it might have seemed. The Midwest Video I decision was by a 5-4 vote, with doubts harbored by some of the majority. Also, two subsequent cases had whittled away at the Commission's authority and its regulations over CTV (Stern 1981; Nemelman 1982). On top of this, the winds of deregulation were blowing in the executive and legislative branches (Simon 1982b).

The Commission claimed that its access requirements helped to create diversity of opinions and voices to be heard, and they had increased the outlets for public expression as was upheld in Midwest Video I. Furthermore, the access provisions had replaced the Court-approved local origination requirements which were more of an economic burden on the operators than the access regulations. Additionally, the FCC ruled in 1978 that the operators did

not have to provide live access programming if tape facilities existed.

In 1979 the Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit in the Midwest Video II decision in which it agreed that the FCC overstepped its congressional mandate. The 5-3 decision was written, ironically, by the same Justice Byron White who, in writing the Red Lion decision, championed the cause of the listener and viewer. The court claimed that broadcasting and CTV were the same, thus making its broadcast decisions applicable. White placed great emphasis on the Court's action with CBS in the BEM/DNC in which it upheld the network's right to reject the request for time to be made available for political discussion by the purchase of time, either in spot announcements or in full programs. In the BEM/DNC case the court stressed the need to preserve the journalistic editorial control of content by the network. This is exactly what the FCC deprived the cable operators from exercising, White claimed.

Another significant factor was the matter of common carrier status, the court saying that the access requirements made the operators common carriers in contravention of paragraph 3(h) of the Communications Act. Justice White rejected brusksly the statement by Chief Justice Burger in the CBS case that CTV, with its diversity,

would be the appropriate medium for public access and that it could be that a limited form of it could be worked out by the FCC or Congress.

White relied heavily on his perception of congressional intent during the formation of the Communications Act in 1934 which indicated that the public was not to be given direct access to the airwaves. Finally, the Court concluded that the FCC regulations were a prohibitive economic burden on the operator. The Court reached no constitutional considerations nor discussed the problems of monopoly.

The Midwest Video II decision has been greatly criticized by legal scholars writing in law reviews and journals (Harrison 1981; Schwartz 1982; Nemelman 1982; Stern 1981; Kreiss 1981; Christensen 1980; Miller and Beals 1981). They said that the court reversed itself from the two previous cable cases; it made strained or spurious interpretations of previous cases to justify itself; and it ignored provisions of previous decisions which would have been favorable to the FCC.

The critics had a field day concerning the following facets of the decision:

1. Common carrier. The Court had approved limited common carrier provisions in the two previous cases in which the operators were required to carry certain specific

broadcast signals and could not control content. The public access channels would merely be additional channels of the same type. The Court mentioned two previous cases involving the definition of common carrier status and the range of acceptability of allowing businesses to be used as such. But the Court ignored or misread the provisions of the cases which clearly would permit the cable industry to fall within the scope of limited common carrier. There are limited common carrier requirements of broadcasting which the Court has approved: the equal time for candidates and the provisions for answering personal attacks. The broadcaster has no content control here. But even more basic is the matter of the wording of the 1934 Act itself. As the writers and even Justice Stevens in his dissent point out, section 3(h) is only definitional in nature; hence, it is only administrative in function, not a prohibition.

2. Economic burden. The Court had previously approved the FCC's local origination provisions which were considerably more expensive to the operators than the access requirements. The operators, themselves, acknowledged this. Furthermore, the Commission had gone to great lengths to lessen the financial impact

on the operators and to provide them with great flexibility in the management of the channels, even permitting them to carry commercial material on access channels if the latter were not fully used.

3. Cable is like broadcasting. CTV has great capacity compared with only a single channel for broadcasting; therefore, there is room for access channels without harming the operator. Because CTV derives its revenue mainly from subscription fees, not advertising, the additional time for access does not result in either loss of revenue or viewership. The Court's objection in BEM/DNC that time cannot be made available for all viewpoints is not applicable to cable because of the latter's multichannel capacity. Finally, the Court ignored its own previous decisions where it stated that CTV was, indeed, different from broadcasting. Justice Stevens also mentioned this. The critics' conclusions were that the cable operators are not broadcasters, but merely mainly retransmitters of broadcast material, thereby exempting them from the common carrier prohibitions of the 1934 ACT which only mentions broadcasters.
4. FCC overstepped its authority. The Court itself had approved local origination requirements which were

more burdensome to the operator than the access provisions. The Court also had approved mandatory channel use for local broadcast signals. The access channels would be more of the same. Finally, the Court ignored the previous HBO decision which stated that the FCC should be given latitude in the regulation of new technology (Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F. 2nd 9 (1977)).

5. State action. In the BEM/DNC case Burger stated that broadcasting was not state action despite all the activities of the FCC which indicate otherwise. CTV also was found not to be state action despite the fact that the state awards the franchise to the operator, and the latter uses public streets and rights of way to install his cable system. Because the state may either set up a monopoly situation or have competitive systems, it determines who will be "heard," i.e., the operator. It also determines the length of the franchise. The Court deemed irrelevant the cases where it had ruled that when the owners of a business opens his property for use by the general public, his rights become circumscribed by those who use it. It could be argued not only that the broadcaster makes his air time available for commercial speech, but that

he opens his property to the public by transmitting his messages on the open, publicly-owned airwaves. The same could be said for the cable operators. Indeed, he places his cable into the homes of the consumers (and only after their approval), constituting an intrusion rather than just an opening up of facilities to the public.

5.3.3 CABLE TV ACCESS: POLITICAL HISTORY IN CONGRESS AND THE STATES

The court system was not the only place in which access was being attacked. In Congress there have been almost continuous assaults by a few people, abetted by the lobby for the cable industry--the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) (Brown, L., 1982; Access 1981z). Some of them came during the unsuccessful attempt to re-write the Communications Act of 1934. Others were in the form of bills introduced by members of Congress or as riders to other bills.

The pressure has been heavy, and different angles have been tried. One was to prevent the local communities from requiring access channels of their franchisees; another was

to cripple access by requiring that only a small percentage of channels be set aside for the public; and a third was to permit governmental and educational access, but to provide for public access only as the people wish to purchase time on a local origination channel (Access 1981e).

The lobbying has been so intense and the deception so great that Ralph Nader labelled the situation as an attempt at a "coup," with "the most outrageous procedural irregularities Congress has ever seen," because some of these bills have been passed in committee without the usual, required hearings (Access 1981i; Access 1982d).

Meanwhile, the FCC Chairman, a Reagan appointee, has been energetically lobbying for complete deregulation of both broadcasting as well as cable television. This includes eliminating public access, the Fairness Doctrine, equal time for candidates, and the right of reply to a personal attack (Simon 1982b).

So far, citizen groups and lobbies for local governments have been monitoring these efforts and have been successful in warding off the attacks on access (Access 1981t). However, Congress has yet to act on the Goldwater bill which, as originally written, would have severely limited the availability of public access channels, effectively crippling a full, free development of access.

(An amendment to the bill by a pro-access senator inserted adequate access provisions.) The bill also would provide for automatic franchise renewal if the operator had not defaulted on the franchise agreement (Access 1982d; Broadcasting 1982h).

Meanwhile, a vice president and lawyer for the NCTA is confident that all public access will soon be held illegal by the courts even if no action is taken by Congress (Access 1981j; Stoney 1981). He points to the Midwest Video II case as well as the antitrust case brought against the city of Boulder, Colorado (Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982)). This involved a franchisee which had not wired the whole city. The city government, wanting to study its options before permitting the operator to wire the rest of town, ordered the company to desist. The Supreme Court ruled that the city was not exempt from antitrust laws and therefore could not set up a monopoly unless specifically authorized by the state. (Again, this Court action was severely criticized, particularly because the city had, in fact, been so authorized by the state government (Draker and Sharer 1982).)

The ramifications of this case could be great for the future of local control of cable franchise selection and for the levying of requirements on the operators (Sherfman and

Rose 1982). With the addition of another suit (Access 1982a) in which the Court let stand an appellate court decision backing the FCC in its dropping of previous rules requiring the operators to carry certain distant signals and in eliminating syndicated exclusivity rules, the Supreme Court has almost deregulated CTV by its actions alone. (The FCC requirements to carry local stations and the franchise fee restrictions remain in effect (View 1982c).) This assumes of course that subsequent cases are decided in a way which is consistent with the past decisions--a rather problematical assumption. Basically, there is a vacuum and great uncertainty regarding the legal status and regulation of cable TV (Mueller, M., 1982 Access 1981e).

The state governments have not been quick to step into this void. As of 1981 only thirteen states had cable-regulating agencies, and of these only three (Connecticut, Minnesota and Rhode Island) have access requirements (Schwartz 1982; Harrison 1981). California has a voluntary access provision, but it contains incentives for the operators to provide such channels. Rhode Island is the only state to levy equipment requirements.

These states have tried in various ways to develop guidelines for setting up operating and content rules. Some of these either have been subsequently changed or have not

been implemented, particularly those regulations regarding obscenity or indecency. Each state has also grappled with the problem of trying to insulate the operators from program content liability such as defamation and obscenity, but without making them common carriers.

Law journal authors and pro-access writers point out the advisability to have some federal requirements, however minimal, to prevent certain abuses, particularly in the awarding of franchises (Buckley, T., 1973; Bell 1983, Wittek 1973; Access 1975a; Schwartz 1982; Harrison 1981; Stier 1982; New York Times 1971). Some abuses which have occurred are as follows:

1. City council members can be bought off by the franchisee.
2. The operator can place key members of the local city government or power structure on his board of directors and can permit them to have small stock positions in the companies.
3. The city, not being interested in access, does not require it.
4. The city, not being knowledgeable, can be talked into a minimal or no access effort on the part of the franchisee.
5. The city might make a contract, not an ordinance,

thereby making it impossible to change requirements if later it becomes desirable to do so.

6. The city might not get promises in writing from the franchisee.
7. The local unregulated rates for local origination access could be placed too high by the operator so that there would be no demand for such a channel.
8. Charges for access time and access equipment can be required which stifle development of access or result in only certain, more affluent members of the citizenry being able to use the system.

There also can be adverse local requirements which can be unfair and harmful to the operator. For instance, the city might levy a franchise fee which is inappropriately high in order to subsidize other activities of city government. Although the FCC regulations addressing this are still valid, they are rarely enforced.

Even if cities are conscientious in requiring a good access package, their ability to do so in the future might become very difficult. One writer expressed the concern that, with concentration of ownership increasing so rapidly, it might soon be that the cities' powers will be dwarfed by those of a handful or less of oligopolistic giants which own not only most of the programming services, but also most of

the franchises and the most viewers (Schwartz 1982, 1029). The cities could be left in a take-it-or-leave-it situation if the giants cooperated with each other in a cartel style of operation. Indeed, there are indications that this is in fact starting to happen (Dobbs 1983).

It also is possible that a coalition of cable operators, their lobbying organization and their affiliated business organizations, particularly bankers, can overwhelm the power of local access activists and their supporters in the state legislatures. This already has happened in California (Schwartz 1982; Harrison 1981)).

5.3.4 THE POTENTIAL OF ACCESS TO CABLE TV

5.3.4.1 General Trend in the 1980s

The courts and Congress are facing a possible access fait accompli by the people, leaving themselves in a position of eliciting a great public outcry if any governmental institution were to effectively cripple public access to cable. The reason is that cable is proliferating and access is blooming (Sima 1981; Jacobs 1981; Jacobs 1982; Taylor 1982). The more than 4,000 cable systems in 1982 reached 26 million homes, with 250,000 new subscribers being

added each month (Greenky 1982). The Nielsen company estimated in 1982 that 30% of TV households were on the cable; but at the end of 1983 it was up to 40% (Multichannel News 1983). (In 1977, 30% audience penetration was not predicted until 1985.) Furthermore, network prime time viewing is down 12% to 15%, and the premium channel Home Box Office (HBO) frequently carries the top-rated show (Berkman 1982). (Ironically, the share of audience of HBO has been dropping as other, non-network cable channels are being watched by more and more people (Multichannel News 1984a).) The latest figures indicate a continuous erosion of network hegemony, with the nets' viewing down to 81% from 88% during the previous year (TV Guide 1982). The audience share also is steadily dropping, down to 59.1% in March 1984 from 60.7% a year earlier (Multichannel News 1984b). One analyst estimates that this figure will drop to 75% in the early 1990s, but another person predicts that it will be only 59% by 1990 (Berkman 1982).

No one knows exactly how many access channels are available and, of those, how many are being used and, if so, to what extent. (Even the cable operators do not know the extent of access on their franchises (Personal conversation with Austin, Texas, Cablevision personnel).) There is great variation of the estimates. The latest FCC information is

from 1977 which stated that of the 8,668 cities with franchises, 885 had access channels of some kind (Harrison 1981). There was no information as to the use of these channels. That estimate is much higher than those from other sources. TV Digest reported in 1978 that of 3,997 systems 205 had access. A survey for the years 1979 and 1980 showed that, of the 4,075 systems which responded, 1,167 had access channels. The TV Factbook data from 1979 through 1983 indicated the access growth as follows:

1. October 1979: 4,180 systems providing 283 public access channels.
2. June 1981: 485 channels.
3. 1982: 1,560 cable systems carrying 752 public access channels (with 730 and 535 channels set aside for educational and governmental access, respectively).

The National Federation of Local Cable Programmers (NFLCP) Video Register for 1983 lists "more than 700" facilities where operators provide access channels.

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The proliferation of access continues. To win the franchise bidding wars or where a renegotiation takes place upon the expiration of a franchise, one of the prime enticements which the operators present to the communities (and which the communities demand) is an attractive public

access package (Cablevision 1982; Feinstein 1984, Access 1982f).

Community groups supporting access are forming all over the country (Sima 1981). Other groups are also actively promoting their particular special interests on the access channels (Access 1981k; Access 1981q; Zimmerman 1984). Networks have been started and there have been attempts to establish more of them, ranging from individuals promoting their own programs to organizations being started to set up networks. Some use simple bicycling methods, while others are trying to employ satellites (Greenky 1982). It is an impressive fact that right now it is possible for any citizen to reach a mass, nationwide audience via public access television. It is no wonder that the courts, Congress and local governments are trying to co-opt, cripple or eliminate access.

5.3.4.2 A PUBLIC ACCESS SUCCESS: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

A good example of the kind of programming the local and national power structures would not want to see proliferated is the weekly public affairs program in Austin, Texas, called Alternative Views which has successfully provided an alternative to the regular media for over five years. There

have been over 200 one-hour programs cablecast on the access channel on subjects and sources which are ignored or distorted on the Establishment media. Of the Sonoma State University's "Project Censored" lists of the most censored and inadequately covered stories, which it has compiled each year since 1976, Alternative Views has reported on all of them.

The programs are in a flexible format to provide the most effective presentation of the subject or subjects. Most shows contain fifteen to twenty minutes of news gathered from a broad range of sources including left wing and right wing publications, the business press, special interest group newsletters and specialized journals. This material is contrasted with the treatment of subjects in the traditional media. The central focus of the program may be on a single subject or on a multiplicity of them.

The types of subjects presented vary. Some programs contain interviews or presentations by well-known people such as anti-nuclear activist Helen Caldicott; former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark; peace activist Daniel Ellsberg; Hollywood film director Edward Dmytryk; civil rights lawyer William Kunstler; American Indian activist Russell Means; former CIA official John Stockwell; Nobel Prize winning Biologist George Wald; black power advocate

Stokely Carmichael; and Dr. Benjamin Spock.

Other guests are not famous but have vital information to relate, such as former political prisoners from Chile, Iran and Argentina who were arrested and tortured; a man who was a mile from the hypocenter of the Nagasaki explosion; a man who, while an exchange student in Iran, was hired by NBC to be liaison between the network and the students holding the hostages in the American embassy; people who talked with survivors of massacres in Guatemala; a reporter who spent three weeks with the guerrillas in El Salvador; a Chicano who relates his brutal experiences in a Texas prison; the former Minister of Mining in the Allende government in Chile; and the man who made the definitive, award-winning film on the CIA.

Many documentaries are presented, some of which have made their American TV debut on Alternative Views because the Establishment media either will not air them or will not present them in uncensored form. Occasionally documentaries are about local issues. Some material is breathtakingly--even brutally--real. Some of the footage is almost too disturbing, but none is censored. An example is the videotape of the horrible consequences to the civilian population of the war in Lebanon, particularly the scenes of the massacres by the Phalangists in the two Palestinian

camps.

Another unique aspect of Alternative Views is that it provides a public forum for individuals and groups which otherwise do not have direct access to a media audience. Over 100 local organizations or local representatives of national groups have been provided an opportunity to speak out. Many third party candidates have been provided a platform to present their views.

The program (repeated weekly) reaches an estimated weekly audience of from 10,000 to 20,000, based on a combination of factors: a study commissioned by the cable company in 1979 and a survey in 1983 indicating that 7% of the audience is watching access; the system has 163,000 home units with cable; the greatly increased programming on the access channel the past 18 months has attracted more viewers; and the continuous and increasing response to Alternative Views itself.

The response to the program has been almost uniformly positive. From the feedback the program's participants receive from viewers, such as from phone calls, letters, people stopping them on the streets, etc., the program is watched by people of all ages, all races and all income and educational levels. Interestingly, viewers who disagree with the material presented nonetheless watch the program

because they get information and perspectives they cannot receive elsewhere. An exception is William F. Buckley (1983a and 1983b), who saw an Alternative Views show in Austin and wrote a column on it, stating that the program was an example of the "moral rot" in the U.S..

When Alternative Views was started, the ACTV staff had fears of censorship from the cable company because it previously had prevented the showing of anti-nuclear material and had stated in writing that it would allow only "suitable" programs about local subjects which were not "disturbing" to the viewers. Yet, although each tape had to be reviewed by the company prior to being cablecast, there were no problems. Later, after the access programming quantity had become so large as to require an inordinate amount of time for company personnel to look at each program, the company permitted ACTV to perform the preview function.

However, this changed when some high company officials from corporate headquarters saw a program to which they objected. Ironically, it was an Alternative Views show about public access and how the citizens could become involved in making programming and in the franchising process. The tape was kept by the company and the preview of tapes by company personnel was resumed. The company

became very hard-nosed about programs, not permitting any show to be repeated if there was as much as one complaint about it when it was first cablecast. One Alternative Views program about the CIA was the victim of this criterion.

Next, no material which fell under the Fair Use Doctrine of the copyright law could be used. Thus, an Alternative Views program could not be cablecast which showed clips of what the TV networks had said about the situation about the Russian troops in Cuba in comparison with what was being said by alternative sources, particularly our guest John Stockwell, the former high CIA official. It was a study of how the networks, the government and the CIA handle an event (or in this case a non-event), pointing out the complexities of the situation and the inaccuracies in the handling of it by the networks. Another program was censored by their company, using the same criterion. This show was an interview with Nobel Prize winning scientist George Wald in which some commercials by chemical companies were played and Wald commented on the truthfulness of the commercials and on the consequences of chemicals in the environment.

The excuse which company personnel gave for such heavy-handed treatment was that, with the franchise coming up for renegotiation, it did not want trouble coming from

viewers who were upset by such "unimportant things as access programming." But the company changed its approach as negotiations neared. Not wanting to appear to be a censor in the eyes of the city government, which would make the decision on the franchise, the company again relinquished control over previewing of programs. There have been no censorship problems since that time.

Alternative Views has gained considerable attention, considering that it is "only" a public access program. Articles about it have appeared in all local newspapers (Collum 1978, Hylton 1983) except for the main one--the monopoly paper Austin-American Statesman--which is hostile to public access (Marriotti 1982). The Progressive magazine (Davis, R., 1982) had a story about Alternative Views, Access newspaper had three small articles on it, and USA Today (Brown, Ben, 1983) included the program in a story about access in the U.S.. Recently, representatives from TV Guide and Community Television Review expressed interest in presenting information about Alternative Views in their publications.

The programs have been seen over other access systems, in New York, Kansas, Montana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan. They have been shown to three conventions of the National Federation of Local Cable

Programmers (NFLCP), a national labor convention and one is presently being bicycled around the country on the cable company's local origination channels. Certain programs have been sold to three colleges. People from Germany, Sweden and Holland have expressed interest in showing Alternative Views in their countries and tapes have in fact been sent to some people in Germany. An internationally known Syrian filmmaker expressed a desire to distribute the programs in the Arab world. Most promising is that the new Channel Four in England has indicated it wants to buy some shows and is planning to send a crew to Austin to do a documentary about access and Alternative Views. Alternative Views recently started being shown in San Antonio, Dallas, Pittsburgh and Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. Additionally, there are plans to begin sending tapes to Atlanta, Georgia, St. Louis, Kansas City, Fayetteville, Arkansas, and Fort Worth, Texas. These are the first steps in the effort to establish a nationwide network.

Funding is a problem in keeping the program alive. The purchase of tapes is the main expenditure. Some assistance was received for many months from the University of Texas in the form of free tapes in exchange for the completed programs being placed in a university library for use by faculty and students. However, with a change of university

policy, tapes became unavailable and it was necessary to cannibalize tapes and record over programs in order to continue operation.

The program has received very modest contributions from individuals and small foundations and small amounts of money from local fund raisers. A network could easily be set up to cablecast Alternative Views around the country to an audience of millions if sufficient funds were available; but there have been only negative responses from the larger foundations to which applications have been made.

The main expense in making the program is time. The producer, who also is editor and on-camera newsperson and interviewer, spends between 40 and 60 hours a week on the each program, depending on the complexity of it. The show is usually taped in a small studio at the University of Texas campus, using only a single camera. Occasionally programs are taped with three cameras and a switcher at the cable company studios which are shared with Austin Community Television (ACTV). When necessary, equipment is checked out (for free) from ACTV to use in shooting events. The program is edited on ACTV equipment--again, without charge.

The significant lessons to be learned from the experience of Alternative Views are as follows:

1. It is easy to make a news program using alternative

sources.

2. People hunger for information of this type and appreciate people who present it to them.

3. The audience can be attracted without slick productions which are made with the highest quality video equipment.

4. The attention span of the audience, even younger people, is not short. The viewers will remain attentive to a complex subject for an hour if the material is presented in an interesting way by articulate people, even if, visually, it is only "talking heads."

5. The feedback from people regarding Alternative Views indicates that the information presented has had two very significant effects: it changes people's minds about world events and it diminishes a sense of isolation which people seem to have when they hold progressive, non-Establishment views but never, or rarely, see them on TV or read them in the print media.

6. Perhaps most importantly, public access TV is a mass medium which is available NOW for progressive people to reach millions of U.S. citizens with their messages. Through networking, particularly by sending tapes to many cities, mass dissemination of information and opinions can be effected at minimal cost. For instance, famous Atheist

Madalyn Murray O'Hair sends her program to approximately 30 cities nationwide.

The public access operation and community participation in Austin, Texas, seem to be, if not the best in the country, at least is among the leaders. But Austin is a progressive city with a very politically active citizenry. Whether the success of a program like Alternative Views could be achieved in other cities, one can only speculate. Such programming certainly could elicit negative reactions in other parts of Texas which are very conservative and where fundamentalist religion permeates the culture, and hostility would be aroused in a city such as Miami, Florida, where there is a concentration of right wing emigres from overthrown, repressive regimes such as Batista's Cuba and Somoza's Nicaragua.

But, with the accent on reality, the program is automatically provocative, disturbing, and sometimes even upsetting. Yet, as Texas Congressman from San Antonio Henry Gonzalez said, after being interviewed, "Harry Truman used to say that people accused him of 'givin' em' hell' when he was only telling the truth. That is what you are doing on Alternative Views."

Perhaps these are the basic reasons for the program's success. The fact that there have been so many requests to

show Alternative Views in other parts of the country indicates that there is considerable, widespread interest in this type of programming.

5.4 PUBLIC ACCESS: A POWER AND RULING CLASS ANALYSIS

The previous review of the court cases regarding access shows the lengths to which the Supreme Court and some of the lower courts will go in applying the law selectively and in distorting it when they wish to justify an opinion or to accomplish a particular goal. Some writers in law publications impugn the intelligence of the justices and judges, while others accuse the courts of "insufficient analysis" or "misanalysis."

But the matter becomes clear if viewed from the perspective of power relationships and the maintenance of ruling class hegemony. Then we can see a consistency throughout the legislative and judicial history of the mass media, particularly since the commencement of radio broadcasting.

In the very early days of radio American Telephone and Telegraph had the best, most powerful stations (Townsend

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1981). Although company personnel controlled content and exercised censorship, they first experimented with access to their airwaves (for a fee) on a first-come, first-served basis--like using a phone booth, AT&T said. Time was made available free for charitable, political and religious groups. When the plan did not elicit much response, the company turned to advertising and networking to make it economically viable (Barnouw 1975, 43, 44). Later, when AT&T withdrew from broadcasting and sold its facilities in 1926, the common carrier nature of broadcasting came to an end and direct access to the airwaves by other than the owners and their representatives ceased. This was affirmed in 1925 by the National Radio Conference when the public interest was equated to the "right to receive," with the right to transmit being placed only with those who owned and operated a transmitter.

But the champions of access (at least for their own groups) fought this interpretation. For a while, there were promising expectations. The original draft of the 1927 Radio Act had a common carrier section in it with the provision that any radio station could be "used for hire or for political candidates or for discussing public questions" (Nemelman 1982, 169).

There was a great outcry from the broadcasters and

Congressmen. They said that "radical" thinkers and "Bolshevists" would be given access to the airways to "fill the air with their efforts to poison the minds of those without formed opinions" (Nemelman 1982, 170). Broadcasters feared that too much profitable air time would be preempted by public discussions of significant issues. As a result, the equal time provisions with no censorship for candidates for federal office became law, and the common carrier requirements were dropped.

But the struggle continued. Many bills to establish public access were introduced in Congress in the 1920s and 1930s. One passed the House in 1933, but President Hoover refused to sign it. Even the American Bar Association criticized the 1927 Radio Act because it did not contain a requirement for the stations to be operated as "public utilities."

When the 1934 Communications Act was being debated, the struggle heated up. Non-profit, labor and educational groups lobbied hard, requesting 25% of available radio channels, because they had been frozen out from the airways. The proposals were all denied, and the equal time feature of the 1927 Act was carried over into the new act. The groups continued to push for access up to World War II, never with any success.

But the law was not the only way of trying to prevent dissident views from reaching a mass audience via radio. When the populist priest Father Coughlin developed an ad hoc network of his own to criticize the big banks, big business and big government (later maligning the Jews and praising Fascists), the National Association of Broadcasters--with urging from the federal government--adopted a rule against the sale of time for discussion of controversial issues, including labor news. The Chairman of the FCC publicly endorsed this action. After originally having a nationwide audience of millions, the Coughlin network collapsed.

In an early radio case the Washington, D.C., Circuit Court approved the lifting of a license in 1932, warning of the danger of people using the ether to "inspire political distrust and civic discord" (Emory 1971, 49). Although the language of the courts has become more subtle over the years, there still exists the same paternalistic, authoritarian attitude and the continuously careful eye to maintain the existing power system intact. In the Red Lion case, which is pointed to as the high-water mark for protecting "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail" (Associated Press v. US, 326 US 1 (1945)), the key sentence in Justice White's decision is "It is the right of the public to receive suitable

(emphasis mine) access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here" (Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 US 367 (1969), 390). Once again we see only the right to receive, not to speak. Furthermore, that information must be "suitable." Suitable as determined by whom? By the CTV operator, newspaper publisher and the broadcaster through their editorial judgements.

This fear of the people expressing and hearing ideas which the ruling class deems destructive to its position of hegemony finds further expression in the other cases discussed in this chapter. Chief Justice Burger stated in BEM/DNC (1973, 124, 125) that Congress wanted to give the broadcaster "broad journalistic discretion." He said that if access were allowed, the idea of public interest would be subject to "private whim" and that broadcasters would have to accept editorials and political advertising regarding "trivial" or "insignificant" matters from someone whose only qualification is either "abundant funds" or a "point of view." Nemelman (1982) observed that this is the same opinion as was expressed in the Congress in 1927 regarding the desire to exclude deviant views from the airways, but saying it in a more subtle, acceptable, modern manner.

In the Midwest Video II case the appellate court stated

the position most clearly when it said that whatever would be communicated over an access channel would be of "no informational value" and only furthered the interest of the particular access user. There was no public benefit in providing time to anyone who "wanted to be seen on TV" (Harrison 1981, 600).

In writing the Supreme Court's opinion in the case, Justice White brusquely brushed aside Chief Justice Burger's statement in the earlier BEM/DNC case that some form of limited access might be devised, particularly in cable TV (Nemelman 1982, 185). White lauded Red Lion (which he wrote) because it gave the licensee the power to "exercise his best judgement" to determine the subjects, shades of opinion to be presented and the spokesmen" (Midwest Video v. FCC, 440 US 689 (1979), 705). And he was pleased to say that the cable operators "now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming will include" (Midwest Video II, 707).

In the Red Lion, BEM/DNC, Tornillo and Midwest Video II cases we see the same attitudes expressed. Content control of the mass media must remain in the hands of the trusted ruling class institutions. The cable case said that the operators may have local origination channels as mandated by the FCC (and approved by Midwest Video I), the local

broadcasters will have mandatory carriage of their signals on cable TV (as approved by Southwestern Cable), but the public cannot have its own channel to communicate directly to the populace.

Chief Justice Burger stated the crux of the issue succinctly in BEM/DNC (130) when he said that "the question here is . . . who shall determine what issues are to be discussed, by whom and when." Thus, these cases (and the congressional activity which preceded them) support the maintenance of a system whereby the affluent, the capitalists and the powerful have access to the media, but the non-powerful, the non-traditional, and the non-affluent do not.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The threat which public access potentially presents is great when seen through the eyes of members of the Ruling Cartel, particularly from the point of view of the Trilateralists. Their opinion is that the three main sources of societal destabilization and undermining of Cartel control are the uncooperative, disruptive press, the "value

oriented" professors, and a populace which is actively involved in politics and is demanding a fair share of the fruits of the system (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975). Public access on cable television at the level of thousands of cities has the potential to bring all three of these destabilizing sources to focus in one medium, causing people to become more politically active, permitting them to communicate freely and directly with fellow citizens, and providing a forum for, not must "value oriented" professors, but for all people and all values. With the possibilities existing for nationwide networking of cable programs--even international networking--the danger to the ruling class control could conceivably be great.

Such a threat, when recognized by the Cartel, cannot go unchallenged. If the rulers do not continue to attack access overtly, or if the overt attacks fail, they probably will do so covertly with agencies such as the FBI, CIA, IRS, INS and BATF as well as various police agencies at all levels of government.

It probably will be an attack from various levels of authority and using many political and economic weapons. Considering the repressive governmental response to the alternative press and on dissidence in general in the 1960s and early 1970s (Columbia Journalism Review 1983b; Baybak

1979a; Mackenzie 1981; Wolfe 1973), it may now respond in kind or with even greater energy, because access producers will be reaching, not just considerably larger audiences, but mass audiences composed of people of all economic and social strata. And what is ironic is that it will be occurring over channels which are capitalist owned and government sanctioned.

But this is only a potential at this time. Access must be allowed to develop and people must use it on a massive scale and in a progressive way before it can start to become a significant alternative and serious challenge to the Establishment media.

Chapter 6

INTERPRETATIONS

We have presented considerable empirical evidence and extensive evaluation on the subject of the U.S. power structure and the mass media. It perhaps now would be advisable to re-evaluate the subject from the empirical and theoretical standpoints in light of material which has been presented.

6.1 EMPIRICAL

A significant question remains: if the Ruling Cartel is in a position to dominate or control the basics of economic and political life, why does there seem to be so much ineffectiveness, strife, failure, indecision, unfulfillment of goals, and even occasional impotence in the management of the system? The answer is complex and lengthy. There are

many reasons. First, there is the nature of capitalism itself. There are the built-in contradictions and weaknesses which provide for inherent instability. Both the Marxists and the defenders of the system recognize this, even though both sides may call certain phenomena by different names. Basic to the nature of capitalism is competition. This causes instability and unpredictability. Capitalists have tried for centuries to eliminate competition whenever possible. One of the reasons for the merger movements was not just to eliminate competition and to make super profits, but to center economic power in fewer hands (theirs), thereby making the system more manageable.

But in doing so they accomplish several undesirable things. As cartelization of national and international capitalism grows, as fewer and fewer corporations and banks control more of the economic activity of the world, and as government more frequently intervenes directly and indirectly to serve the Cartel interests, a fragmented, competitive, flexible international economy becomes one interrelated system. When this occurs, the instabilities and contradictions are magnified, and severe economic and business shocks can bring down the whole system, because the system's ability to adjust, bend, compensate and recover is gone.

It also produces the situation which has baffled mainstream economists for years: stagflation. Recession and inflation can occur simultaneously when the economy is cartelized rather than competitive. Even though a recession occurs, prices can be maintained or increased, because the market power of the corporations allows them to administer prices almost as they wish rather than to adjust them downward to either meet decreased demand or to try to stimulate demand. They simply lay off workers and perhaps also take their money and invest it overseas where the profits are greater.

This creates popular discontent as the middle class is slowly impoverished and the poor become more desperate. Yet, as the centralization of power becomes more apparent and as the dominators of the economic system move more openly into direct control of the state apparatus and use it to their benefit, it becomes possible for the people to get a clearer picture of how the system operates and for whose benefit. The contradiction is that, although the public can seldom touch the corporate world, it can sometimes influence the government. Thus, with the government more deeply involved in the total system, it gives the people more direct leverage on the system, which can result in more instability and civil strife. This in turn requires heavier

indoctrination of the public and control over the press.

As these fail to do the job and as people continue to struggle to improve their situation, heightened repression is resorted to in the form of pitting class against class, group against group, and race against race; by raw police repression such as the FBI's COINTELPRO program; continued repression of minorities; coordinating and manipulating activities of right wing terrorist groups such as the Klan, Nazis and Cuban exile groups such as Omega 7; continuing to permit foreign intelligence organizations to operate in the U.S., particularly in their terrorist activities against progressive members of their emigre communities; and by lowering of the economic standard of living so that people will have little time left over for anything but making a living and living in fear of losing their jobs (Singletary 1984; Taylor, J.F., 1981; Wolfe 1973). Students also become preoccupied with obtaining an education, mainly to enable them to get a good job. If the Cartel can also keep the country out of the war, the students should remain quiescent. (The resistance to draft registration shows the folly and arrogance of the decision makers.)

A second basic instability of the system is that, because it is based on the extraction of wealth from its workers, it must continuously expand. This necessity to

expand is a point on which Marxists, mainstream economists and businessmen agree. (Indeed, any economic system today must extract a surplus of wealth from its workers to pay for the costs of government, national defense, loan repayment, and imports, if there is a balance of payments deficit.) Otherwise, people would not have the purchasing power to buy the goods being produced, corporations could not meet their debt payments, and there would be more recessions.

A third problem results from the treatment of the Third World by the Trilateralists and their corporate institutions. For most large corporations, their large profits depend on their business activities overseas. Continued exploitation of these Third World peoples and resources is of prime concern to the Cartel leaders. Their attempts to stabilize the situation in these countries by a combination of co-opting the local elites into the system, the production of a docile, cooperative middle class, and the maintenance of a hard hand to deal with the masses, cause severe economic deprivation, mass unrest and repression. The Trilateral support of unpopular, bloody dictatorships only increases the danger to long-range hegemony of the global corporate system. The uncompromising, disruptive stance against countries whose people choose to organize themselves in ways which either

are inimical to the ideology of the Trilateralists (such as in Cuba), or who try to stay within the system but control it and modify it enough to create greater wealth and well-being for their people (such as Manley's Jamaica, Allende's Chile, Bishop's Grenada and the Sandinistas Nicaragua), only leads to greater uncovering of the multinational capitalist system and how it works. This also makes it necessary for the American government and Establishment press to go further and further in obfuscating the reality of what is happening in the world and in justifying what the U.S. is doing overseas and at home. Additionally, it makes it necessary for the U.S. government to resort more frequently to covert activity by increasing CIA operations and by using surrogates in various regions of the world, proxies such as the Shah's Iran, Morocco, South Africa, Israel, Argentina and Honduras.

Fourth, the Trilateralists are very aware of the competitive challenge of the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. This threat has been blunted to a significant degree in many of the Eastern European countries, particularly those which have turned to the West to get the funds, the technology, and the investment for developing their countries and for loosening their dependence on the USSR. However, this has caused further

instability in these countries, as attested by the unrest in Poland and by the economic problems of inflation and debt to Western banks which countries such as Romania and Hungary have faced.

A fifth source of instability is competition, stress and disagreement within international capitalism itself: Japanese import tariffs and sales in U.S. markets; Rockefeller banks destabilizing the dollar (Multinational Monitor 1982); competition for arms sales, nuclear plants and technology; the new economic muscle of Europe; former President Nixon's "national" approach to economics; David Rockefeller's control over and handling (some say mishandling) of the huge amount of petrodollars (Karpel 1978a and 1978b); the maintenance of high interest rates in the U.S. which creates havoc in European financial circles and exacerbates the problems of Third World debtor countries; the instigation of the oil crisis by David Rockefeller via Henry Kissinger and the Shah of Iran, causing severe economic dislocation and hardship; the use of the U.S.-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) to destabilize and discipline European and Third World countries; differing outlooks among Trilateral countries as to relationships with the Soviet Union; and the huge loans which the transnational banks have made to Third World

countries, non-repayment of which threatens to bring down the whole international banking system.

These are just a few of the sources of strain on the system. The Spotlight (Nicholas 1978a) reported that in a Bilderberg meeting a severe tongue lashing was administered to a tight-jawed David Rockefeller by European members because of the megabanker's activities.

In short, there still seems to be a combination of mismanagement, duplicity and a low-keyed, occasional power struggle at the highest levels of international capitalism. Although the U.S., via the TLC, pays homage to interdependence and cooperation, and although it states that the America is not so powerful as to be the totally dominating force it once was in the world, it seems that the American rulers, particularly the Rockefellers, cannot resist occasionally taking as much as they can, when they can, and improving their financial power position at the expense of their Trilateral friends.

The sixth source of instability, which the Trilateralists and other capitalists have made surprisingly clear, is the basic incompatibility of monopoly capitalism and democracy. The former can flourish only if the latter is ineffective, with the populace remaining passive and apathetic, or at least compliant. If the people do not do

this, the only solution is repression and economic hardship.

Seventh, there is conflict within the American power structure itself. This is more complex than using the simple Domhoffian axis of disagreement between the moderates and conservatives within the Ruling Class or between new and old wealth. There is some of this, of course, particularly when it comes to foreign policy in regard to the USSR and in the treatment of labor and welfare matters. On one side there are anti-communist hardliners who press for huge defense spending, and on the other are less hawkish, more accommodating people who are desirous of detente with the Soviets and their allies. Even here the distinctions can be blurred where we find Russophobic men effecting lucrative business and financial deals with the USSR.

We must be careful to differentiate between genuine anti-Russian feeling and the tactic of whipping up popular anti-Russian or anti-Communist sentiment in the American people so that the populace will more willingly follow or will allow greater freedom of action to the leaders to pursue the lucrative arms race and to deal more freely overseas against Third World countries. Another reason for Red Scare tactics is to keep people's minds off hard times

at home and to accept the "sacrifices" which must be made to meet these "threats." Finally, the "Red" label can be attached to any domestic challengers of the system, although in more recent times the term "terrorist" is being used instead of "red." Another tactic is to point to any activity at home and particularly abroad as "Marxist," "leftist," or Cuban or Russian inspired. This is used then for justification for any repressive measures in those countries, including invasion using the U.S. armed forces as in Grenada, or employing the CIA in covert armed aggression as in Nicaragua.

A dichotomy among the Cartel Rulers also seems to exist among the hardliners who wish to effect their desires into policy regardless of the opposition of the people--those who prefer to let the police state take care of them--and the more enlightened members of the ruling class who see themselves as the stewards of the system which must be maintained through a combination of consensus, co-optation and sufficient concessions to the people to keep them from becoming so restive and desperate as to overthrow the system. Repression should be used more sparingly and selectively--particularly against those who pose a perceived potential threat to the system itself, not those who merely want to effect some degree of change within the system.

Another source of differing opinion within the power structure--although not a clear one--is the conflict between U.S. corporations which are multinational, hence export and free-trade oriented, and those which are basically national in markets and business scope, hence desirous of import protections. The Trilateralists are the former. The auto industry is an example of the latter. The U.S. steel industry is also used as an example of the latter, but this is deceptive because, although the steel companies complain about unfair foreign competition, they invest in building steel plants overseas. Additionally, the banks which are big stockholders in U.S. Steel and which have interlocking directors with the company also invest in overseas steel plants.

There is another division which should be mentioned, particularly because it has not been carefully studied. This is the dichotomy between the non-upper class, high corporate executives and the blue-blooded men of the powerful financial and legal institutions. Menshikov (1969) recognizes this, showing that the corporate managers, although living in high style and having considerable power within their institutions, do not wield the final measure of power and they must bow to or struggle against the domination of the men who have ultimate control: the

financial institutions, law firms and the outside directors of their companies from the Eastern Establishment. Menshikov shows that there is considerable turnover of these high managers and that there is a great deal of grumbling among them about their status vis-a-vis the outsiders, and they hope that someday they will be admitted to the next and ultimate social level.

This analysis is buttressed by the study of interlocking directors by Soref (1976), noted previously, in which it was found that the outside directors who had interelocks with other corporations were mostly of upper class origin, whereas the management personnel on the boards generally were not of the upper class.

Another reflection of this can be seen in the book Ethics and Profits (Silk, and Vogel 1976) in which top corporate heads were interviewed about the status of the U.S., relations between business and government, relationships with workers, the nature of the economy, and U.S. society and institutions in general. These men were mostly the manager-directors and chief executive officers of the major corporations rather than the elite of the upper class. (These are the people, along with the lower-level technocrats, who Galbraith (1976) claims actually have the power--the managerial elite.) While the men interviewed

generally followed the Trilateral line on the need to more tightly control and discipline the American worker, they complained bitterly about the government interference in business. Although one could see this as the standard conservative complaints about getting the government off the back of business, particularly such requirements as safety, health and environmental and antitrust measures, it could be further interpreted as criticisms of the upper class "moderate" ruling of the country, especially since it is from this group where most of the leaders and policy makers have come since the 1930s. The interviewees also were dissatisfied because their high-pressure jobs at the top of the corporate world would last only for about six years, then they would be replaced or retired. You do not hear such complaints from the stratum of the real rulers from the upper class law firms and banks. Ethics and Profits was written by two men from the Council on Foreign Relations who look upon the top executives as another special group with which the Ruling Cartel must deal, rather than as people at the apex of the ruling hierarchy.

There are tensions created in the economy as a result of the varying effects which policy can have on different sectors of the economy. For instance, the oil crisis has been a bonanza for the petroleum industry, the megabanks

which try to recycle the petrodollars, and the multinational corporations which reap the big contracts with the OPEC countries; but it is bad for other businesses (particularly small businesses) which have to pay such high prices for energy. This burden is lessened in many of these corporations because, since they are in monopoly-oligopoly industries, they can merely pass on the costs to the consumer. But other sectors of the economy can be severely crippled or even destroyed.

Such situations can cause unrest among high corporate managers, some of whose own wealth and the future of their careers can be largely determined by the performance of their companies, not only in profits but in stock price. If the outside directors and financial institutions representing the Establishment are satisfied with lessened company performance-- if this fits into the overall interests of their other institutions--it can be a source of friction with the inside company directors.

Further hostility of managers occurs when larger corporations go merger hunting and pick the managers' businesses as game. Particularly incensing is a hostile takeover attempt, especially when the target company's banker is cooperating with the predator.

Instability is maintained in the system by the

continuation of the Cold War and the arms race. The high cost of defense results in great economic instability and hardship, huge governmental deficits, high interest rates, balance of payment problems, increased unemployment, a brain drain of research and creative personnel from the more productive areas of the economy, and continued inflation. The maintaining of economic hard times and a warlike foreign policy results in a fearful, restive, demonstrating populace and worried allies.

As people struggle, more repression is necessary along with an increased need for the mass media to help keep the people pacified with a combination of censorship and disinformation and with the constant attempt to deflect discontent from the real causes and toward the "communists, Marxists, subversives and terrorists." But the media are caught in a bind. They are firmly in the Establishment web of financial and directorate control as are the other major U.S. industries. But the media call themselves the watchdogs of the system. They have to present news; they have to do a little muckraking; they have to present some degree of reality so that they can retain their credibility. They must permit some innocuous diversity of opinion and news. But this can be difficult to control because of overzealous reporters, pressures from the

alternative press, overt and covert revelations from governmental and private investigations, information coming from outside the country which must be deal with, and because of occurrences which are of such great magnitude that they cannot be ignored or effectively distorted immediately. Sometimes reality looms too large (Molotch and Lester 1974).

This infuriates the corporate world, including the Trilateralists. It accuses the press of being anti-corporate and as being one of the main disruptive forces in society. Coming from a world which is extremely authoritarian and heirarchical, the business moguls want a press that is a handmaiden (Silk and Vogel 1976; Silk and Silk 1980). This, of course, would destroy the media's credibility.

Key Trilateralist Samuel Huntington (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975) deals with these problems and the role the mass media play in creating and sustaining uncertainty. He feels that if the media fan the democratic flames too much; if they criticize the established authority to such an extent that the populace loses confidence in its leaders, its institutions and its system; or if too many voices are heard giving too much information and too many opinions, the whole system could be undermined. Huntington says that the media have gone too far and have acquired

dangerous power, enough to stop the Viet Nam War and to topple President Nixon. Therefore, media access to information must be curtailed and the freedom to present information and opinions must be limited. The media must be cooperative with the power structure.

The Trilateralists have said that Americans must learn to expect a lowered standard of living and limited opportunities for improvement. So, the people must be kept pacified as their economic situation deteriorates sufficiently to meet the international plans of the Ruling Cartel and the immediate profit plans of the transnational institutions, and as the populace suffers the consequences of the recessions which periodically rack the capitalist system. On the other hand the people must be made to keep buying to continue to stimulate the economy.

The people must believe in the illusion of democracy. They must be acquiescent to and have respect for their leaders. They must be properly socialized so that they will accept whatever happens and still believe that this is the best of all possible systems. But they also must believe that it is possible to make changes, that progress can be made, and that their leaders are working on it. However, the citizens must not be allowed to make a pervasive or truly meaningful attempt to participate in the democratic

process and to extract a positive response to their own needs or to effect basic change. The people must be apathetic and, above all, credulous.

The populace must not know how their economic, political and social system is truly organized, and they must not become aware of the power structure through which the Cartel maintains itself; hence, the dearth of information on phenomena such as the CFR, TLC, Bilderbergers, David Rockefeller, and the concentration of ownership of the wealth and business in the U.S..

The press must attempt to accomplish all this while maintaining the illusion that it is providing "all the news that's fit to print," thereby keeping the confidence of the people and making them think that anyone with information and opinions outside of the controlled range of subjects and opinions is either a kook or a dangerous subversive. This is the biggest function of the mass media. Up to now, they have done their job well.

So long as there is no effective, mass alternative to the Establishment media, the problem is not very severe. But the potential exists in the public access system of cable TV to present a significant alternative to the established media, particularly if people use the system on a mass basis and especially if national networking of

programming is developed. This is a danger of which the authorities are well aware. Public access to mass media has been denied by the Supreme Court on each occasion a case has reached the Court. Additionally, the cable owners and their sympathizers in Congress and in various communities have been trying to clip the wings of access, or at least to severely minimize it.

At the more covert level, the FBI COINTELPRO program to destroy the alternative press during the 1960s and 1970s is a chilling reminder of how far the U.S. power system will go in preventing legitimate alternatives to the existing media. And none of them had the potential to reach a mass audience as do the programs on public access TV.

But this exciting experiment in democratic mass communications is at a very critical and vulnerable stage. It can easily be destroyed, weakened or taken over by the Establishment. Both sides must act quickly to protect their interests.

6.2 THEORETICAL

The problem with theory making is that, for the theory

to be cogent enough to work with, it must oversimplify or exclude many aspects of the real world of individual and institutional complexities. To argue that one approach is THE answer as compared with another seems to be related more to defense of intellectual or academic territoriality than of truthful, scientific, and objective scholarship. Elements of most of the various approaches can be found when studying the American power structure and the mass media. Curiously, it has only been very recently that scholars have started studying the two fields together.

The traditional media researchers merely accepted the pluralist paradigm as given, carried out experiments, and theorized. Parallel to this was the Marxists, who with minor exceptions, wrapped themselves in their particular brand of Marxian theory, and expounded. In the field of power studies the mass media were not extensively analyzed.

Now that the two fields are beginning to be considered together, the added multidisciplinary complexities may be a considerable burden for scholars. But it is a necessary burden to shoulder if we are going to be able to understand the total situation.

6.2.1 POWER THEORY

Let us review the theoretical positions on power which were presented in an earlier chapter and see how they look in light of the information presented in this dissertation. Marx was correct concerning the capitalist class owning and controlling and running the economic system for its own benefit. Everything starts with the economic system. In the U.S., people only have political power if they either have economic power or have been placed in a position of power by someone who is economically powerful. Marx' statement that the capitalists' ideology is the dominant one in society seems affirmed; but this is not accomplished without a combination of much effort and no little force. Finally, Marx' observations about the increasingly powerful role which banks would play have also been proven valid.

Lenin was correct in his evaluation that true democracy cannot be attained within capitalism. (Ironically, the capitalists, themselves, agree with him.) His observation that democratic political forms are a manipulatable facade shielding a repressive core controlled by the ruling class has been demonstrated time and again. However, it is mainly within the arena of these political structures that significant struggles of the people take place.

Veblen described a system of social cohesion based on the lower classes trying to imitate the life styles of the

wealthy. Today we do not see the wealthy so conspicuously as we did then. The super rich perhaps have learned to be more discreet. But the basic mechanism is still there at work: we see predominantly upper middle class, affluent families, houses and mores in TV commercials, all designed to make the great middle class and below dissatisfied with their lot and work toward the higher life style through consumption. But this is only one aspect of social control and cohesion. The later, Marxian concept of hegemony is more comprehensive and applicable to society today.

The Italian theorists Pareto and Mosca glorified the ruling elites as providing a barrier between the control of the state and the faceless, ignorant, crude masses or a rogue demagogue. Ironically, they endorsed Mussolini. Rule by elites is not a guarantee that the state will be run by people of wisdom and capability and for the good of the people. The U.S. presidency is a good example. Rule by the elites is a guarantee that the state will be run for the elites.

Some of the American followers of the elite theory tried to inject a small amount of democratic influence into the process. Ortega y Gasset advised against democratic participation, but called for the elites to be influenced by the needs of the masses. What we have in the U.S. is more

of a combination of this and what Schumpeter called for: elections to be held between competing sets of elites which would govern with a minimum degree of accountability. The elites would be insulated from the masses, which should willingly accept their leaders. This is the type of system which the Ruling Cartel would like to have.

In our system we have the facade of accountability. The press makes a big game of calling the politicians to heel, and it places them in front of cameras and on the printed pages in a supposed adversary situation. In reality, however, there is little real accountability to the populace but the constant attempt to keep discourse and political activity within the bounds of the ruling limits. Most of the U.S. system--particularly the economic sector--is not reached by the political sphere. Even though individual politicians get elected and defeated, the key leaders of the executive branch come from the same Ruling Cartel pot. Presidents are disposable. Presidents and their advisors, cabinet members and heads of the CIA and FBI can commit the most egregious, illegal acts, even violence and murder, and rarely are called to account individually.

Weber hit upon a core aspect of elite political and economic control when he made his observation about the dominant groups forming "collegial bodies" where consensus

is developed and where institutions are developed to supervise the political economy. His ideas fit perfectly the development and function of organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Bilderbergers and the Trilateral Commission.

The congressional economic studies which provided considerable data on the U.S. power structure were not used by anyone to make a comprehensive picture of the American power system until Mills came along with the Power Elite in 1956. Still, his critique was based more on sociology than on economics. Domhoff followed in the same pattern, except he did introduce more economic data. The writers who analyzed corporations to see how many were under managerial control instead of family or director control simply looked at one aspect of many means of effecting corporate control. This type of research still is being made, the latest in 1981 by Herman. But interest group studies such as by Knowles and Phelps show clearly the inadequacies of the managerial revolution writers.

The information of the latter is used to show support for the pluralists, but the pluralists were describing a world which exists mainly in the myths. Even the pluralistic activity which goes on in the U.S. at the national, state and local levels is nothing like that

espoused by the pluralist writers. There is a stacked deck against ordinary people and public interest groups. The real pluralism exists at the ruling level where the Cartel people compete, jostle and compromise where necessary on what will happen and who will benefit. The pluralistic activity observed in Congress and at state legislatures is mainly a sharklike feeding frenzy of special interest groups of capitalists attacking the ripe body of the fiscal appropriations, contracts and special interest laws. The other central activity is ensuring their continuing control of the political process and keeping it out of the hands of the masses. It takes a supreme effort for public interest groups to achieve their goals, and even then these victories can be lost at the budgetary and regulatory levels of government or can be overturned in court or at the next legislative session. The system is set up by and for the powerful capitalists, and they benefit the most from it.

Mills, and later Domhoff, started the power elite/ruling class school. Domhoff has continuously refined his arguments and has made some great contributions. However he has not given a significant place yet to the Trilateral Commission and none to the Bilderbergers. Additionally, he has not looked closely or comprehensively enough at the economic side to show the myriads of

interconnections in the system. Domhoff could benefit from a session with Knowles. Domhoff also might consider blending his material with that of some of the Marxists, particularly those who study hegemony. He also might benefit from a few hours spent with his Marxist cousin, the instrumentalist Miliband.

The Marxist approaches all have something to contribute. They could be combined and blended into a comprehensive picture which would be much more relevant and revealing than each school of thought steadfastly maintaining its own territory. Today the studies of the legitimation crisis and hegemony seem to be crucial in understand the twin aspects of the problems with the capitalism and how the system sustains itself. But it is not just the Hegelian-Marxist position of hegemony which is crucial. The instrumentalist analysis of the structure and functioning of the state is needed to see hegemony at work.

As we have shown, the range of approved subjects and opinions appearing on the media generally coincides with that found within the Ruling Cartel itself. This could be termed the hegemonic range. A similar span of limitations can also be found in the activities of the Cartel think tanks and foundations. Even in the elite universities, professors who stray from the hegemonic ranges of their

disciplines--particularly if they are publicly outspoken and write in "unapproved" (non-Establishment) publications--frequently find themselves failing to receive tenure, or if tenured, they suffer various forms of penalties and harassment.

But the maintenance of hegemony is not something which is static or automatically built into the system, although the power is stacked on the side of the rulers. It is something at which the power structures at all levels must constantly work. Shielding the people from reality and fending off the counterhegemonies of the struggling masses is a difficult job which requires full-time effort.

The media are particularly crucial here because of the high acceptability and credibility by the public (especially for TV), and because of their pervasiveness. The airwaves are saturated with hegemonic ideology in both entertainment and news programming. Deviant employees are fired; censorship and distortion are rampant; newsrooms are hegemonically socialized; the authoritarian, corporate structure is used everywhere; news and events are trivialized and are dismembered from their total interconnected framework; and dissemination of disinformation from the CIA is more and more common. Pervading all this is the almost constant message of

acceptance of authority (Gerbner 1972 and 1977; Gerbner and Gross 1976).

The significance of comprehending hegemony is not just in understanding an important aspect of ruling class control. Knowing how the hegemonic process works instrumentally, it is easier to develop strategies to combat the system dominance and to provide countering information to the people through both Establishment and alternative media. The Structuralist ideas on the capitalist state's need to maintain legitimation and to promote accumulation are very instructive in understanding why the state and media function the way they do. However, the Structuralist position that the state functions relatively independently of and not just as a simple tool of the capitalist class seems to be true in appearance more than in substance. As we have seen, it is the Cartel personnel who hold the key decision making positions in the government. Most of the laws and functions of government activity support the interests of the institutions and individuals of the Cartel and its capitalist brethren.

The state may seem to be acting independently for several reasons. The first is ideological. As Schiller says (1973, 11,12), the people must believe that their political institutions are independent and are objectively

run for the benefit of everyone. If the government does not continually give the appearance of doing this, the democratic myths are exposed and fall apart.

Secondly, because within the Ruling Class there is a range of opinions and because there are other non-Cartel capitalists to contend with (such as the Hunts of Texas), the state must deal with these varying interests, particularly as they vary from one part of the country to another.

Third, the state is the focus of the struggles of the people through elections and special interest groups. Because the state must contend with these problems in addition to the contradictions within the system itself, it may seem that the state is independent of the capitalist economic system. But this is not the case. The use of the terms "public" and "private" sectors is a propagandistic illusion. The state is where the political and economic systems come together, and the government must work out certain problems for the benefit of the dominating forces of the system, including measures which are developed to contain the struggles of the people through a combination of concessions and repression.

Wolfe has a key insight in his analysis of American politics as an alienating system which extracts surplus

political energy from the people during their struggles. Because politics is an inside game of the capitalist class, opponents must exert tremendous efforts and resources even to obtain small victories, much less to maintain the status quo to retain gains previously fought for. So much effort goes into fighting the system, using the system's stacked rules and in the system's institutions, there is very little time, energy or money left over to establish true alternative institutions so that a serious destabilization and challenge to the ruling class can be made. This is particularly true because politics does not touch the centers of power. It is next to impossible to develop a strong alternative third party, and access to mass media to directly disseminate alternative ideas is generally closed. And yet, even with all these disadvantages which the challengers of the system face, the Cartel leaders are very much concerned with these efforts of the people and with the predilection of the press to occasionally present some information on dissident activities and opinions.

The Marxian analysis of the legitimation crisis is crucial to understanding the twin necessities of the Ruling Class to closely control the key political and economic institutions, and to maintain exclusive dominance of the ideological institutions of society, particularly the mass

media. Because the economic system operates to the detriment of most of the people and because the political system is run by key capitalists for the primary benefit of themselves and their ilk, the legitimation crisis is a constant problem, particularly in hard economic times when the realities of the system can be seen with greater clarity by the people. As the legitimation crisis continues to spread and becomes more acute, the governmental rulers must resort to a combination of repression, increased propaganda and false crises in their attempts to manipulate public opinion so that the people will be supportive of Cartel policies (or at least to be apathetic or cowed) and to deflect domestic dissatisfaction.

As can be seen, there are many ideas and theories which are relevant and useful in developing a total picture of the U.S. power system and how it operates. It appears that at many points in the analyses of various writers the mass media play an important role. We will now assess media research and see how relevant it has been over the years, how it has been developing recently, and what needs to be accomplished.

6.2.2 MEDIA THEORY

As McAnany (1981, 4-15) states, although there has been considerable theorizing the past few decades regarding mass communications, it has been done in a vacuum. The state, the socio-economic system, and their relationships to the media and society have not been realistically and comprehensively described. Before this research is carried out and general societal theories are developed, no relevant communications theory can be provided.

After the first stage of constructing a macro view of society and the media are complete, McAnany believes the next step is one in which development of a micro view of the media and society is undertaken. This "process and relationships" stage looks at interrelationships and links in mass media institutions and at media systems. This dissertation is an attempt to take us through these first two stages.

Most media research has been done in response either to the requirements of the capitalist system or has uncritically taken for granted capitalism and its relationships in society. Research which looks critically, not just at mass communications, but the entire societal system, can result in a challenge to the system itself.

This type of more objective approach will undoubtedly bring down upon the writers the hostility of the defenders of the myths of both the existing political-economic system and the mass media.

The history of the development of mass communications theory shows different stages (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1982). Following World War I the media were seen as pervasive and all-powerful, as evidenced by the successes of British pro-war propaganda in the U.S.. From the late 1940s through the 1960s a reverse evaluation was made. Based upon empirical studies it was indicated that the audience was not merely a mass of passive receptors of the media, but it actively interacted with them and brought different individual and group experiences, needs and information processing actions to the media experience. It was claimed that the media did not have so great an impact except to reinforce the opinions which audiences already held.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s this view was challenged from two sources. One was from researchers who looked at the old empirical data and came up with different conclusions, mainly that the media did have significant influence in a number of cases and situations. Additionally, these researchers stated that in view of the

great impact of the comparatively new medium of TV, the whole question of media effects should be reevaluated.

The other new source of criticism of the old paradigm was the Marxists. They said that the previous research was fatally flawed because it was uncritically based on capitalist pluralism--a false perception and understanding of the real world. They said that the media are powerful, pervasive transmitters of ideology which is central to the maintenance of ruling class domination. However, as the years passed, the Marxists became more interested in empirical studies and in the complexities of ideology found at the level of the audience. As a result there was a shift away from the media as dominantly powerful, as was evident in the earlier Marxist critiques. But, in more recent years the shift of focus of media study has been made from the audience to the transmitters, i.e., the messages and how they were made and by whom. As Curran (1982, 17) stated, there were four "strands of interest:"

1. Institutional structures and role relationships
2. The political economy of media institutions
3. Professional ideologies and work practices
4. Interaction of media institutions with their socio-political environment.

These studies show that the ultimate power to shape media messages comes from the top of the corporate power system, and, therefore, the media ultimately serve the economic and power interests of the corporate elite.

The pluralists have stated that the media professionals are autonomous and work freely within a system which objectively reports the news. Marxists claim that the journalists are part of the system, subservient to the dominant ideology and that their work reflects this. Later trends seem to indicate that there are intermediate positions now being taken between these opposing views.

The fourth focus mentioned above shows that the media do not exist in a vacuum, but are part of the socio-political environment and interact with it. The news producers are therefore not just limited by the institutional and individual perimeters of possibilities within this framework, but also have a symbiotic relationship with these institutions. The pluralists see the media professionals and the power institutions as being in an equal position of mutual dependence. Marxists base their theory on the thesis that the economic base determines the nature of the other institutions in the superstructure. Therefore, they see the media as an integral part of the power system. By acting their role within the system, the

media reproduce the viewpoints of the dominant institutions.

A school of thought within Marxism began questioning this approach as being too rigid a basis for evaluating the media. In the late 1970s and 1980s some of the structuralists began looking at the media as part of a comprehensive system of inculcation and maintenance of ideology rather than as just actors within the political-economic power framework. Some writers reject the base-superstructure model and indicate that ideology is the main aspect of social cohesion, because it is ideology through which all people experience the world.

The structuralists were criticized by the political-economy oriented Marxists who said that ideology had no autonomous effectiveness. They claimed that ideology is the means through which the media are able to conceal and distort the real nature of society, thereby producing a combination of false consciousness in the people and legitimizing the system at the same time. The structuralists in turn criticized that position, saying that too much was assumed to follow naturally after showing that the economic base existed and that there was concentration of ownership and control of the media. A particular deficiency was that the political economy approach simply

left us with the simple view of the media as distorters of reality rather than actors in a complex ideological interactive framework.

Another Marxist approach has recently arisen--the culturalist. This school of thought places the prime media focus on the audience, particularly the cultural setting and the individual experiences which people bring to the communications' interaction. The media and other phenomena of society are part of a "complex, expressive totality" (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1982, 27). To the culturalist the study of how and by whom the messages are produced is not enough; the receivers are the ones who authenticate experience. The culturalists spend a great deal of time analyzing content, looking at semiological and linguistic aspects of the mass communications, assessing the hegemonic composition of the messages, and looking for contradictions.

The culturalists seem to have more in common with the pluralists such as Lazarsfeld than they do with Marxist thought. In fact, by completely deemphasizing political-economy the culturalists have almost squeezed Marx out of it. As a result, Hall has tried to combine the structuralist and culturalist approaches (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1982).

The divergent opinions about the nature of the media and their place and function in society result greatly from the dual nature of the media: economic and ideological. The media are advertising institutions designed to create desires in the receivers of the messages and to motivate them to buy the products and services advertised. But ideology also permeates the press, overtly and covertly, in news as well as in entertainment. Both the economic and ideological aspects are mutually reinforcing.

But primary to both natures of the media is control. With control you can maintain dominance over both these functions. Because capitalists, particularly the Cartel, have control of the media, we get mainly capitalist ideology. Change the basic nature of the economic system and the media would present a different ideology. However, because the dominant ideology is so comprehensively hegemonic, it does take on a life and inertia of its own which make it difficult for people to accept either counter-ideologies or information on the realities of the system. This is reinforced by the dominant ideology being supported at all levels and phases of society: the workplace, educational institutions, family, churches, research organizations, government, and of course the media.

And yet, as the writers who discuss the legitimation crisis say, the people are increasingly questioning the system because of the contradictions in the system itself and the gap between reality and the myths and propaganda. It is possible that the dominant ideology could be significantly challenged if the masses of the people had easy access to alternative information from respected, authoritative sources, particularly if advances were also made on a broad range of subjects by individuals and groups challenging the system. The top Cartel people also recognize this.

Thus, it appears that the most realistic view of the media and society is compiled from certain aspects of most of these approaches, just as most of the power theorists have something relevant to add in developing the total picture of power structures. Even the writings of pluralists can be of value in showing various micro ways the system supposedly works. Even though these pluralist studies are handicapped by their false analyses (or lack of analysis) of the political-economic system, one can use these studies effectively after placing them in their proper ideological perspective. They can be used as small pieces in the great power structure-media puzzle.

Now that a comprehensive, empirical picture of the U.S.

power structure and mass media has been presented, theory building can begin with a more realistic analysis of what society is like, at least from the top down. There remains much to do in the way of research, particularly in the area of the effect of the media on the people, especially in relationship to ideological hegemony. Some particularly interesting experiments could be made about the effect of counter-hegemonic information on people. A third fruitful area could be the success of usage and effect of public access in the presentation of alternative information. Fourth, the battle over public access at the national and local levels should be comprehensively chronicled so that the power structure responses to the new medium can be ascertained. It would be important to know the response of the people to viewing access. Is it different from regular TV? Are audience expectations different? Is it as credible as the regular media?

At a more macro scale there are many pressing questions regarding the media, power, society and the individual. Halloran (McAnany 1981) lists many subjects for inquiry, many dealing with the impending communications revolution. There is a terribly pressing urgency to accelerate the analysis of communications and society and to take immediate steps to intervene in the impending revolution before most

media and their relationships have been formed and solidified. If academics merely wait and see, then chart and analyze what has happened, it will be too late.

We are at an extremely significant juncture. The combination of computer technology and new communications capabilities is about to take off in a quantum jump which could very well transform society. Even now, the control of such technology is highly concentrated. The multinational corporate system would be impossible without instantaneous, widespread global communications, not only within their own organizations but with others. The international banking system is coordinated world wide, and nation states are almost helpless against it. (However, recently there are signs of the debtor nations' joining together to form a cartel in order to present a united front to the debt holding nations--especially the U.S.--and to exact some concessions, particularly to obviate the harsh terms of the IMF.) Labor unions are severely handicapped in combatting international capital because they do not have the organization or communication system to match their multinational corporate adversaries.

But this is minor compared with what can happen in the next ten to thirty years. Twin revolutions are occurring in communications delivery and in computers. Cable TV and

direct broadcast Satellites (DBS) can saturate individual and societal need and desire for informational channels and services. The impending development of "megacomputers" promises to give an enormously accelerated advantage to the possessors, perhaps more than England had in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. When the day of the "smart" and "teaching" computers arrives, the people, institutions and countries without them can be left far behind.

Thus, the question of control becomes absolutely critical. Who decides who is to have access to the super systems? Who will decide the software/content? Who will decide the use of the systems? Who will have access? Who will benefit?

The answers to these questions, and doubtless many more, cannot wait. Action must begin now. Communications and political strategies must be developed to counter the development, control and use of the new technology being concentrated in few hands.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 THE AMERICAN POWER STRUCTURE

As Chapter Two indicates, the American power structure is a complex framework of political, social and economic interlocks in the fields of business, government, intelligence, philanthropy, education, idea formation, and the mass media. People, ideas and money move from one of these sectors to another with smoothness. New organizations frequently are formed to fill a perceived need, and old ones are either laid to rest or are modified when their usefulness has become outdated. The national power structure has its tentacles in the state and local levels in order to maintain dominance, to keep informed, to establish consensus, to effect coordination, and to bring in fresh, new people who can be beneficially used at the national level. The prime political decision making positions have been filled from the same small group of Ruling Cartel

institutions for decades, regardless of administration. The Cartel control over the economy has been increased over the years as a result of the merger movements. This also has concentrated the control of wealth into fewer and fewer hands, so that a small number of decision makers in banks, law firms and key industries (such as the oil industry) have far-reaching effects on the rest of the world. This drive for concentration of economic and political power is so great and continuous that there seems to be no evidence at this time of a countervailing power to slow it down, much less to reverse it.

The structure of the mass media in the U.S. is the same as the rest of the American economy--concentrated. There are only three TV networks, two significant wire services, two major news magazines, and only two newspapers with significant national political importance and impact. There is an interrelationship among these organizations, in that some use the others' material, and some provide information and agenda setting functions for the others, particularly the print media for the TV networks. Because the leaders and significant employees from these media organizations also play roles in key Cartel organizations and the government, the prime U.S. mass media are closely tied in with the Ruling Cartel.

Two basic features of the American power structure are control and limitation. As Domhoff (1967) and Mills (1956) have shown, the entry into upper class status is carefully managed: the powerful Cartel people closely screen and limit participants in key organizations; employees are suitably socialized and closely scrutinized to ensure that they fit into the organization and fulfill its goals. Even rich capitalists cannot break into the Cartel's ruling circles on the basis of wealth alone, even though they might be very powerful within their own corporate empire.

Control and limitation are not just used to insure the ideological purity and efficiency of the ruling circles; they also are required in the attempt to keep control of people and organizations outside the chosen group. As we saw in the first two chapters, there are many means to do this. Control of the key economic institutions is a barrier to an outsider becoming too powerful. The political process is limited through the use of money and access to the mass media and through the inside game found in the relationship of the government with the prime Cartel organizations. Groups such as the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations limit policy formation; foundations nurture only those cultural and intellectual quests which fit their needs; and the favored think tanks and

most cities:

1. Public access TV on cable systems. We have already discussed this at length in previous chapters. Local groups can present their material either by producing their own programs or by appearing on established shows. In addition to the local experts being on the programs, the groups' out-of-town guests can appear as well. Furthermore, any videotapes, slides or films to which the groups have access can be used. Programs can be made on location where the activity is taking place, or arrangements can be made to tape in a studio.
2. Radio and TV call-in programs. Because most larger cities have these, it is very simple to have immediate access to large audiences. It would be highly advisable for progressive groups to have a "duty list" of people in their memberships to devote specific times and days to phone-in their opinions on these programs. Additionally, because the people who produce these programs are continuously looking for guests and subjects, change-oriented groups should contact the producers in order to provide people to be on these programs, either from their own memberships or from the flow of experts who are brought into town

universities perform the major work in the development of these Cartel requirements. Lower and higher education is always under close scrutiny in order to ensure that its production fits the needs of the system. The fact that the major organizations in these institutional categories are themselves interlocked provides a framework for control and coordination.

It is not just in the corporate sector where a watchful eye is kept on ideological purity. Universities also carefully control their staffs and faculties, and sedulously try to weed out the outspoken dissidents. The public school systems and state boards of education also closely scrutinize textbooks and employees to ensure ideological dependability. People and organizations which fall outside of this range of acceptability often find themselves targets for overt and covert activity by the police organizations of the country, including, occasionally, the military.

7.2 THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA

As Chapter Three shows, concentration of media ownership and control is found not just nationally, but also

at the local and regional levels. It is not merely the fact that the electronic and print media are mainly in the hands of capitalists and are used primarily for making a profit, but the ownership itself is concentrated, particularly in the areas of distribution, audience and profits. And, as with the economy as a whole, the concentration is continuing unabated, particularly in the field of cable television where there was such promise of variety from its multichannel capacity. Even public TV provides no exception to control by corporate and power structure interest, both at the the national and local levels.

Finally, as the chapter on media content shows, the end result of control of the press is a range of opinion and information which generally falls within the range of acceptability within the ruling class itself. Anything outside of this range generally either is ignored, distorted or derided. Meanwhile, the alternative press struggles to survive the twin threats of economic starvation and predatory governmental activity, leaving many people and groups mostly dependent on the vagaries and distortions of the Establishment media for dissemination of their opinions and ideas.

This pervasive control of idea formation, education, and particularly the mass media is vitally necessary to

maintain societal hegemony. It is vitally important to the rulers that the people do not have easy and continuous access to unapproved views. But even more important is that the people internalize the hegemonic values so that they are immune to dissident information and opinions. It is much easier to control society if the people place themselves within the desired ideological prison of which the Ruling Cartel is the warden. That is why the control of the press is so crucial, because the people spend so much time with the media, particularly television.

But there are leaks in the system.

1. People can occasionally see that reality is different from what they are told in the myths and what they observe within the hegemonic information range. Sometimes the real world looms too big for the media to cover up or distort.
2. Because the press sells itself as the watchdog of the system, it must perform some muckraking or lose credibility.
3. There is information coming from the alternative press and from overseas with which the Establishment press must occasionally deal.
4. There are disagreements within the ruling class itself which is dealt with publicly. (Although not always.

For instance, the debate that raged within the Council on Foreign Relations over the Viet Nam War was not reported (Shoup and Minter 1977).

7.2.1 THE PUBLIC ACCESS TV ALTERNATIVE

It is into this information and opinion gap that the new medium of public access television on cable can step. It has the potential to play a significant role in informing the people, and it can lead toward a weakening of Cartel hegemony, if it is allowed to proliferate and grow and if the people use it in a progressive manner. This will not be accomplished without a struggle, because as Chapter Five shows, the Supreme Court and Congress have steadfastly torpedoed public access to the press--both electronic and print. The existing Burger Court and the recent activities of Congress and the regulatory agencies have been detrimental to the public's interest and have been working squarely for corporate desires. And at the local level across the country there have been many attacks on public access TV, both by government and by the industry.

The attitude of the Cartel was subtly stated by Justice White in the Red Lion case, which many people seem to

interpret as the prime victory of the people over the media. White said that it was not the rights of the media owners, but of the people which were paramount. What was crucial was the right of the people to "receive suitable" information. This same rationale was used later to attack public access in the Midwest Video II case. It is very clear: the people must not be allowed to speak directly to each other; Establishment control must be maintained so that the masses cannot have access to information which is "unsuitable."

However, public access TV is proliferating, developing audiences and generating excitement in most places where it is available. In Austin, Texas, the public access manager--Austin Community Television (ACTV)--has captured over seven percent of the viewing audience and has facilitated participation by a large number of individuals and community groups which have a wide range of interests and points of view. Yet, even with such a record of success (or perhaps BECAUSE of such success) ACTV is under attack by the city government and the local monopoly newspaper.

There is one program which has been appearing on ACTV for over five years which has been particularly successful--Alternative Views. A news magazine program which derives its information and guests mainly from

non-Establishment sources, Alternative Views has developed a large following in Austin, Texas, and is now being shown in several other cities in the country. It has attracted national and international attention, with many requests having been received for playing of the show in other parts of the U.S. as well as overseas. Alternative Views is not just a good example of how easy it is to start and maintain a public access news program series, it also reveals that the American people are thirsting for a broader range of information and ideas than that which they are usually served.

7.3 THE PEOPLE'S STRATEGY

In view of the enormous power and control which the American Ruling Cartel has over the political, economic and communications aspects of the country, the attack on the Cartel must come from a variety of sources using a multitude of media and methods. As we have seen, there are many weaknesses, contradictions and areas of instability in the system, particularly because of its capitalist and imperialist nature and in its present multinational,

monopoly, and militarist form.

The most destabilizing information which could be the subject of mass dissemination is the reality of the system itself--the type of information presented in this dissertation. If people were to learn the truth about the U.S. power structure, it would go a long way in destroying the myths which help to hold the system together and stabilize it, making it resistant to basic change. Citizens' eyes would be opened to how the country really is run, by whom, and for whose benefit. They would be able to see their place in the system and how they are exploited. There certainly would be resistance to this, because it is very uncomfortable for people to have their myths challenged. There also would be a negative reaction from people who think they are receiving a fair shake from the system or who identify themselves strongly with. Finally, there would be great resistance from the power structures at all levels of society, but particularly from the Ruling Cartel itself.

7.3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL

This basic destabilizing effort of disseminating information about the realities of the U.S. power system is

only a part of the struggle. Before this can be accomplished on a mass scale, a combination of things must be accomplished. Because the Establishment media will not present such information, the matter must be brought to the attention of all the change-oriented individuals and groups which are also struggling, so that they will have the understanding of how the system works. They they can use this knowledge in their own operations and publicity. There is a wide spectrum of such groups and activities, such as unions, single-issue organizations, consumer groups, churches, neighborhood organizations, pressure groups, stockholder meetings, and school textbook groups.

The efforts of such organizations would be much more effective if they disseminated information on the Cartel and interpreted their information using Ruling Cartel analysis as a basis. There are other activities in which these organizations could involve themselves for even greater effectiveness. They could form umbrella organizations where their mutual interests coincide in order to increase their strength and participation. They can support progressive, independent and third party candidates. They can work in elections so that the most favorable candidates can be chosen. They can participate where possible in fund-dispersing organizations, so that worthy,

change-oriented individuals and groups--most of which are starved for funds--can survive and grow.

Probably the biggest hurdle is the unions, because their leadership not only is usually conservative, but the top people in most of the largest unions have already been co-opted by the Cartel by participating in such elite organizations as the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderbergers. It is mainly with the rank and file and with the union locals where change-oriented efforts would probably be successful.

7.3.2 MASS MEDIA STRATEGIES

In all these activities the use of the mass media is crucial. In too many groups a great amount of time is spent in activities which will reach only a few people, and these people are already convinced of the rightness of the point of view of the group. Newsletters and lectures only reach a few people. The masses are watching TV, listening to radio, and reading the local newspapers. This is where progressive people must go in order to reach the people. There are many strategies which can be used in addition to the traditional ones of holding symposia, lectures and demonstrations. There are several methods which are readily available in

to speak. It is not only local programs which are available. The cable channel which presents governmental and public affairs programming--C-SPAN--and Cable News Network have daily call-in programs with a national audience. There also are radio programs at night which feature call-ins, not only on stations with powerful signals which can be picked up in large parts of the country, but there is also one program, the Larry King Show, which is on the nationwide Mutual Broadcasting System.

3. Local newspapers can be approached through reporters or editors who might be sympathetic or interested in what a group might have to present. If the local monopoly newspaper will not do it directly, it sometimes can be pressured to provide coverage if the other media in town are talking about the subject, particularly either in the alternative media, if any, or on the electronic media.
4. The electronic media news departments may be more cooperative than the print media because of (1) their Fairness Doctrine requirements (if still enforced), (2) there are more competitive media outlets, and (3) generally their ownership and managements, although conservative, are not so closely allied with the local

power structure than is the large, local daily newspaper.

5. Letters to the editors are always advisable, although it is always problematic as to whether the newspaper will print the letters, or if it does, whether it will print them without distortion.
6. Guest editorial are sometimes printed by newspapers.
7. Press conferences. It is particularly important to keep in mind the operational schedules of the media so that the conference time will make it easy for the media to place the stories into their work routines. In this regard it is always more attractive to have a local or national notable or expert who has name identification. The local media are more likely to print or broadcast the information.
8. Journalism Reviews. If one is available locally, this is a good place to critique the local press. If a journalism review does not publish locally, you can publish in an out-of-town, prestige publication and follow up by ensuring that local media and politicians get copies of the article. Of course, it would be ideal to start a journalism review locally, perhaps in conjunction with high school and college journalism departments.

9. Articles. There are many publications which are constantly looking for interesting and provocative articles, ranging from scholarly journals and special interest magazines to the progressive press with limited distribution and the publications with mass circulation such as the "mens' magazines" which do some muckraking. Publications in the last category are Playboy and Penthouse, and examples of the progressive press are In These Times, Progressive, Nation, and Guardian. Additionally, many cities have small papers and magazines which can be approached.
10. Books. Although this is a huge task, writing a book can be very effective in reaching a mass audience. Textbooks can provide an alternative to the hegemonic selection now used in schools, particularly in colleges where individual professors can select the books to be used in their classes.
11. Wire Services and out-of-town newspapers. If an event takes place or if you present a program (either live or on videotape) you can make a press release about the content and send it to the wire services and the out-of-town publications as well as to the local media. Sometimes the local power structure and politicians are more sensitive to adverse publicity

which is carried outside of the city's borders than that which is published only in the local media.

Action must begin now and continue at an accelerated pace. Progressive people in the U.S. must join hands with their counterparts in other countries. Their adversaries are firmly transnational. Efforts need to be made to establish networks for dissemination of video tapes by using bicycling and eventually by leasing satellite space. (The next step would be to get the cable operators to carry the signal--a problematical task.) Funding sources must be found to finance the production and dissemination of this programming. Because most of the large money-dispensing sources are also Cartel controlled, the established foundations and wealthy individuals may not be the best places to solicit funds. However, through the combined resources of many progressive organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union and progressive churches, it would be possible to purchase space on a satellite. It is not very expensive. Even European sources of funding might be possible. Foundations frequently help groups or individuals in other nations when they would not do so in their own country for political reasons.

Cartel ideological hegemony must be broken, or at least

successfully challenged, before a liberating, mass movement can take place to overcome the existing system of power and control. To do this, alternative information must be provided to the masses of the people. They are mainly at home watching TV. That is where progressive people must go with their messages. NOW!

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE (pages 1-33)

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section will be from Garson (1977).
2. At the turn of the century Moody (1904), Brandeis (1914) and the Pujo Committee (US Congress 1913) saw that the economy was dominated by a coalition of families and corporations of great wealth and power, particularly the Rockefellers and Morgans. Berle and Means (1932) estimated that 2,000 people controlled one-half of U.S. industry. The New Deal's Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) Monograph No. 29 (Thorp and Crowder (1914) considered that the top thirteen most affluent families, particularly the duPonts, Mellons and Rockefellers, shared economic primacy in the country. Sweezy said in 1939 that there were eight or more financial interest groups with their own satellite corporations which dominated the American economy. Other speculations as to how many people control the country have been made by Baran and Sweezy (1966)--10,000, Dye (1976)--4,100, Gordon (1945)--4,000. (Other guesses are covered later in this chapter.) The conservative Hayek recognized

in 1944 that monopoly capitalism was leading to a totalitarian, corporative state which would be controlled and operated by and for the monopolists.

3. One of Rose's students told the author that Rose said to her, before he died, that the Power Elite perspective was correct after all. Dahl made a similar statement in a visit to the University of Texas at Austin. This also is the rather plaintive theme of Dahl's After the Revolution (1970): political scientists--the pluralists--had been ignoring the economic realities of the system; true pluralism was therefore a goal for which we should strive.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, the information comes from Gold, Lo and Wright (1975).
5. Marxists frequently point to contradictions inherent in the capitalist system which produce instability in the system with which the capitalists are constantly trying to deal and which also form areas of focus on class exploitation, discontent and struggle. Marx pointed out two main contradictions, the most basic being the arbitrary and unnatural division between capital and labor, the result being that, because the capitalist wants production only for profit and because he appropriates this profit (or surplus) from

the wealth produced by the workers, the capitalist actually fetters the productive mechanism which could produce much more of a socially beneficial nature than just to provide accumulation for the capitalist. The other main contradiction is that production is a social process, whereas the means of production are privately owned, and the greatest benefits also are appropriated privately: profits are not socialized. Another contradiction is that, in this process of accumulation, the spending power of the workers is reduced below that which can be used to purchase everything that is produced. If this occurs, recession results. Also, because corporations are in almost constant debt, they must make continually rising profits to pay their creditors. Therefore, capitalism must expand continuously. On this point even the capitalists agree. Hence, to grow, the system must accumulate. Without such growth, economic and social disintegration occurs, people see the system more clearly, discontent is rampant, and struggle is heightened. As O'Connor points out, under monopoly capitalism even the costs and results of production (such as pollution) are increasingly socialized (born by the government, hence taxpayers);

but the profits go to the corporations. Now, even the risks are being socialized: gas consumers are paying higher rates to finance an Alaskan pipeline; defense industries are guaranteed profits; the government reimbursed the big banks for the latters' loan losses to Poland. Still, the corporations collect the profits.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO (pages 34-150)

1. Some of these large corporations and their stock held by the top institutionals include AT&T (4.1%), Western Union (30.4%), Burlington Northern (28.3%), Southern Railway (35%), Caterpillar Tractor (26.9%), Chrysler (22.5%), General Electric (18.6%), Mobil Oil (23.8%), Monsanto (25.8%), Union Carbide (18.9%), Northwest Airlines (45.5%), United Airlines (39.4%), United Aircraft (36.6%), Virginia Electric and Power (23.3%), Safeway Stores (24.3%), Travelers Insurance (29.5%).
2. For example, General Motors has two interlocks with Ford, four with Chrysler, and five with International Harvester. Exxon has interlocks with Mobil (6), Standard of California (6), Atlantic Richfield (4), Texaco (2), Standard of Indiana (2) and Shell (1). These are basically indirect interlocks which are not

prohibited by the Clayton Act, but which might be in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, according to Metcalf.

3. Unless otherwise indicated, CFR information is from Shoup and Minter.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, Bilderberg material is from Liberty Lobby [1975].
5. Some of these policies are as follows: decrease restrictions to free trade; let the dollar float; revise the National Security Council; strengthen the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank with U.S. tax money to guarantee the loans of U.S. transnational banks to other countries; lower the standard of living of American citizens; and support the lesser developed countries by creating a common support fund for their commodity prices. "Interdependent" is a favorite buzzword of the TLC. When it appears in a political or economic speech or article, chances are there is TLC influence somewhere.
6. Whittaker has an outstanding chart on pages 158 and 159 which show the direct and indirect connections of various foundations with the CIA.
7. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in the

section on universities comes from D.N. Smith (1974).

8. The three TV networks are no longer listed in the Fortune 500 for industrial corporations.
9. Unless otherwise indicated the information in this section comes from Network Project 1973a.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE (pages 151-253)

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistics are from Compaine (1979, 312-315).

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR (pages 254-349)

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the information for the News Budgets section is from Epstein (1973).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the information for the section on rating services is from Kellner (1976).
3. The network positional information is based on Epstein (1973).
4. Schorr remarked on the Dick Cavett Show on PBS that CBS executives would stop him in the hallways and give him informal feedback.
5. Unless otherwise indicated, the information for this section is from Epstein (1973).
6. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section comes from a Liberty Lobby publication,

particularly the Spotlight. See Allen and Ehre 1980; Bartel 1978; Foner 1979; Grey 1980; Liberty Lobby [1975]; Lincoln 1979; Nicholas 1978a, 1978b, 1978c; Potts 1978; Shaw 1980; Spotlight 1979a, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b; Waits 1979. See also Fund to Restore an Educated Electorate 1980, another right wing source.

7. Compared with the right wing, which first started talking about the Bilderbergers in the 1950s, the left wing did not begin covering the organization until late. See Mayo 1980; Shoup and Minter 1977; Eringer 1980; Weissman and Eringer 1977; Judis 1978; Sklar 1980.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE (pages 350-388)

1. In *United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.*, 334 US 131 (1948) the Supreme Court ruled that radio as well as newspapers are considered to be the "press."
2. To see the change in court thinking, compare *Hammer v. Degenhart*, 247 US 251 (1918) and *US v. E.C. Knight*, 156 US 1 (1895) with *US v. Darby*, 312 US 100 (1941); *Wickard v. Filburn*, 317 US 111 (1942); and *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US*, 379 US 241 (1964).
3. See bibliography for other significant works by Barron. For a comprehensive listing of articles see

Lange (1973). Lange has a list of anti-access writers on page five. Authors not listed by Lange are (for access): Maeder (1974); University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1974); Myers (1974); Barrow (1975); Cornish (1974). Anti-access authors are Boyer (1975); Loper (1974). For an extremely comprehensive review of access and cable television as of 1973 see Fordham Law Review (1973).

4. There was an isolated Ohio case in 1919 mentioned in Pearce (1972, 59) in which it was held that if the newspaper was the only one in town, all people should be given equal opportunity to purchase space (22 Ohio N.P. 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919)).
5. See Pierce (1972, 68-80) for a discussion of the following cases.
6. Jaffee says that the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ was helping more than 100 community groups.
7. BEM/DNC (1973, 123). Nicholas Johnson says this is exactly the situation now--the wealthy dominate the media (Johnson and Weston 1971, 625).
8. See endnote 3 and Pierce (1972, 94, 95, and her footnotes 22-27).
9. Justice Douglas concurred only with the result of

BEM/DNC, but said that if broadcasters did perform as government agencies, access would inexorably follow (148-170).

10. In addition to its pro-access views in the previously mentioned cases, the Court of Appeals said in the 1971 case of Citizen Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2nd 1202 (D.C.C.A. 1971) that "new interest groups and hitherto silent minorities . . . should be given . . . the chance to broadcast on our radio and television frequencies."
11. In Broadcasting during the first four months of 1974 there were several issues which referred to Justice Department activity urging the FCC to take a stronger hand on the subject of concentration.
12. For information on local access usage and struggles see the following: Access 1981k, 1981q, 1982f, 1982g, 1983b; Access, Austin Community Television (ACTV) 1983b; Anderson 1983; Applebaum 1981; Austin American-Statesman 1984; Barbaro, 1983; Bark 1980; Barton 1983a, 1983b, 1983c; Behre 1983; Bell 1983; Buetler 1978; Bilello 1980; Blow 1980; Bond 1979; Botein 1972; Brown, B., 1981; Brown, Ben, 1983; Brown, L., 1979b; Buckley, T., 1973; Burchell 1980; Bushnell 1982; CableVision 1983d, 1983a; Calloway 1979; Cerra 1982;

Clines 1977; Collins 1980; Cone 1979; Crook 1983;
 Cullum 1978; Cumming 1983; Davis 1982; Dillard-Rosen
 1982; Divoky 1979; Dobbs 1983; Durkin 1983; Enstad
 1983a, 1983b; Feinstein 1984; Ferretti 1971, 1972;
 Fisher, S., 1979; Gent 1971a, 1971b; Getlein 1976;
 Glover 1979; Goetze 1982; Gould 1971a; Grand Rapids
Press 1979; Greene 1982; Greyson 1983; Harrington
 1973; Halvorsen 1974; Hanks and Longini 1974; Hudson
 1977; Hylton 1983; Independent 1983a, 1983c;
Indianapolis Star 1974; Jacklin 1975; Jacobs 1981,
 1982; Jaynes 1978; Kasler 1979; Kerr 1983; Kirmser
 1973; Kreiger 1980; Lane 1983; Laurence 1982a, 1982b;
 Lydon 1971; Manley and Harzog 1983; Marriotti 1982;
 Maxon and Swanson 1984; Meislin 1981; Melvin 1982;
Minneapolis Tribune 1975; Montgomery 1974; Myers 1981;
 National Federation of Local Cable Programmers 1983a;
New York Times 1971, 1980a, 1980b, 1981b, 1981c; Noam
 1981; O'Connor, J.J., (all); Omaha World Herald 1980;
 Oppenheim 1972; Oresman 1982; Owens [1978], 1980;
 Passell 1981; Perking 1979; Phillips 1971; Portland
Oregonian 1982; Powell 1982; Rice 1984; Rosen 1980;
 Salganik 1982, 1983; San Jose Mercury 1977; San Diego
Union 1978; Schomisch 1981; Schwartz, T., 1980, 1981a,
 1981b; Self-Reliance 1981; Sima 1981; Sorenson 1983;

Stier 1982; Stoney 1981; Strickler 1983; Taylor 1982; Third Coast 1983; Thomas 1980; Tucci 1983a, 1983b, 1983c; Van der Veer 1979; Wadler 1974; Whitehouse 1981; Williams 1980; Wisser (all); Wittek 1973; Wyoming State Tribune 1975.

13. Atheist Madalyn Murray O'Hair has a network of about 30 channels. Various religious groups have regional and national distribution. A conservative veterans group distributes nationally. See the section on Alternative Views for information on growing national distribution of this alternative news magazine program. Also, people trade tapes on an individual basis to show on their respective access channels.
14. Many of these attacks at the local level can be found in endnote 12 above. Good examples are Access 1982g; Barbaro 1983; Behre 1983; Bond 1979; Durkin 1983; Feinstein 1984; Owens 1980; Sorenson 1983; Tucci 1983c.
15. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section will come from Townsend (1981).

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 - 1975d Harlem Documentary to be Aired Despite Protests. 16 June, 18.
 - 1976a 22 March, 5,9.
 - 1976b 31 May, 12
 - 1976c 14 June, 22.
 - 1976d The FCC "Insures" Institutional Involvement in Broadcasting. 28 June, 12.
 - 1976e 1 December, 10-14.
 - 1977 3 December, 4.
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 - 1981c 23 February, 8.
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 - 1981e Will Boulder Case Demolish Cable Regulation? 4 May, 1.
 - 1981f 4 May, 2.
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 - 1981i 1 June, 3.
 - 1981j 13 July.
 - 1981k Women's Cable TV Clearinghouse. 13 July, 4.
 - 1981l Media Reformers Attack Backdoor Deregulation. 27 July, 1.
 - 1981m 10 August, 2,3,4.
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 - 1981w 16 November, 2.
 - 1981x 30 November, 2.
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